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Renewable energy transitions are accelerating in the Global South, nowhere more quickly 
than in semi-arid rural India. Expanding energy production in India is seen as necessary to raise 
the 363 million poor out of poverty.  India is swiftly transitioning to low-carbon electricity 
generation through solar park development. Indeed, solar parks comprise the lion’s share of India’s 
Nationally Determined Contributions to the 2015 UN Paris Climate Agreement to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Despite exceeding emissions reduction targets, many social 
development claims remain unrealized on the ground. Using two solar parks as case studies 
(Gujarat Solar Park and Kurnool Solar Park), this dissertation asks the following 4 research 
questions: 1) How are solar development and project-associated land enclosures discursively 
rationalized by the state?; 2) How and through what processes are the costs and benefits of the 
Gujarat Solar Park and Kurnool Solar Park distributed across differently situated individuals?; 
3) How are project-associated land enclosures resisted by adjacent resource-dependent people? 
4) Does the Gujarat Solar Park influence already gendered social-economic-political 
asymmetries? To answer these questions, this dissertation draws on and seeks to advance 
scholarship from feminist political ecology and critical development studies focused on gendered 
agrarian change, land enclosures and renewable energy development. I conducted fieldwork in 
India in 2018 using mixed methods and field-based research., including critical discourse analysis, 
household surveys, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. 
This dissertation argues that solar parks are rationalized via discursive formations of the 
climate crisis, economic development and ecological modernization. These discursive formations 
rationalize greener capital accumulation in neoliberal India that don’t address asymmetric power 
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relations, despite discourses otherwise (research question 1). This study identifies regimes of 
dispossession via an ascendant resource/state looking to capitalize on ‘wasteland’ geographies. 
The modalities by which solar development transpires dispossesses smallholder peasants of land 
and livelihoods, creating a surplus population without employment opportunities (research 
question 2). Resistance against solar park development ‘from below’ takes diverse forms, 
including protests, blockades, lawsuits, slander and even suicide. Resistance among affected 
populations is often contingent on social positionality (research question 3). Land enclosures have 
also dispossessed resource-dependent women of access to firewood, producing new patterns of 
gendered social differentiation. Intersectional subject-positions are (re)produced vis-à-vis the 
exclusion of access to firewood in the land enclosed for the solar park, lack of employment at the 
solar park, and exclusionary Corporate Social Responsibility activities. Lower-caste and lower-
class women from adjacent villages affectively express their resistance in emotional geographies 
(research question 4).  
India has become a global power broker for solar development. Through its new leadership 
in the International Solar Alliance, India will seek to latitudinally export its large-scale 
dispossessive model of solar development throughout the Global South. Ergo, India’s solar state 
has become a major geopolitical force that is reshaping relations of production in agrarian systems 
globally. The vast dispossession experienced by smallholding peasants in these case studies has 
implications throughout the Global South and reestablishes the importance of answering the 
classical agrarian question in the neoliberal Anthropocene. Indisputably, a breakneck transition to 
renewable energy generation in India is necessary to stave off additional emissions driving a 
changing climate system that delivers unforetold present and future natural and political hazards 
in this underdeveloped nation. However, low-carbon electricity generation doesn’t positively 
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“transform the lives” of adjacent residents, a raison d'être for solar park development. While the 
Government of India develops more solar parks to profitably mitigate climate change and generate 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Fist Impressions 
Stumbling in the pouring rain, the drunken farmer lunged forward and swung a punch. I dodged. 
He grabbed my shirt, ripping a button off the middle. In total shock, my field assistants pulled me 
into the corner of the shed, away from the ensuing altercation. Glaring at us between snarls and 
exclamatory exhales, he snatched up our clipboard, extracted the survey questionnaire, and ripped 
it down the middle, tossing it out into the rain. He accused us of trying to steal his land to build 
the Kurnool Solar Park, an unfounded charge with enough (neo)colonial veracity that no official 
documentation, university affiliation, or village council approval could easily explain away. A 
semi-circle of seven village farmers formed around us. Embarrassed by the scene and equally 
drunk, a village headman stepped into the enclave to reprimand the farmer, chests pressed together 
and forearms locked. The headman defended my presence in the village as a researcher, against 
the drunken farmer’s understandably visceral rage, and proceeded to push him further away from 
the scene. He shouted: “How could the American steal your land? You haven’t signed anything!” 
The disgraced farmer smacked him across the jaw. Like a coiled cobra, the headman thrust him 
backwards into the mud as the farmer dragged him down as well. The two men proceeded to roll 
around in the heaviest monsoon rainstorm I had ever experienced in India, back and forth, on 
bottom then on top of each other, exchanging muddy blows. Later, I learned that several farmers 
in this village were dispossessed of their land for the solar project. I arrived at this village as a 
researcher conducting household surveys on the social dimensions of solar park development. But 








This vignette of my first day of fieldwork in Sakunala village (Figure 1), bordering the vast 
expanse of the Kurnool Solar Park in Andhra Pradesh, reflects emerging socioecological frictions 
within low-carbon energy transitions in the Global South. Within India, the spread of solar energy 
is socially and politically charged. Unquestionably, solar development is necessary in India to 
mitigate climate change. However, it is creating many injustices that policies claim to address but 
ultimately do not. My dissertation examines these tensions. Many residents near the Kurnool Solar 
Park, and others like it, have been dispossessed of their lands and livelihoods. Like the angry 
farmer from Sakunala, they are understandably irate. Taking my differently-situated positionality 
in the context of the colonial history of India, he saw me as an agent of dispossession. Punchy 
beginnings to fieldwork in this region yielded many insights and had a deep impact on my research 




Five months prior to this fist fight in Sakunala, I began fieldwork in India with a Fulbright-Hays 
Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship to investigate the social dimensions of solar 
park development in Gujarat state. Having just concluded my fieldwork in villages bordering 
India’s first solar park (Gujarat Solar Park), I decided to scale-up the study and investigate similar 
questions with another solar park, comparable to the former. India is in the midst of a “solar boom” 
in a race to achieve emissions reductions targets established through the 2015 Paris Agreement to 
mitigate climate change. However, solar park development has many consequences for farmers, 
like the man in Sakunala and others in adjacent villages. Some of their experiences and 
perspectives are documented in this dissertation. 
 
Through its leadership in the International Solar Alliance, India is recognized as a world leader in 
solar development for its role in facilitating large-scale climate change mitigation in the Global 
South (UNEP, 2018). Yet India is the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse gases (Olivier et 
al, 2017). By 2030, India is likely to produce 2-3 times more greenhouse gases than present rates 
(Dubash et al, 2015), despite rapid scaling-up of large-scale solar infrastructure domestically 
(Government of India, 2017). The nation’s electricity supply is expected to increase 3-4 times in 
the next decade (Dubash et al, 2015), thanks to both solar and coal. India also has the world’s 
second largest population (Government of India, 2011), a young population with big plans. As in 
the context of other developing countries, expanded energy production (including renewables) and 
concomitant rising CO2 levels are seen as necessary to help raise India’s 363 million poor out of 
poverty. However, it remains understudied how India’s energy future will impact the lives of 
historically marginalized populations. The promise of solar parks weighs heavily in government 
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discourse and international negotiations. And yet, their weight is felt entirely differently between 
urban and rural spaces and even by adjacent villages. For the farmer in Sakunala, the weight is just 
too much to bear and he is not alone in his indignation. There is a growing sense of “not in my 
backyard” (NIMBY) concerns regarding the siting of renewable energy projects in rural India 
(Kapur, 2014). As I demonstrate in this dissertation, many of these concerns are justified. Using 
qualitative data and theoretical framings from the field of political ecology, this dissertation will 
explore the discursive power, material dispossession and gendered impacts of solar development 
in India through a study of two solar parks in two different regions of the country.  
 
2. Rise of Solar Energy 
The geographic region of South Asia is considered highly vulnerable to climate-related impacts 
(Cruz et al, 2007), with great variation in vulnerability among and within nations (Thornton et al., 
2014). Renewable energy technologies (i.e. solar photovoltaics) are largely considered to be a 
means to mitigate climate change while also ensuring energy security long into the future (IPCC, 
2011). Globally, utility-scale photovoltaic solar systems have been scaling up rapidly as costs have 
been dropping precipitously (IRENA, 2018). Developing nations added 94 GW of solar power to 
their electrical grids in 2017, with China at first place adding 53 GW (Climatescope, 2018). At 
second place, India has added over 10 GW solar in 2017 and has reached an average of 8 GW 
annual grow in solar installations (Climatescope, 2018). 
 
India has one of the world’s most competitive solar markets (TERI, 2018). With an average cost 
of $0.035 per kilowatt-hour, solar energy in India is cheaper than energy sourced from fossil fuels 
(Tongia, 2018; Safi, 2017). From 2010-2017, India has seen a 70% decline in utility-scale solar 
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PV systems (IRENA, 2018). Presently, India has the capacity to manufacture 3.1 GW of solar cells 
and 8.8 GW of solar modules. However, only 10% of solar installations use domestic cells and 
modules, as most solar products are imported from China and Malaysia (TERI, 2018). It is for this 
reason that the Government of India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) has 
imposed a tariff of between Rs.0.38 to Rs. 0.50 for each imported solar unit for two years (TERI, 
2018), a policy that is likely to increase the risk of solar investments (Kumar, 2018). However, 
this is unlikely to stall solar India’s momentum. To great international acclaim, Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi has also spearheaded the International Solar Alliance with France to establish 1000 
MW of solar energy in less developed regions that lie between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic 
of Capricorn by 2030, for which he was recognized as a policy leader and awarded the UN’s 2018 
Champions of the Earth Award (UNEP, 2018). Needless to say, the nation has become 
synonymous with the rise of solar development in the Global South. 
 
India’s aggressive expansion of domestic solar development is due to favorable national and sub-
national policy frameworks, to which I now turn. In a strategic move to position the nation as a 
global leader in solar energy, the Government of India (GoI) established the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Solar Mission (JNNSM) to facilitate the requisite policy conditions for a swift diffusion 
of solar development (MNRE, 2012). Currently, the JNNSM scheme is in its third phase of 
implementation (2017-2022). In aggregate, the JNNSM schemes contribute towards GoI’s 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) to the 2015 Paris Agreement to prevent more than 2 
degrees Celsius warming globally by achieving 100 GW of solar energy nationwide by 2022, 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 33% and to achieve 40% of total installed electrical generation 
from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030 (GoI, 2015). During FY2018-FY2020, India’s Ministry of 
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New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) plans to hold auctions for 80 GW of solar energy (TERI, 
2018), much of which will likely be utility-scale solar projects.  
 
The JNNSM projects are roughly divided into utilities projects (i.e. ground-mounted solar panels, 
solar panels covering canal extensions) and residential projects (i.e. solar water heaters, solar 
irrigation pumps). At present, there is more than 20 GW of solar power installed, of which utility-
scale is roughly 18.4 GW (Sanjay, 2018). Many of the utility-scale JNNSM projects are ground-
mounted solar panels (MNRE, 2016; Yenneti, 2016) installed on government-owned “marginal” 
lands or brownfield sites (Rignall, 2016), utilized by agropastoralists for grazing, fodder and 
fuelwood foraging (MNRE, 2016; Yenneti and Day, 2015), explored in-depth in chapters 5 and 6. 
The majority of these large utility-scale solar projects are developed inside enormous solar parks, 
spanning thousands of acres (i.e. Gujarat Solar Park, Kurnool Solar Park). According to the 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (2016: 2), a solar park is “a concentrated zone of 
development of solar power generation projects and provides developers an area that is well 
characterized, with proper infrastructure and access to amenities and where the risk of the projects 
can be minimized.” Of these, so-called ultra-mega solar parks are those with a minimum generating 
capacity of 500 MW. The rapid development of ultra-mega solar parks will facilitate this urgent 
scale-up of renewable energy capacity. Post-Paris Agreement 2015, there are more than 25 solar 
parks being developed throughout the nation, largely in rural spaces of dryland regions (MNRE, 
2014). As previously mentioned, this dissertation will investigate the political economy, policy 
frameworks, and social dimensions (across caste, class and gender) of two solar parks in two 
different states: the Gujarat Solar Park (GSP) in Gujarat state and the Kurnool Solar Park (KSP) 
in Andhra Pradesh. The GSP was India’s first solar park. As of writing this dissertation, the KSP 
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is India’s largest completed solar park. The next section will attempt to situate these parks within 
global problems and identify how this dissertation contributes to our understanding of these 
problems. 
 
3. Research Questions 
I was inspired to examine the promise and pitfalls of solar development by a circuitous career in 
development, policy, activism and academia, loosely centered around the social dimensions of 
environmental problems. Previous fieldwork in Gujarat, India researching climate change 
adaptation and vulnerability among farmers with a Fulbright-Nehru research fellowship (2014-
2015) presented a wellspring of context, connections and curiosity. Upon beginning my PhD in 
2015, a close reading of literatures from the diverse thematic areas of renewable energy, gender 
and development, climate policy and issues related to social justice in South Asia left me with 
several unanswered questions regarding solar development in India.  
 
Globally, solar development is situated between the need to mitigate climate change, the land these 
electrical infrastructures require, and the effects these land-intensive transitions have on the 
ground. Solar parks require thousands of acres of land and India is developing many of them to 
meet its Paris Agreement commitments to mitigate climate change. They are often built on 
‘wastelands’ or smallholders farm land. However, India’s agricultural sector experiences severe 
land constraints. In fact, the history of rural development in India punctuated by contestations over 
land. Additionally, land acquired for the solar parks occurs through uneven processes of the Land 
Acquisition Act of 2013. Each of these phenomena are explored in this dissertation. Given land 
constraints, how India meet its Paris Agreement commitments? What does this mean for nearby 
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smallholder agropastoralists like the Sakunala farmer? These overarching questions have both 
inspired and guided this dissertation study. The following research questions (RQ) emerge from 
the aforementioned overarching tensions and are an attempt to contribute to our understanding of 
them: 
 
1) How are solar development and project-associated land enclosures discursively rationalized 
by the state? 
2) How and through what processes are the costs and benefits of the Gujarat Solar Park and 
Kurnool Solar Park distributed across differently situated individuals? 
3) How are project-associated land enclosures resisted by adjacent resource-dependent people? 
4) Does the Gujarat Solar Park influence already gendered social-economic-political 
asymmetries? 
 
Through mixed methods fieldwork and this written dissertation, I attempt to answer each of these 
questions. Each of these questions are explored in depth. RQ 1 is explored in chapter 4. RQ 2 and 
RQ 3 are explored in chapter 5. RQ 4 is explored in chapter 6. Through answering these research 
questions, this dissertation will provide a critical perspective and useful contributions to lacunae 
within disparate yet overlapping fields of scholarship explored below. 
 
4. Scholarly Contributions 
First and foremost, this dissertation draws from the diverse “field of practice” of political ecology 
(Robbins, 2012). Mooring my intellectual endeavors here has provided me the nourishment of 
deep disciplinary roots and far-reaching cross-disciplinary branches. This dissertation aims to 
contribute to conversations and advance scholarship within the cognate fields of critical agrarian 
studies (RQ 2 and 3), feminist political ecology (RQ 4) and critical development studies (RQ 1). I 
contribute to the broader field of critical agrarian studies through my exploration of the causal 
mechanisms for the material and discursive dispossession of marginalized peasants in the 
9 
 
sociopolitical space of renewable energy transitions. Drawing upon debates from agrarian 
Marxism (i.e. Kautsky, 1988; Levien, 2018), this research reestablishes the urgency of responding 
to the classical agrarian question in the context of low-carbon energy transitions. Additionally, this 
study presents novel insights to resistance movements against renewable energy infrastructures. 
Drawing upon conceptual frameworks of resistance from Borras and Franco (2013) and Scott 
(1985), This research complicates essentialized notions of unified peasant resistance in the face of 
agrarian transformation and resource dispossession. 
 
My research contributes to feminist political ecology by analyzing the embodied contestations of 
livelihood impacts within changing resource regimes, site-specific intersectional subjectivities 
within multi-scalar structures of power, and asymmetries of access to resources and decision-
making (Sultana, 2009; Nightingale, 2011). Specifically, I draw upon Mollett and Faria’s (2013) 
postcolonial and intersectional approach to FPE to analyze social differentiation through solar 
development occurring in my study sites. 
 
This research contributes to critical development studies, providing a textured analysis of the 
sociopolitical impacts that specific climate-related interventions (i.e. solar parks) have on 
differently situated rural populations. Drawing on a conceptual framework from Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001), I critique apolitical discourses of climate change mitigation. Further, I explore the 
uneven development of rural spaces through the lens of accumulation by dispossession (Levien, 
2018). This dissertation is an intervention to each of the aforementioned literatures. Below, I trace 




5. Chapter Outlines 
This dissertation proceeds in 6 substantive chapters. Chapter 2 provides background and context 
to solar park development in India. I locate my case study within several policy frameworks across 
multiple scales of governance, from the UNFCCC Paris Agreement down to state solar policies. I 
conclude this chapter by pivoting towards identifying institutions and actors involved in the 
development, operations and management of both solar parks.  
 
Chapter 3 explains the methods and methodological approaches by which I conducted fieldwork. 
Beginning at the beginning, I describe how the project was conceived and provide justification for 
both field sites. I then describe in detail how I conducted 400 household surveys across 8 villages 
in two solar regions, 84 semi-structured interviews with villagers, bureaucrats and solar park 
employees, discourse analysis of 26 policy and technical documents, my approach to participant 
observation and method of geospatial mapping. I also conduct a reflexive examination of my own 
positionality and how this influenced my fieldwork. I then describe each case study region and the 
2 solar parks in detail. This chapter concludes with village profiles where fieldwork was 
conducted. 
 
Chapter 4 will explore the following research question: How are solar development and project-
associated land enclosures discursively rationalized by the state? This chapter explores the 
discursive formations that rationalize solar park development, including the climate crisis, 
economic development and ecological modernization discourses. These discursive formations are 
(re)produced and circulated via public institutions to ensure a techno-managerial approach to 
mitigating climate change. This chapter asserts that these discursive formations comprise a deus 
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ex machina that rationalizes capital accumulation in neoliberal India (albeit with a greener face) 
without addressing asymmetric power relations. These solar parks do not positively “transform the 
lives” of residents, a raison d'être for solar development. 
 
Chapter 5 will explore the following two research questions: How and through what processes are 
the costs and benefits of the Gujarat Solar Park and Kurnool Solar Park distributed across 
differently situated individuals?; How are project-associated land enclosures resisted by adjacent 
resource-dependent people? This chapter elucidates patterns of dispossession within villages 
bordering the GSP and KSP in detail. Many people have lost their land and livelihoods to solar 
power project developers, seeking to capitalize on government ‘wastelands.’ Despite promises of 
economic development, most dispossessed peasants have not been offered gainful employment at 
the solar parks. This leaves them in a more precarious situation than before the solar park arrived. 
Further, I explore the modalities by which dispossessed peasants are resisting the solar 
development. 
 
Chapter 6 will explore the following research question: Does the Gujarat Solar Park influence 
already gendered social-economic-political asymmetries? I utilize a postcolonial and 
intersectional approach to investigate the (re)production of social difference at the GSP. The 
enclosure of land for the solar park prevents access to natural resources (i.e. firewood, fodder) to 
smallholders and pastoralists. This has a disproportionate impact on women in nearby villages, 
whose daily tasks of household reproduction include resource procurement. Adding insult to 
injury, this solar park operates within policy frameworks that boast female empowerment and has 
hosted a corporate responsibility scheme that sought to develop marketable skill-sets within these 
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same women. This chapter explores the embodied experiences and emotional geographies of many 
peasants within villages bordering the GSP. 
 
Reflecting on the research conducted, this dissertation concludes with a pivot towards uncertainty. 
Chapter 7 opens with a vignette about a solar engineer from the Kurnool Solar Park who admits 
that his staff does not interact with local people. I assert that solar parks present us with an aporia, 
simultaneously offering grand solutions to climate crises as it dispossesses and marginalizes 
smallholding farmers and agropastoralists. I conclude by discussing the broader significance of 
this dissertation research. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To conclude this introduction, it is my hope that readers will find this study both provocative and 
productive. May scholars of development in South Asia consider and critique my conclusions and 
strive towards more equitable approaches to solar development in the region to ensure that 
peasants, like the angry farmer from Sakunala, are not excluded from the benefits of renewable 
energy transitions. The pace of solar park development in India is only accelerating, as are the 
stakes. In the next chapter, I will provide background information on the policy frameworks under 












CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
 
1. Introduction 
India is currently approaching solar development with tremendous scale and celerity. The solar 
parks discussed in this dissertation (GSP, KSP) are emblematic of India’s “solar boom.” Presently, 
there are many solar parks in India that merit critical examination. However, as I detail below and 
in the subsequent chapter, I selected the GSP and KSP for their historic and present significance 
within this national moment of expansion in solar development. The GSP became the de facto 
model upon which all subsequent solar parks were designed; the director of a company operating 
at the KSP informed me that they consulted with the GSP’s developer prior to commencing 
operations. Solar parks are implemented and regulated through many institutions and various 
policy frameworks, all operating at different scales of governance and financial management. 
Although implemented under similar institutional and policy frameworks with detailed guidelines 
for solar park development, each park is elaborated within unique sociopolitical contexts, as this 
dissertation will reveal. In this chapter, I will provide context and content needed to understand 
solar development in the two case studies of this dissertation research, moving from the macro to 
micro spatial and political scales. For clarity of argument and readability, I focus on only the 
institutions and policy frameworks relevant to my case studies. 
 
2. Policy Frameworks 
2.1. Kyoto Protocol 
In an attempt to mitigate the pace of climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) drafted the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was created, wherein sustainable development projects 
(i.e. solar parks, wind farms) may generate Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) units, 
reductions in CO2 output, valued in emissions trading schemes (UNFCCC, 2016). Many of these 
projects involve renewable energy generation (i.e. solar, wind). The UNFCCC designed CDMs to 
provide “gender positive” or “gender neutral” impacts for women (UNFCCC, 2012). Of particular 
concern to Kyoto’s CDM are countries with high emissions that are expected to continue growing 
in future decades, like India. Many solar parks in India are CDMs and still generate CERs, of 
which there is an oversupply due to a virtual collapse in carbon markets. CERs are not presently 
trading much in India but the institutional and economic infrastructure around CDMs are still in 
place for many climate mitigation projects and infrastructure. Presently, India’s solar parks 
comprise the lion’s share of contributions towards another UN protocol, the Paris Agreement. 
 
2.2. Paris Agreement 
The 2015 Paris Agreement is an agreement within the UNFCCC that is designed to establish global 
support for confronting climate change. Specifically, the Paris Agreement seeks to establish a 
global framework for nation-states to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and implement adaptation 
initiatives. Each nation-state that committed to this agreement was required to establish Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs), wherein each individual country independently proposes 
measures to mitigate climate change by reducing their absolute emissions levels and reduce 
emissions intensity per unit of GDP growth. Developing nations that have signed the Paris 
Agreement can access funds for their NDCs through the UNFCCC’s Green Climate Fund and the 
Global Environment Facility (Climate Focus, 2016). The Government of India’s NDC for the 2015 
Paris Climate Agreement establishes “the planning and implementation of actions to enhance 
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climate resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change” (Government of India, 2015: 30). 
Here are a few of India’s NDCs: 1) reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33-35% from 
2005 levels by 2030; 2) achieve 40% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil 
fuel-based energy resources by 2030; 3) create additional carbon sinks of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent through reforestation and afforestation by 2030 (Climate Action Tracker, 2019). 
India’s Paris Agreement NDC document is a showcase of sustainability-focused initiatives, 
including renewable energy schemes (i.e. solar, wind, hydro), energy efficiency schemes, a smart 
cities campaign, sustainable transportation schemes, afforestation initiatives, pollution abatement 
activities, and civic and corporate social responsibility schemes related to the environment. India’s 
NDC states that all measures taken under this policy represent challenges to address “gender 
equality and women empowerment” (Government of India, 2015: 4), The solar parks discussed in 
this dissertation comprise a large part of India’s NDC goal of achieving 40% of total installed 
electrical generation from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030 (Government of India, 2015). Without 
large-scale solar development, India’s Paris Agreement commitments will be virtually 
unattainable by 2022. Through the Paris Agreement, India was able to position itself as a global 
leader on climate change mitigation in the Global South through its partnership with France in the 
International Solar Alliance, discussed below. 
 
2.3. International Solar Alliance (ISA) 
Established on the sidelines of the 21st Conference of Parties in 2015 that resulted in the Paris 
Agreement was the International Solar Alliance (ISA). Prime Minister Modi announced the idea 
of the ISA in November 2015, just prior to the UN Paris Agreement. The ISA is a treaty-based 
intergovernmental organization, initiated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi (India), comprising 
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121 countries between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. The initiative is to create 
1000 MW of solar development by 2030 throughout the tropical zone of the planet to mitigate 
climate change, at a projected cost of $1 trillion USD. The headquarters of the ISA is located in 
Gurugram, Haryana, India. India is one of the leading members of the ISA, pushing towards 100 
MW generation of solar energy by 2022. Among the initiatives of the ISA is to make solar 
photovoltaic technologies more affordable and accessible to poorer countries with abundant solar 
radiation. The World Bank has collaborated with the ISA to assist with funding for solar 
development among ISA-affiliated countries. Striving to be the global OPEC of solar, the ISA will 
export the model of solar parks latitudinally throughout the Global South.  
 
2.4. National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) 
The ISA and Paris Agreement follow a longer-term concern in India with climate change. On June 
30, 2008, the Government of India (GoI) released the National Action Plan on Climate Change 
(NAPCC) as an ostensibly unified national strategy for climate change mitigation, adaptation and 
sustainable development. NAPCC developed eight national missions, including: the Jawaharlal 
National Solar Mission, National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency, National Mission on 
Sustainable Habitat, National Water Mission, National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan 
Ecosystem, National Mission for a Green India, National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture, and 
a National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change (Government of India, 2008). 
These eight national missions remain India’s flagship environmental schemes. This document is 
largely recognized as India’s first step towards committing to a more sustainable path of 
development. Most subsequent environmental programs, launched at both the national and sub-




2.5. Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) 
On January 11, 2010, former Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh launched the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) as part of the Government of India’s National 
Action Plan on Climate Change to promote solar power through state governments (MNRE, 2010). 
The scheme was designed to undergo three phases: Phase I (2010-2013), Phase II (2013-2017) and 
Phase III (2017-2022). The initial target of JNNSM was to achieve 20GW of total installed solar 
energy capacity by 2022 (MNRE, 2010), which was revised in 2015 by Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi to 100GW by 2022 (MNRE, 2015). The JNNSM program achieved 20 GW of solar power 
by January 2018, four years ahead of the 2022 deadline, of which utility-scale solar is ~18.4 GW 
(i.e. GSP) and rooftop solar is ~1.6 GW (Sanjay, 2018). Prior to launching JNNSM, India’s solar 
power capacity was just 17.8MW (MNRE, 2012). The JNNSM program strives to achieve tariff 
parity with conventional fossil fuels by 2022 (MNRE, 2018). As mentioned earlier, achieving 
India’s Paris Agreement NDCs is nearly impossible without utility-scale JNNSM solar parks. 
 
2.6. State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC) 
Presently, 29 states and 5 union territories (out of 29 and 7 respectively) of India have submitted 
State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC) that detail policies, projects and processes being 
implemented to address climate change at a sub-national scale. These SAPCCs are local policy 
frameworks that fall under the national-scale NAPCC. The SAPCC for Andhra Pradesh commits 
to establishing incentives for a state-wide rooftop solar power generation scheme and begin 
promoting affordable alternative energy systems (i.e. solar parks). Gujarat’s SAPCC commits to 
promoting renewable energy sources, including solar parks and rooftop solar (focusing on 
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Gandhinagar as a future “solar city”). Within the Government of Gujarat’s State Action Plan on 
Climate Change, women are identified as a being a vulnerable population, stating that climate 
change may negatively impact their access to natural resources, like fuelwood. “Women who have 
the responsibility of securing water, food and fuel face the greatest challenges. In addition, unequal 
access to resources, and to decision-making processes make them more vulnerable” (Government 
of Gujarat, 2014: 191). The Government of Andhra Pradesh’s State Action Plan on Climate 
Change does not discuss gender issues directly, beyond identifying a disproportionate prevalence 
of micronutrient deficiency in women (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2012). 
 
3. Institutions 
There are many public and private institutions involved in the development, operation and 
regulation of solar parks at multiple scales of governance. The plurality of institutions involved 
creates a patchwork of intersecting, overlapping and opposing bureaucratic procedures which often 
compliments but occasionally complicates solar park development. As this interplay is not a vital 
element of my central thesis, I do not detail the complexity of solar park governance. However, I 
believe the below graphic is illustrative of this complexity. Figure 2 details the institutional 






Figure 2: The institutional structure of solar parks under the Government of India’s JNNSM scheme (Source: Asian 
Development Bank, 2017). 
 
 
The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Solar Energy Corporation of India, State distribution 
and transmission utilities, POWERGRID, NTPC are all public institutions. Additionally, both of 
the two solar park project developers (SPPDs) that constructed the solar parks explored in this 
dissertation are companies owned and managed by public-sector institutions. However, there are 
also a few solar parks in India that are developed and managed by private sector companies (i.e. 
Kamuthi Solar Power Project in Tamil Nadu). Given the complex governance structure of 
institutions and policies around the solar park, I will attempt to only highlight those relevant to this 





3.1. Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) 
The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy is the Government of India (GoI) nodal agency for 
renewable energy development and generation. MNRE currently has many schemes relating to 
solar energy, including the JNNSM scheme, which includes both grid-connected and off-grid solar 
installations. MNRE also established the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) to manage all 
solar parks under the JNNSM scheme. 
 
3.2. Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) 
The Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) is a public institution established by GoI’s Ministry 
of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to facilitate and manage projects under the JNNSM 
scheme. Located in New Delhi, SECI serves as an intermediary between MNRE and solar park 
developers, facilitating funds from MNRE to develop the solar parks in specific states. Each state 
seeking to host a JNNSM solar park must work through SECI to access necessary government 
funding. Additionally, SECI is the government institution that provides oversight over each solar 
park, in accordance with national and sub-national policies on solar development. Further, SECI 
establishes incentive structures for states to vie for solar funding, effectively inducing a state of 
competitive federalism to rapidly advance solar development throughout India. This can be done 
through national-scale auctions for solar projects, wherein developers propose bids for solar tariffs, 
or for individual solar parks. 
 
3.3. Solar Power Parks Developers (SPPD) 
The Solar Power Parks Developers (SPPDs) are institutions responsible for developing the solar 
parks. They are responsible for land acquisition (discussed in chapter 5), receiving authorization 
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and clearances and managing financial transactions between all actors involved. Next, I will 
discuss 2 public institutions that served as SPPDs to the Gujarat Solar Park and the Kurnool 
Solar Park. 
 
3.3.1. Gujarat Power Corporation Limited (GPCL) 
The Gujarat Power Corporation Limited (GPCL) is a state government company that was 
designated as the nodal agency to serve as SPPD for the GSP. As such, they were responsible for 
land acquisition and other bureaucratic procedures necessary to establish the GSP. GPCL has 
successfully obtained 30 companies to establish solar arrays at the GSP (detailed in next chapter). 
The private companies operating in the GSP are not mandated to implement social development 
schemes, but many of them do. Many of these private companies advertise their generation of solar 
energy to be a corporate social responsibility scheme. On their website, GPCL has committed to 
improving the lives of women and children: “GPCL has initiated some significant participatory 
and non-participatory roles in the areas of upliftment of Women & Child.” GPCL also discusses 
future corporate social responsibility activities envisioned for the region: “In the immediate future, 
we intend to widen our scope towards the development & strengthening of girl child [sic]” (GPCL, 
2015).  
 
3.3.2. Andhra Pradesh Solar Power Corporation Limited (APSPCL) 
The Andhra Pradesh Solar Power Corporation Private Limited (APSPCL) is a joint venture 
company of the state and central government, specifically the Solar Energy Corporation of India 
(SECI), Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation (APGENCO) and New and Renewable 
Energy Development Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited (NREDCAP). APSPCL is the SPPD 
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for the KSP, managing land acquisition and bureaucratic procedures. APSPCL facilitated the 
establishment of GreenKo, Softbank, Azure and Adani corporations’ solar arrays within the park. 
As private corporations operating within a solar park established the government, these companies 
are not required to implement social development schemes, although many of them do. Further, 
these companies consider the production of solar energy in the KSP to be a form of corporate 
social responsibility and advertise it thusly. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In sum, solar park development occurs through myriad policy frameworks and institutional 
structures at various scales of governance. This has facilitated the rapid spread of solar technology 
throughout the nation. To demonstrate this, I have chosen to focus on a handful of actors, 
institutions and policies from 2 solar parks. This constriction of focus reflects the research 
questions I explore in this dissertation. It is my hope that this background chapter serves as a 
resource for readers who “get lost” while reading my dissertation. Unavoidably, this dissertation 
research relies heavily on acronyms for unwieldy names of institutions and policies, a practice 
very common in India. Readers may refer back to this chapter for acronyms mentioned or for 





CHAPTER 3: METHODS AND STUDY AREA 
 
1. Overview 
As revealed in the previous chapter, solar park development is politically complex. This 
dissertation will also reveal that beyond complexity, it is also contentious. To examine the 
sociopolitical complexities and frictions at the heart of solar park development in India, I 
strategically chose to undertake a mixed methods and field-based approach. Fieldwork was 
conducted in the Indian locations of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, New Delhi and Hyderabad. Below, 
I will explore each method and study area in detail. The methods utilized to conduct this research 
include household surveys, semi-structured interviews, participant observation and discourse 
analysis. These methods were selected both to answer the questions asked, as well as to assist with 
the triangulation of research findings. This approach and fieldwork itself were influenced by my 
unique positionality as a researcher and was not without its limitations, both discussed in this 
chapter. Now, allow me to begin at the beginning. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Introduction to Methods 
As Edward Said argued in Beginnings (1978), once you have ideas about a project, you have 
already begun the project. The seeds of this dissertation were planted in the fertile ground of a 
previous research project in Gujarat, India, supported by a Fulbright-Nehru research fellowship 
(2014-2015). In collaboration with Professor Amit Garg of the Indian Institute of Management-
Ahmedabad (with whom I collaborate again in this dissertation), we performed a comparative 
study of farmers in three villages in different agroecological regions of Gujarat state, looking for 
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adaptations to climate change, adaptive capacity of these villages and local-scale institutions, as 
well as perceptions of vulnerability of the farmers themselves (Stock et al, 2019). Despite this 
project focusing on climate adaptation, I became interested in how climate mitigation projects 
interact with social systems and what affect this has on social vulnerability. The Gujarat Solar Park 
(GSP) is very well-known throughout the country, especially in the state of Gujarat. During my 
research and travels, people would reference it, I would encounter signs advertising it and 
government agencies would boast about it. This project idea began to bloom before I had the 
necessary conditions to explore it (i.e. admission to doctoral program, funding, time). Pace Said, 
I suppose I had already begun this dissertation years ago. 
 
Building off of my experience utilizing survey methods from the previous project in India, I 
decided to incorporate them again for this dissertation. I believe that a mixed methods approach 
can help answer different types of questions, as well as assist in triangulating responses for 
accuracy. Thus, I decided this mixed methods approach would include household survey 
questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, participant observation and discourse analysis. These 
methods were conducted from January to August 2019, in the Indian locations of Gujarat state, 
Andhra Pradesh state, New Delhi and Hyderabad. These methods were chosen for the research 
study for the following reasons: 1) fit of methods for the type of research being conducted; 2) 
standard suite of methods for the sub-fields of geography and cognate fields I conceptually draw 
upon; 3) appropriate data collection methods for the locations in which fieldwork is being 
conducted; 4) methods provide appropriate explanations for the specific research questions being 




2.2. Institutional Review Approval and Research Clearance 
I received full IRB approval to conduct this research from the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign’s Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (IRB Exempt Approval #18363) on 
January 8, 2018. Likewise, I received the Department of Education’s Protection of Human 
Subjects clearance (P022A170064) on January 9, 2018. Additionally, I received full IRB approval 
from the Indian Institute of Management-Ahmedabad (IIM-A) on January 25, 2018. All research 
conducted for this dissertation research was undertaken in accordance with the ethical review 
guidelines for each aforementioned institution. 
 
2.3. Justification for Field Sites 
In my research on the social dimensions of the GSP, I decided to conduct comparative research in 
four adjacent villages. The comparison villages were chosen with robust selection criteria (Table 
1). I wanted to scale-up this comparison study by conducting similar research at another solar park 
in India. The reason for a larger comparative study was to understand whether the processes 
occurring at the GSP are unique or more general to solar park development in other areas of India. 
If the processes at the GSP are unique, how, in what ways and why does it differ from other solar 
parks? If the processes at GSP are similar to other solar parks, why is it the same despite different 
political and economic processes, and local conditions? Thus, I decided to investigate similar 
research questions at the Kurnool Solar Park (KSP) in Andhra Pradesh, the beginning phase of a 
more substantive engagement with the Andhra Pradesh geographical region. 
 
To ensure a methodologically defensible study, the additional solar park and surrounding villages 
must be comparable in many ways to those in Patan district, Gujarat. Both solar parks were selected 
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using specific selection criteria (Table 1). According to 2010 statistics, Patan district of Gujarat 
(containing the GSP and study villages) receives an annual mean rainfall of 529.8mm, compared 
with 667.9mm in the state of Gujarat (Indicus Analytics, 2018). Similarly, Kurnool district of 
Andhra Pradesh (containing the KSP and study villages) receives an annual mean rainfall of 
642.4mm, compared with 882.9mm in the state of Andhra Pradesh (Indicus Analytics, 2018). The 
selection criteria for villages near the KSP were identical to selection criteria for the GSP (Table 
1). Villages selected for comparison with impacted villages was restricted to those with a 
population of less than 3,000 to ensure consistency with selection parameters.  
 
Solar park selection criteria   
1 Ultra-Mega Solar Park ≤1000 MW generating capacity   
2 Solar park developed by public sector institutions   
3 Dryland ecosystem (average annual rainfall below 750mm)   
4 Primarily rainfed smallholder agricultural systems in adjacent villages   
    
Village selection criteria   
1 Village(s) whose land was enclosed for the park   
2 Villages adjacent to solar park and adjacent to enclosed village lands   
3 Villages within 15 kilometers of the solar park   
4 Villages with a population of less than 3,000   
 
Table 1: Parameters for selecting solar parks and villages 
 
 
2.4. Data Collection 
As mentioned previously, the methods selected for this dissertation research were: 1) household 
survey questionnaires; 2) semi-structured interviews; 3) participant observation; 4) discourse 






2.4.1. Household survey questionnaires 
2.4.1.1. Administering the Survey 
I administered two hundred (n=200) households across four (4) villages (Charanka, Fangli, 
Jamvada, Dhokavada) that border the GSP, fifty (n=50) surveys per village (Figure 3). 
Additionally, two hundred (n=200) household surveys were administered in Andhra Pradesh state 
to four (4) villages (Gani, Sakunala, Kazipeta, Brahman Palle) bordering the KSP, fifty (n=50) 
households per village, for a grand total of four hundred (n=400) surveys conducted between the 
two solar regions. In each solar region, one to two villages surveyed experienced land enclosures 
by the solar parks (Charanka, Gani, Sakunala), and the remaining villages surveyed serve as 
comparison studies (Fangli, Jamvada and Dhokavada at GSP; Kazipeta and Brahman Palle at 
KSP). Following Moss (1995: 447), numerical data generated from the surveys was used to 
“situate qualitative interpretations within the wider social order and political economy.” 
 
 




2.4.1.2. Selection Criteria 
Households were selected using an ‘every third household’ sampling technique. Survey questions 
detailed basic household production information and material benefits of the solar parks, as well 
as included more open-ended questions that focus on the gender-based challenges of project 
implementation. Questions focusing on gender were included in the surveys because of claims for 
female empowerment by institutions related to the solar parks and ‘gender positive’ mandates by 
policy frameworks under which these solar parks operate. Respondents were randomly stratified 
by class, caste and gender and reflect the larger demographics of the village.  
 
2.4.1.3. Survey Languages 
In both states, enumerators were used to assist the researcher. Through my institutional 
connections in Gujarat (Indian Institute of Management-Ahmedabad) and in Andhra Pradesh 
(Indian School of Business), I interviewed and eventually hired 3 enumerators. My enumerator for 
Gujarat was a graduate from Venus International College of Technology. One enumerator from 
Andhra Pradesh was a student from the University of Hyderabad, another a high-school graduate 
who was raised in Kurnool district. I extensively trained all enumerators on research protocols and 
etiquette. This also included providing background knowledge on the solar parks and basic 
demographic explanations of the study villages. In villages near the GSP, these surveys were 
introduced verbally in the languages of Gujarati, Hindi or English, depending upon the fluency 
and comfort of the respondent. In villages near the KSP, the surveys were conducted in Telugu, 
Hindi or Urdu languages, per the respondents’ fluency. In 2014, I received a research scholarship 
to study Gujarati language intensively for three months. As a result, I can speak, read and write 
the language at an intermediate level. However, the same is not true for Telugu, Hindi or Urdu. I 
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translated each survey with the assistance of a fluent speaker (i.e. enumerators) or language 
instructor. Prior to conducting the surveys, a few pilot surveys were conducted to anticipate any 
poor translations, incomprehensible or confusing questions, inconsistencies, or otherwise 
suboptimal components. Next I will discuss the semi-structured interviews conducted for this 
study. 
 
2.4.2. Semi-structured interviews 
2.4.2.1. Interview Modalities 
I conducted eighty-four (n=84) interviews for this dissertation research (Table 2). The interviews 
were conducted within the three project-affected villages and one village not impacted, with 
government officials and with representatives of solar companies in the locations of New Delhi, 
Gandhinagar, Hyderabad, Patan district and Kurnool district. Some of the interviews conducted 
with residents included those whose households were surveyed. Each interview did not exceed 60 
minutes in length and was conducted in the languages of Gujarati, Hindi, Telugu, Urdu or English 
(assisted by translators) per the respondents’ fluency. Interview respondents were selected using a 











Institution Solar Park Village 
Gujarat Gujarat Power Corporation 
Limited; Gujarat Energy 
Development Agency; 





Charanka; Fangli  
Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh Solar Power 
Corporation Limited 
GreenKo; Azure Sakunala; Gani 
New Delhi Solar Energy Corporation of 
India; Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy; Ministry 




Table 2: Regions, institutions and sites where interviews were conducted. 
 
 
2.4.2.2. Village Interviews 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with people in each of the villages whose land was 
enclosed for the solar park. Prior to conducting any interview, I received permission from members 
of the village council (Panchayat) in each location. Near the GSP, fifteen (15) resource-dependent 
people from Charanka were interviewed, most of whom lost their land (voluntarily and 
involuntarily) to the development of the GSP. In nearby Fangli village, ten (10) interviews were 
conducted with resource dependent people to gauge their experiences and perceptions on the solar 
park. Additionally, one (1) interview was conducted in Dhundi village and one (1) interview with 
a representative of the Self-Empowered Women’s Association (SEWA). Total interviews 
conducted in Gujarati villages were twenty-seven (n=27). 
 
Adjacent to the KSP of Andhra Pradesh state, eleven (11) interviews were conducted in Gani and 
twelve (12) interviews were conducted in Sakunala village. Similar to those conducted in Gujarat, 
respondents were resource dependent, many of whom lost their land to the development of the 
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solar park. Total interviews conducted in Andhra Pradesh villages were twenty-three (n=23). Total 
interviews conducted in the village setting of both solar regions for this research project is forty-
eight (n=48). 
 
2.4.2.3. Solar Park Interviews 
I also conducted several interviews with employees at both of the solar parks (Figure 4). The goal 
of these interviews was to determine how solar park employees interact with local people, as well 
as their awareness of the solar parks’ social impacts. At the GSP, five (5) people were interviewed 
at the Gujarat Power Corporation Limited. At the KSP, ten (10) people were interviewed from 
GreenKo and Azure companies. Total interviews conducted at both solar parks were fifteen 
(n=15). I also conducted one (1) with a CEO of a private solar firm, Amplus, based out of Haryana. 
 
 




2.4.2.4. Government Interviews 
Additionally, I conducted several interviews with government officials in New Delhi, Andhra 
Pradesh and Gujarat. At the Gujarat Energy Development Agency in Gandhinagar, I conducted 
three (3) interviews. At the Gujarat Climate Change Department in Gandhinagar, I conducted one 
(1) interview. At the Andhra Pradesh Solar Power Corporation Limited in Hyderabad, I conducted 
six (6) interviews. At the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy in New Delhi, I conducted two 
(2) interviews. At the Solar Energy Corporation of India in New Delhi, I conducted six (6) 
interviews. At the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change in New Delhi, I 
conducted two (2) interviews. Total interviews conducted with government officials for this 
research were eighteen (n=18). Government employees were interviewed to determine knowledge 
and perceptions of the solar parks’ social impacts. 
 
2.4.3. Participant Observation 
To assist with corroborating interview data, I conducted participant observation at the Gujarat 
Energy Development Agency (GEDA) and Gujarat Power Corporation Limited (GPCL) in 
Gandhinagar, as well as the Solar Energy Corporation of India Limited (SECI) and the Ministry 
of New and Renewable Resources (MNRE) in New Delhi. The purpose of conducting these 
observations was to assess project decision-making, community outreach and participatory 
processes among various stakeholders connected to the solar schemes. Also, understanding how 
various institutions define problems internally influences the discourses produced and 
disseminated, which informs community members of risks and opportunities. I took notes on my 
observations and experiences in a “field notebook” throughout the course of my fieldwork in India. 




“The differences between GEDA and GPCL offices could not be more pronounced. GEDA is humming with 
activity, collaboration, artwork hanging on the walls with inspiring environmental quotes, excited dialogues 
of fast-walking employees fluent in sustainability jargon. GPCL is filled with drab, isolated cubicles, an 
almost mournful energy to the office. No artwork, even the plants seem to grow downwards. Employees 
arrive late, leave early. Everything requires prior authorization by absent figures, seemingly arbitrary layers 
of red tape. I’ve been waiting 4 hours for my scheduled appointment with a man who yelled at me for 
vocalizing the wrong inflection point in his first name: “It’s RA-jendra, not ra-JEN-dra!’” 
 
My fieldnotes were originally hand-written, then typed up for safe storage and convenient access. 
These observations are filtered into the three results chapters and help contribute to a ‘thick 
description’ of what transpired during fieldwork. 
 
2.4.4. Discourse Analysis 
I conducted a discourse analysis of documents pertaining to the two solar parks. Specifically, 
discourse analysis was conducted on twenty-six (n=26) documents, ranging from technical 
documents to policy documents (Table 3). Institutional reports frame solutions to environmental 
problems that influence institutional decision-making.  Prior to engaging in this method, I created 
a “Discourse Analysis Codebook” in Microsoft Excel that was used to distill important bits of the 
texts. First, I referenced Waitt (2010) for various methods of conducting a discourse analysis. Next, 
I utilized various tools from Rose (2001) to guide my analysis, including “descriptive codes”, 
“analytical codes,” and “effects of truth.” Essentially, I collected all of the policy and technical 
documents, read through them multiple times, and then coded them according to categories of 
interest. Specific themes I was coding for were sustainable development, economic development, 
social development, social difference and energy security. I then used Fairclough’s (2001; 2003) 
critical discourse analysis typology vis-à-vis structural analysis, interactional analysis and 
34 
 
interdiscursive analysis. Finally, I utilized Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) critical understandings of 
discourse to understand how these texts influence social power and political economy and can be 
utilized to entrench or counter hegemonic truth-claims. 
 
Table 3: Texts utilized to conduct discourse analysis. 
 
No. Institution Year Name Document Type 
1 Asian Development Bank 2011 CDM Assessment Report for the Charanka Solar Park, Gujarat, 
India 
Project Report 
2 Asian Development Bank 2012 India: Support to Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar 
Mission 
Project Report 
3 Asian Development Bank 2017 Solar Transmission Sector Project (RRP IND 49214): Solar Park 
Development and Business Structure 
Project Report 
4 Asian Development Bank 2017 Social and Environmental Monitoring Report: IND: Gujarat Solar 
Power Transmission Project (November 2014–April 2015) 
Project Report 




2009 Gujarat Solar Power Policy–2009 State Policy 
6 Government of Gujarat 2014 Gujarat State Action Plan on Climate Change State Policy 




2015 Gujarat Solar Power Policy–2015 State Policy 
8 Government of Gujarat 2017 Setting up a 700+ MW Ultra Mega Solar Power Park in 
Radhanesda village, Gujarat 
Business 
Promotion 




10 Government of India 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change National Policy 
11 Government of India 2015 India's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working 
Towards Climate Justice 
National Policy 
12 Government of India, 
Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy 
2010 Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission: Towards Building Solar 
India 
National Policy 
13 Government of India, 
Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy 
2011 Strategic Plan for New and Renewable Energy Sector for the 
Period 2011-17 
National Policy 
14 Government of India, 
Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy 
2012 Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission Phase II National Policy 
15 Government of India, 
Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy 
2014 Implementation of a Scheme for Development of Solar Parks and 
Ultra Mega Solar Power Projects in the country commencing from 
2014-15 and onwards (i.e. from the year 2014–15 to 2018–19). 
National Policy 
16 Government of India, 
Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy 
2015 Resolution: Scaling up of grid connected solar power projects 
from 20,000 MW by the year 2021-22, to 1,00,000 MW by the 
year 2021-22 under National Solar Mission 
National Policy 
17 Government of India, 
Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy 
2016 Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission: Guidelines for 
Development of Solar Parks 
National Policy 
18 Government of India, 
Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy 
2016 Akshay Urja: Solar Parks: Accelerating the growth of solar power 
in India 
Magazine Article 
19 Government of India, 
Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy 
2017 Akshay Urja: Success Story of Solar Parks in India: Vis-à-vis 




Table 3 cont… 
 
No. Institution Year Name Document Type 
20 Gujarat Electricity 
Regulatory Commission 
2015 Determination of Tariff for Procurement of Power by Distribution 
Licensees and Others from Solar Energy Projects for the State of 
Gujarat 
State Policy 
21 Gujarat Power 
Corporation Limited 
(GPCL) 
2014 Gujarat Solar Park World’s first Multi developer, Multi facility, 
Multi Technology and Multi beneficiary solar park at Charanka 
Village, Dist Patan-Gujarat 
Slideshow 
22 Gujarat Power 
Corporation Limited 
(GPCL) 
2015 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Policy of Gujarat Power 
Corporation Limited 
State Policy 
23 International Solar 
Alliance 
2015 Let us turn to the Sun to power our future: PM Narendra Modi at 
the launch of International Solar Alliance in Paris  
Conference 
Speech 
24 International Solar 
Alliance 
2018 Prime Minister Narendra Modi's speech at Founding Conference 
of International Solar Alliance (March 11, 2018) 
Conference 
Speech 
25 World Bank 2015 Project Appraisal Document (QER Stage) on a Proposed IBRD 
Loan in the Amount of US$ 270 Million and a Proposed Clean 
Technology Fund (CTF) Loan in the Amount of US$ 30 Million to 
the POWERGRID Corporation of India Limited for Transmission 
for Power Evacuation from Solar Parks Project (P156974) 
Project Report 
26 World Bank 2015 Republic of India: Private Sector Commercial Financing 




2.4.5. Geospatial Mapping 
I conducted a series of GIS maps (see Figures 8 and 10) for this research, utilizing ArcGIS 
software. First, I obtained a Garmin GPS unit from the Indian Institute of Management-
Ahmedabad, which I used to collect “waypoints” of each research locations I visited. Then I 
downloaded shapefiles from DIVA-GIS of administrative boundaries of the country, which I used 
to make layers of the national, state, district and block levels. These waypoints were then used to 
comprise the village-level layers for the GIS maps. The boundaries of the solar parks were traced 
using satellite imagery of the solar parks using Google Earth and then transformed into shapefiles 
for ArcMap. 
 
2.5. Reflexivity and Positionality 
Critical self-reflexivity was a constant companion while doing fieldwork and writing this 
dissertation. Conducting defensible scholarship means reflecting upon my subject-position to 
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ensure that my fieldwork and knowledge claims do not reproduce power hierarchies between my 
subjects and I (Mohanty, 2003). Reflexivity in research and fieldwork also necessitated that I 
remain flexible in changing my way of thinking, research questions and theoretical approach based 
on field observations and information obtained from my interlocutors. As a development 
geographer, it remains important to me that I “do development” while being conscious and critical 
of development policies and the implementation of development projects (Sultana, 2014). 
Wherever possible, I strove towards field methodologies wherein data was co-produced with 
subjects (Ackerly and True, 2010). I am wary of the specter of “disembodied scientific objectivity” 
(Haraway 1991) that still stalks the hallowed halls of human geography. All knowledge-claims in 
this article represent situated “partial perspectives” (Rose, 1997). To the best of my ability, I tried 
not to privilege any one way of knowing the world (Fontana and Frey, 2012). 
 
A few of the documents I reference for the discourse analysis component of this dissertation were 
originally written/spoken in non-English languages. I read and referenced those in Gujarati 
language for this work. Additionally, I ensured that all survey instruments were translated and 
administered in local languages (i.e. Gujarati, Telugu, Hindi, Urdu) and respondents received 
copies of the Informed Consent document that explains the risks/rewards of this study, including 
all of my contact information, in that same language. During fieldwork, I specifically hired 
enumerators and research assistants from historically marginalized or ethnic/linguistic minority 
communities. This was an important decision, as many of my research subjects were women from 




This dissertation represents my contribution towards the feminist turn of political ecology 
scholarship (Heynen, 2018). I use feminist theory in this study to inform my analysis (see Rose, 
1993a; see also Rose, 1993b). I am motivated to conduct research that empowers historically 
marginalized populations, research that questions and contests societal structures of patriarchy in 
this period of late capitalism. At times, I use the conceptual lens of embodiment and emotional 
geographies to analyze the modalities of affectivity and resistance by peasants affected by solar 
park development. But reflexive qualitative research is also a “corporeal performance” (Crang, 
2003) by the researcher themselves. I must acknowledge that my corporeal performance as a 
researcher has material affects and may have influenced the data I was able to collect. I am an 
“embedded” research scholar who occupies a different subject-position (i.e. American white male 
academic) than the people I engaged for this study (Moss, 1995). As such, it was of utmost 
importance that I consciously execute surveys and interviews in these rural villages of India 
according to strict gender and cultural norms.  
 
To this end, I would always begin work in a village by first meeting with the Panchayat village 
councils. Only after showing them all of my research documents and identification, then receiving 
their approval, would I continue working in a location. Next, I would always approach the head of 
the household, often a male within these patriarchal patrilineal communities. I would conduct 
surveys or interviews with women in open spaces of the village or neighborhood to prevent rumors 
of inappropriate behavior, and always did so in the presence of other men and women, whomever 




In fieldwork and writing, I strove to dismantle the “masculinism” rampant in human geography 
(Rose, 1993b), while also avoiding essentialist tropes of vulnerable third world women (Mohanty, 
2003). Following England (1994), this research strives to provide a voice to my research subjects 
without appropriating their voices. The extensive use of quotations is one attempt to do so. I also 
conducted the practice of fieldwork by engaging my research subjects with deep empathy (Rowek, 
2018), reflective of my social justice motivations of research, which was critical to understand 
their experiences, learn from them, and let my research be guided by them. The empathic impulse 
served as a useful compass throughout the longue durée of fieldwork. No matter how deep my 
relationship with my research subjects, there is still a power differential between us (Mohanty, 
2003). Despite best efforts to observe “codes of behavior” (Hay 2010, 252) in order to “blend in” 
while observing, I must remind myself that “connectedness is false” (McLafferty 1995). However, 
I am of the belief that research should be a process of mutual learning and knowledge exchange. I 
entertained almost every request to divulge my life story by my research subjects and friends in 
my 8 study villages. After all, “research is theft” otherwise (Robbins, 2006). Next, I will explore 
the limitations of this dissertation study. 
 
2.6. Limitations 
This dissertation research was not without its limitations and oversights. First, this investigation 
into the solar parks began after both projects were commissioned. By virtue of studying completed 
projects, I was afforded only a cursory glimpse into how specific land deals transpired and 
subsequent reactions erupted. The benefit of researching completed projects is my ability to readily 
contextualize them within the broader political economy of renewable energy and climate policy, 
hindsight assisted. I am reliant upon the perspectives of villagers whose memory and affectivities 
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undoubtedly influenced their responses. As a critical geographer, I view their partial and situated 
perspectives to be a strength of this study, providing great texture to both case studies. 
 
Another limitation to the study was my reliance on male field assistants and survey enumerators, 
particularly when surveying, interviewing and observing females. Many academic circles in India, 
as in rural villages, are still heavily patriarchal. I utilized my extended networks in country to 
identify and interview six different female field assistants, but ultimately none of them felt 
comfortable with the job. Understandably, travelling with a foreign male in remote areas of the 
country for weeks at a time elicits suspicion and apprehension. However, my plan was to hire two 
women and they’d travel together, all lodging arrangements would be separate. The rate of pay I 
offered was much higher than average for such a position, in hopes of securing more qualified 
candidates. A few of the women declined the position due to their husband’s discomfort with the 
situation, another because of her father’s discomfort. Left with no other option and sympathetic 
towards the gendered power relations we are entangled in, I resumed fieldwork with male field 
assistants. Mindful of the discomfort and disrespect that many female respondents in the study 
villages may feel, I would conduct surveys or interviews with women in open spaces of the village. 
Doing this supports transparency of process and greater safety for the women involved. Every 
interview and survey conducted with women was in the presence of other people, per the woman’s 
comfort level. I have no way of accurately gauging how their responses may have been influenced 
by my presence, male field assistants, or bystanders with differential social power. However, it is 





Finally, a limitation of this study is also a strength. Examining two solar parks necessarily limited 
my ability to remain in one village and one solar region for extended lengths of time. As such, I 
had innumerable encounters with stakeholders and obtained a wellspring of data that allowed me 
to understand whether the processes occurring at one solar park were unique or more general to 
solar park development in other areas of India. By virtue of conducting research in 8 villages in 2 
different states (not mentioning the many weeks of fieldwork conducted in New Delhi and several 
more in Gandhinagar and Hyderabad), the longest I was able to reside in just one village was a 
few weeks. In the future, taking a more ethnographic approach by residing in only one village or 
one solar region for several months would likely improve or contest the validity of my conclusions. 
 
3. Study Area 
3.1. Solar Regions 
Presently, there are roughly 25 solar parks in various sizes and stages of development throughout 
India. Given the wide variability of SPPDs, sub-national policy frameworks, regional political 
economies, ecologies and demographics, I have chosen to constrict this dissertation to a study of 
2 solar parks: 1) Gujarat Solar Park (in Gujarat); and 2) Kurnool Solar Park (in Andhra Pradesh). 
These solar parks are emblematic of others in the country and considered the gold standards1 by 
which subsequent solar park development occurs. The Gujarat Solar Park is located in Patan 
district, Gujarat and the Kurnool Solar Park is located in Kurnool district, Andhra Pradesh. Both 
of these solar parks are located in regions of the country with exceptionally high solar irradiance 
                                                          
1 The Gujarat Solar Park was India’s first solar park. The Kurnool Solar Park is India’s largest completed solar park, 
as of writing this dissertation. 
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(Figure 5). Next, I will discuss each of these regions in more depth and detailing both case studies, 
including villages where research was conducted (Table 4). 
 
Figure 5: Map depicting annual average solar irradiance at 10kms, with warmer hues indicating better solar potential 























Table 4: Research sites in the two solar regions. Distance measured by primary author using GPS waypoints, collected 
March-July 2018. 
 
3.1.1. Caste Study 1: Gujarat Solar Park 
3.1.1.1. Gujarat state 
The GSP is situated in the Northern region of the economically prosperous state of Gujarat. 
Northern Gujarat has large tracts of semi-arid commons lands officially categorized as 
‘wastelands’ (i.e. Banaskantha, Patan, Kachchh districts), which are viewed as prime locations for 
solar parks. The GSP is located in Patan district. It has an annual mean rainfall at just 529.8mm, 
compared with 667.9mm for Gujarat and 1185.4mm for India (India Meteorological Department, 
2015). Roughly 50% of the state is under cultivation, 10% is forests, and 40% of the state’s land 
mass is “either left barren or unculturable/culturable waste” (ICAR, 2010; Figure 6). The state also 
suffers from highly saline soils, affecting 8% of the total geographical area. The vast majority of 
Patan district, roughly 136.96 square miles of the total geographical area, is classified under the 
“land with scrub” category of wastelands. Total estimated degraded lands in Patan district is 
317,000 hectares (ICAR, 2010). 





Gujarat Solar Park Charanka 2.5 1,233  
Fangli 7.7 1,040  
Jamvada 13.7 1,332  
Dhokavada 7.4 2,597 
Kurnool Solar Park Gani 3.7 3,448 
 





Kazipeta 3.7 *   
*Omitted from census 




Figure 6: Degraded and wastelands of Gujarat (Government of India, 2010). 
 
The GSP is located in Charanka village in the district of Patan, which borders the Rann of Kutch 
desert and the Little Rann of Kutch Wild Ass Sanctuary (home to endemic Equus hemionus khur) 
and is in close proximity to the border of Pakistan. Additionally, the region is home to several 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The Santalpur Special Investment Region specializes in cotton 
ginning and agricultural products processing, located just 15 kilometers from Charanka. The Euro 
Multivision Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is located only 140 kilometers west of Charanka 
(Government of Gujarat, 2017). The Gujarat International Finance Tec-City (GIFT City) near 
Gandhinagar is also only 219 kilometers from Charanka, a SEZ designed to be a regional IT 
services hub with a 60MVA capacity substation for electricity generation (GIFT, 2018). Each of 





Figure 7: Map of solar parks (new and existing) in Gujarat (North) and Andhra Pradesh (South; Source: Google Earth). 
 
3.1.1.2. Gujarat Solar Park 
The state government of Gujarat is recognized as a national leader in solar development 
(Government of Gujarat, 2015). Most state nodal agencies oversee a reverse bidding process to 
implement the JNNSM scheme, wherein private corporations looking to generate solar energy bid 
a tariff for the solar park. In contrast, Gujarat fixes a preferential tariff system that benefits private 
industry by providing financial incentives to invest in renewable energy spaces in the state 
(Yenneti, 2014). One such renewable energy space is the GSP, an ultra-mega solar park 
constructed on 5384 acres of land (Figure 8). Of these, roughly 2669 acres were designated as 
government ‘wastelands’ and the remaining portion was local farmers’ private land purchased by 
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the park’s SPPD, Gujarat Power Corporation Limited (GPCL). GSP was India’s first solar park, 
commissioned on April 19, 2012. At present, the GSP has 640 MW solar power generation 
capacity installed by roughly 30 companies2 (GPCL, 2017), and will likely be expanded to 800 
MW by summer 2019 (personal communication, 7 August 2018). There are three more ultra-mega 
solar parks being developed in the state in various stages of completion, including Radha Nesda 
(750 MW) and Harshad (500 MW) in Banaskantha district, Dholera (5,000 MW) in Ahmedabad 
district (Figure 7). The Radha Nesda solar park (750 MW) has already had its land surveyed and 
allocated to solar park project developers (personal communication, 24 March 2018). The solar 
park boasts a number of “social commitments” for rural upliftment and capacity building. Among 
the social commitments listed by MNRE are the temporary employment of 1,000 unskilled 
laborers and 500 semi-skilled laborers, a teachers training program, a drinking water facility, 
installation of solar streetlights in Charanka and adjacent villages, paved roads, renovation of the 
local primary school and ambulance services for Charanka (MNRE, 2014). These social 
commitments and their capacity to lead to rural upliftment will be discussed with more depth in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
                                                          
2 Companies operating at the Gujarat Solar Park (GPCL, 2017): 1) ZF Steering Gear (5 MW); 2) NKG Infrastructure Ltd 
(5 MW); 3) Alex Astral Power (25 MW); 4) SEI Solar Power Gujarat Private Ltd (25 MW); 5) GSPC Pipavav Power 
Corporation (5 MW); 6) GMR Gujarat (25 MW); 7) Surana Telecom and Power (5 MW); 8) Solar field Private Ltd (5 
MW); 9) EI Technologies Private Ltd (1 MW); 10) Emami Cement (10 MW); 11) Gujarat Power Corporation Ltd (15 
MW); 12) Roha Energy (25 MW); 13) Sun Clean Renewable (6 MW); 14) Avtaar Solar (5 MW); 15) AES Solar (15 MW); 
16) Lanco Infrastructure Private Ltd (15 MW); 17) Palace Solar (15 MW); 18) Yantra e Solar Private Ltd (5 MW); 19) 
Universal Solar (2 MW); 20) Kindle Energy and Construction (50 MW); 21) GSECL (10 MW); 22) Torrent SolarGen (51 
MW); 23) SJVNL (5 MW); 24) GIPCL (80 MW); 25) Renew Solar (40 MW); 26) Astra Solren (65 MW); 27) Orange (40 
MW); 28) Tata Power (25 MW); 29) GACL Vadodara (30 MW); 30) GSFC Vadodara (10 MW). Total energy 




Figure 8: Map of the Gujarat Solar Park and adjacent study villages. 
 
3.1.1.3. GSP Villages 
Research near the GSP was conducted in the villages of Charanka, Fangli, Jamvada and 
Dhokavada (Table 4; Figure 8). Of the 4 villages adjacent to the GSP where research was 
conducted for this dissertation, Charanka is the only village whose land was acquired for solar 
park development. The political economy of these villages is exclusively agricultural-based, with 
the majority crops being cumin, pearl millet, sorghum and wheat. These crops are aggregated by 
middlemen in the district and sold to larger crop markets in the nearby towns of Radhanpur or 
Unjha (boasting the highest regional price for crops). Households in the four villages surveyed for 
this research are largely dependent on rainfed agricultural for their livelihoods with no irrigation 
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systems (of which I am aware) in the four villages besides pumping from a nearby Sardar Sarovar 
dam canal extension (cf. Birkenholtz, 2016). Water scarcity is a problem in this region, especially 
for Charanka. Peasants here typically grow in only one season per year (kharif). The caste 
composition of these 4 villages is dominated by people affiliated with the Other Backward Castes 
(OBC) classification, largely Rabari (semi-nomadic pastoralists), Ahir, Gadhvi, Thakore and Koli. 
These villages have fewer residents affiliated as general caste, Muslim or Scheduled Castes 










Charanka 10% 60% 24% 6% 
Fangli 38% 54% 8% 0% 
Jamvada 58% 40% 2% 0% 
Dhokavada 0% 98% 2% 0% 
 
Table 5: Social composition of respondents (n=200) in GSP study villages. 
 
 
3.1.2. Case Study 2: Kurnool Solar Park 
3.1.2.1. Andhra Pradesh state 
The region of Rayalaseema in Andhra Pradesh comprises the districts of Kurnool, Chittoor, 
Kadapa and Anantapur. Rayalaseema is a semi-arid and drought-prone region. Annual mean 
rainfall in Kurnool is 642.4mm compared to 882.9mm in Andhra Pradesh state and 1185.4mm in 
India (India Meteorological Department, 2015). Near the solar park in Kurnool district, the vast 
majority of agriculture is rainfed agriculture. Nearly 40% of land in Andhra Pradesh is under 
cultivation. In Kurnool district, roughly 549,000 hectares of total geographic area considered to be 
“degraded and wastelands” (Figure 9). Much of the wastelands in Kurnool are due to mining 
activities (ICAR, 2010). The region has vast deposits of granite, limestone and silica, and there are 
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many nearby quarries. Consequently, the region is a hub for the cement industry, as there are four 
cement manufacturing plants in the district. One cement factory is adjacent to Gani village. In stark 
contrast to Rayalaseema, the larger Andhra Pradesh-Telangana region is nationally-known as a 
hub for Information and Communications Technology (ICT) centers, including Special Economic 
Zones (Zoomers, 2010); one of these in Hyderabad is futuristically branded as Cyberabad. 
 
 
Figure 9: Degraded and wastelands of Andhra Pradesh (Government of India, 2010). 
 
3.1.2.2. Kurnool Solar Park 
KSP is an ultra-mega solar park with 1000 MW generating capacity (Figure 10), finally 
commissioned in July 13, 2017. The park’s SPPD is Andhra Pradesh Solar Power Corporation Pvt 
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Ltd (APSPCL), a joint venture between the Andhra Pradesh government and the Central 
Government’s Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI). Presently, there are 4 companies3 
operating within the solar park. The KSP is built on 5683.22 acres of semi-arid land, of which 
3494.29 acres (61.5%) is government land. The non-government land was enclosed from the 
villages of Gani and Sakunala (see Figure 10), which remains a politically contentious issue (see 
The Hindu, 2017). These private lands constitute a mix of conventional private lands with titles 
and public lands that were assigned4 to poor and landless peasants of marginalized communities 
(i.e. Dalit, ST; hereafter assigned land) and hence private. As of August 2018, KSP is the world’s 
largest completed single-location solar park, with larger ones proposed and being developed. In 
the next few years, Andhra Pradesh will host three additional ultra-mega solar parks: Kadapa (1000 




                                                          
3 Companies generating solar power at the Kurnool Solar Park (as of August 2018): 1) GreenKo (500 MW); 2) 
Softbank (350 MW); 3) Azure (100 MW); 4) Adani (50 MW). Total energy commissioned and generated is 1000 
MW. 
4 The category of “assigned land” and resulting process of land distribution to the landless poor emerged with the 
Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977. Unlike private land, assigned lands are 




Figure 10: Map of the Kurnool Solar Park and study villages in Andhra Pradesh, India. 
 
3.1.2.3. KSP Villages 
Research near the KSP was conducted in the villages of Gani, Sakunala, Brahman Palle and 
Kazipeta (Table 4). Most residents within the 4 villages surveyed belong to the Reddy (general), 
Kuruva (OBC), Boya (SC), and Madiga (SC) castes with sizeable Dalit and Muslim populations 
(belonging to the Sheik caste) (Table 6). All agriculture in these four villages is rainfed with no 
irrigation systems of which I am aware. Typical crops grown in this region are cotton, sorghum, 
and chili peppers. Crops are aggregated by local middlemen and sold en masse to markets in the 












Gani 4% 50% 8% 38% 
Sakunala 6% 56% 28% 10% 
Brahman Palle 20% 24% 46% 10% 
Kazipeta 34% 60% 0% 6% 
 
Table 6: Social composition of respondents (n=200) in KSP study villages. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, I took a mixed methods approach to answer my research questions. This included 
household surveys, semi-structured interviews, discourse analysis and participant observation. I 
believe these methods are well-suited to disentangle the sociopolitical complexities and frictions 
of solar park development, providing robust empirical data. In this chapter, I also provided a 
detailed account of study areas, solar parks, and adjacent villages. No doubt, critically assessing 
the merits of Solar India has been an indulgent exercise in academic privilege. All errors and 







CHAPTER 4: DEUS EX MITIGATA: DENATURALIZING THE MATERIAL AND 
DISCURSIVE POWER STRUCTURES OF SOLAR INDIA 
 
1. Introduction 
Upon launching his country’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (2008), Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh announced, “We will pool our scientific, technical and managerial talents, with 
sufficient financial resources, to develop solar energy as a source of abundant energy to power our 
economy and to transform the lives of our people” (MNRE, 2018). Since 2008, the Government 
of India (GoI) has been promoting large-scale solar development to mitigate climate change and 
safeguard energy security (Government of India, 2008; MNRE, 2012), part of a high-modernist 
solar grand plan5 (Zweibel et al, 2007; Hunold and Leitner, 2011). The Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Solar Mission (JNNSM) was created to establish India as a global leader in solar energy by creating 
the policy conditions for its diffusion across the country as quickly as possible (MNRE, 2012). In 
aggregate, the JNNSM schemes contribute towards GoI’s Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDC) to the 2015 Paris Agreement of achieving 100 GW of solar energy by 2022, reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 33% and to achieve 40% of total installed electrical generation from 
non-fossil fuel sources by 2030 (GoI, 2015). At present, there is more than 20 GW of solar power 
installed, of which grid-connected solar utilities are roughly 18.4 GW (Sanjay, 2018). Among the 
                                                          
5 High modernism is a paradigm of modernism that believes in scientific and technological control of society and the 
environment, often with disregard to place-based sociocultural context. In India, the Nehruvian post-Independence 
period of governance and subsequent large-scale infrastructure development is defined by high modernist thinking 
and planning (Guha, 2007). Urban planning initiatives (i.e. Chandigarh, Gandhinagar; Scott, 1989) and hydroelectric 
projects (i.e. Sardar Sarovar; Baviskar, 2004) are examples of high modernism. Hunold and Leitner (2011: 688) make 
the case that large-scale solar development, as envisioned by Zweibel et al (2007), is a high modernist scheme for 
sustainability, which they define as, “initiatives intended to promote grand technological projects while legitimating 
or concealing their true environmental repercussions, often through specific constructions of the land, resources, 
and ecosystems at issue.” 
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most impressive milestones towards the Paris Agreement NDCs are the installation of utility-scale 
ultra-mega solar parks6. India’s Kohinoor7 (crown jewel) of all solar parks was the Gujarat Solar 
Park (GSP), commissioned April 19, 2012. Presently, the GSP generates 640 MW of renewable 
energy and is the model by which all subsequent solar parks have been developed. The GSP was 
built under the same institutional and economic logics of Special Economic Zones (personal 
communication, 17 July 2018), with specific economic and trade regulations that allow for “plug-
and-play” operations by interested companies or investors. In this case, the solar power parks 
developer (SPPD) was a state entity, the Gujarat Power Corporation Limited (GPCL). In addition 
to the GSP as a case study, this paper will examine the Kurnool Solar Park (KSP), commissioned 
on July 13, 2017. The park generates 1000 MW of renewable energy and is one of the largest8 
solar parks in India. The SPPD of this solar park was the Andhra Pradesh Solar Power Corporation 
Ltd (APSPCL). In accord with Singh’s declaration, the developmental approach of solar parks has 
been largely techno-managerial, insofar as the place-based sociocultural context is weakly 
attenuated in project design or development. As this paper argues below, these large-scale solar 
projects have “transformed the lives” of Indian people, though not always in positive ways. 
 
Post-Paris Agreement 2015, the pace at which such solar projects have been developed are 
breakneck (Government of India, 2015). Today, there are more than 25 solar parks being 
developed throughout the nation, largely in rural spaces of dryland regions (MNRE, 2014). The 
                                                          
6 According to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (2016: 2), a solar park is “a concentrated zone of 
development of solar power generation projects and provides developers an area that is well characterized, with 
proper infrastructure and access to amenities and where the risk of the projects can be minimized.” 
7 The term Kohinoor refers to a massive cut diamond, sourced from India, that became the “crown jewel” of the 
Victorian era. The term is often used to describe something of immense value. 
8 As of writing this manuscript in February 2019, the KSP is the largest completed solar park in India, with even larger 
ones in nascent stages of development (i.e. Pavagada, Dholera). 
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Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI), under the direction of GoI’s Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy (MNRE), opens tenders for solar park development in vast stretches of semi-
arid or arid rural landscapes where solar potential is abundant (MNRE, 2016). In addition to private 
land acquisition9, large-scale land acquisitions for these large solar installations typically occur on 
“government waste/non-agricultural land” (MNRE, 2016: 19-20). According to the Indian Council 
for Agricultural Research (2010), 40% of Gujarat state’s land mass is “either left barren or 
unculturable/culturable waste,” with 317,000 hectares of the total geographical area of Patan 
district (encompassing GSP) classified as wastelands. Comparatively, 549,000 hectares of total 
geographic area of Kurnool district (encompassing the KSP) is considered to be “degraded and 
wastelands” (ICAR, 2010). 
 
Without a question, swift renewable energy transitions are essential in the age of the 
Anthropocene. However, the modalities by which such renewable energy transitions occur often 
reproduce social inequalities and social difference. Apropos to my central thesis, specific 
discourses mobilized for solar development in India (hereafter Solar India) buttressing the much-
acclaimed JNNSM solar schemes (MNRE, 2012) benefit from a techno-managerial eco-
consensus10 (Swyngedouw, 2013) wherein mitigation projects are uncritically championed, even 
in cases with neocolonial relations of production (Bumpus and Liverman, 2010; Bachram, 2004; 
Robbins, 2006). Solar parks are a deus ex machina at the climax of late capitalism. 
                                                          
9 Private lands for solar parks are acquired via the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (LARR; High Court of Gujarat, 2015). In practice, this process is highly 
variable and there are numerous examples of land expropriation outside of this legislation (The Hindu, 2016; The 
Hindu, 2017). This Act also rationalizes dispossession of peasant land for private interests (Levien, 2011; Levien, 
2013). 
10 By way of definition, Swyngedouw (2013: 4) exclaims: “the technomanagerial eco-consensus maintains, we have 
to change radically, but within the contours of the existing state of the situation—‘the partition of the sensible’ in 




This article is an attempt to illuminate and denaturalize specific representations and practices that 
are used to develop large-scale solar infrastructure in India by bringing together insights from the 
field of political ecology and poststructural theories around power, discourse and the politics of 
knowledge. This project attempts to answer the following research question: How are solar 
development and project-associated land enclosures discursively rationalized by the state? 
Further, this manuscript explores the operationalization of Solar India discourses and provides 
empirical evidence of their (un)intended effects. 
 
The paper proceeds in 5 further sections. Section 2 is a theoretical exploration of power and 
discourse, including a discussion of how specific discursive formations are used to justify 
apolitical modalities of low-carbon development. Section 3 will explore the methodology by which 
this research was conducted. Section 4 is an exploration of research results, critiquing large-scale 
solar development justified as solution to the climate crisis, denaturalizing claims of economic 
development and illuminating the (re)production of social difference through solar development. 
Section 5 puts the findings of this research in conversation with Agamben’s (2005) state of 
exception and Wainwright and Mann’s (2013) climate leviathan. Section 6 concludes the paper by 
foreshadowing a global reproduction of dispossessive large-scale solar development, justified 







1.1. The power of discourse 
“Every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition 
of emergence” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 107) 
 
For the purposes of this research, the term discourse refers to “a specific series of representations 
and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations 
established, and political and ethical outcomes made more possible” (Gregory et al, 2009: 166). 
The approach of analyzing the effects of text and linguistic structures taken in this research is akin 
to what Michel Foucault (1972) calls an archaeology of knowledge that strives not to discover an 
ultimate “truth” behind scientific knowledge, but to reveal the structures, rules and practices that 
produce such strands of knowledge as “truth” to be commonly accepted as such. Ergo, discursive 
formations of science are not neutral statements of truth, but products of a political economic 
context in which they have arisen, with ontological effects (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). According 
to Rose (2001: 137), “discursive formations are the way meanings are connected together in a 
particular discourse.” Discourses articulate people into different subject-positions (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001). These subject positions are both constituted and influenced by discursive 
formations. Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 115) clearly establish this connection: “Subjects cannot, 
therefore, be the origin of social relations — not even in the limited sense of being endowed with 
powers that render an experience possible — as all 'experience' depends on precise discursive 
conditions of possibility.”  
 
There are many studies utilizing a discourse analysis approach to understand or critique political 
and institutional discourses around renewable energy transitions (i.e. Genus, 2016; Smeets, 2018; 
Chaiyapa et al, 2018; Winfield and Dolter, 2014; Späth, 2012), actor-centered discourses 
(Rosenbloom et al, 2016; Hermwille, 2016) or representations of nature to promote renewable 
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energy (Einsiedel et al, 2017; Chaliganti and Müller, 2016). For example, Chaliganti and Müller 
(2016) investigate the social construction of ‘wastelands’ through discourses of ecological 
modernization for the political purposes of adopting India’s National Policy on Biofuels. However, 
there is a gap in the literature about how discursive formations around renewable energy are 
operationalized through institutions that also investigates the “truth effects” of these discursive 
formations. Rather, what impacts do these discourses have “on the ground” for affected 
populations? This manuscript seeks to fill that lacuna. 
 
Social power in human-environment systems depends upon the production and dissemination of 
representations, discourses and knowledge (Castree, 2014; Hecht and Cockburn, 1989; Fairhead 
and Leach, 1996; Leach and Mearns, 1996; Fairhead and Leach, 2000; Birkenholtz, 2008; Stock 
et al, 2019). The politics of knowledge is asymmetric and often used to reinforce cultural 
hegemony by dominant forces (Crehan, 2002). Solar India comprises an epistemic community that 
cohabitates with an ontological field of practice (Castree, 2014). This field of practice is the 
domain of “experts” (i.e. solar engineers, bureaucrats) making solar development happen. In this 
case, state institutions leverage discursive formations of sustainability from multinational 
corporations (i.e. Adani, Tata) and multilateral institutions (i.e. UNFCCC, World Bank) that 
legitimate capital-intensive “green” development (i.e. solar parks). In aggregate, such discursive 
formations work through state institutions that propagate sustainable ideologies through social 
structures, often with assistance from civil society institutions. Discursive formations about solar 
development are extensions of state ideology11. As structures of value within a society, ideology 
                                                          
11 In discussing Gramsci’s conception of the materiality of ideology and it’s relation to hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe 
(2001: 67) define ideology as “an organic and relational whole, embodied in institutions and apparatuses, which 
welds together a historical bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles.” 
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is a constitutive element of social construction that informs discursive formation, which can induce 
subject formation through social relations and garner the consent of “collective wills” in order to 
exercise hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Dombroski, 1989). Indeed, ideology is a terrain 
upon which social relations occur. However, the production of “truth” and subsequent “truth-
effects” are constituted through discursive formations within social relations, not social structures 
(Stoddart, 2007). As such, discursive formations are vital modalities through which Solar India’s 
hegemony is sustained and counter-hegemony is waged.  
  
For the purposes of this study and case sites, I identify the following institutions as Solar India: 
MNRE, SECI, APSPCL, GPCL, and the Gujarat Energy Development Agency. These institutions 
promote sustainability-related discursive formations work in consort with state institutions of 
authority (i.e. laws, government institutions, police). Together, these institutions comprise an 
epistemic community of experts, using discursive formations embedded with colonial 
representations of progress and nature (Willems-Braun, 1997) in order to reproduce the 
exploitative relations of production and reinforce control in such a way that advances renewable 
energy projects in a post-Paris Agreement nation-state like India (see The Hindu, 2016). As if by 
magic, climate change mitigation represents an opportunity to preserve and produce asymmetric 
power relations and a capitalist political economic order. 
 
1.2. From deus ex machina to deus ex mitigata 
In this section, I argue that India’s push for solar development represents a “deus ex machina” type 
of plot device in the context of neoliberal expansion into heretofore uninvestible spaces (i.e. 
wastelands) under the unquestioned auspices of climate change mitigation (see Li, 2014). This 
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deus ex machina is a set of discursive formations from Solar India that legitimize “green” capital 
accumulation and obtain “consent” for specific regimes of dispossession. Next, I will define deus 
ex machina and put it into conversation with sustainable development. 
 
“Deus ex machina” is a phrase that means “a god from the machine” (Allinson, 1921). Translated 
from the Greek phrase ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεός (apò mēkhanês theós), so-called ‘gods from the machine’ 
would appear during stage performances of ancient Hellenic tragedies in order to reconcile a 
conflicted plot sequence or insurmountable problem the characters encountered. Several authors 
and playwrights of the time (i.e. Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides) were prolific in the use 
of such plot devices in the 5th Century B.C., notably in The Odyssey, Eumenides, Medea, and 
Oedipus at Colonus. In modern parlance, the phrase refers to a “person or thing (as in fiction 
or drama) that appears or is introduced suddenly and unexpectedly and provides a 
contrived solution to an apparently insoluble difficulty”  (Mirriam-Webster, 2018). Perhaps 
the first to use the phrase to describe the plot device, Aristotle heavily criticized its use in plays 
(Aristotle, 1961). Nietzsche also lamented that the use of deus ex machina plot devices, claiming 
they give the audience an artificial consolation to unfolding tragedies (Nietzsche, 1872). Presently, 
there is a paucity of studies that demonstrate similar sociopolitical plot devices to solve 
environmental problems. Pace Nietzsche, this research contests that Solar India discourses serve 
as a Trojan horse for capital accumulation with a greener face that doesn’t resolve the underlying 
crises or latent power inequalities in India. Further, this article suggests that Solar India is a deus 
ex mitigata, a deus ex machina set of discursive formations. Specifically, these discursive 
formations relate to the topics of energy security, economic development and social development. 
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As I explore below, these discursive formations have been utilized to justify a top-down large-
scale approach to renewable energy development in India. 
 
1.3. Solar India: Descent of the deus ex mitigata 
Carbon capital schemes (i.e. solar parks) with global deployment of renewable energy technologies 
are increasingly receiving funding from transnational corporations (i.e. Adani) or international 
development funds (i.e. Asian Development Bank, World Bank). These projects are often 
operationalized as Corporate Responsibility Schemes and contributions to international 
agreements (i.e. Paris Agreement). The opportunity to marketize nature under the moralistic and 
unquestioned cover of carbon mitigation represents a deus ex machina of late capitalism in the age 
of the Anthropocene for developed nations that contributed most of the greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
In India, the national government has arranged many large-scale solar projects (Figure 11) for 
“plug-and-play” operation, wherein institutions can establish a determined amount of solar arrays 
within a section of the solar park without needing to directly acquire land or traverse local 
bureaucratic procedures. As such, the national and state governments are increasingly playing the 
role of “land broker-in-chief” (Levien, 2018) to enable state-making in previously ungoverned 
spaces and resource-making of previously uncommodified resources, all for the purposes of 
attracting corporate investment. Further, national and sub-national institutions (i.e. Gujarat Energy 
Development Agency) produce “true” knowledge on climate change, sustainability and renewable 
energy to influence stakeholders, private investors, and policymakers to support the accelerated 






Figure 11: A view of the GSP from above. (Photo: Ryan Stock) 
 
With the deus ex mitigata as a moral cover and harbinger of hope and opportunity, the need to 
radically transform the current mode of production that has irrevocably unbalanced the chemical 
composition of our atmosphere, thereby creating the “wicked” problem of climate change, can 
largely remain intact, as if by magic. As former Prime Minister Singh resolutely proclaimed, 
solutions to climate change remain techno-managerial and conveniently conform to the current 
neoliberal political and economic hegemony (Ojha et al, 2016; MNRE, 2018; Birkenholtz, 2012). 
Without altering the material realities of differently situated rural subjects, the Government of 
India can implement internationally-vetted solutions to climate change (i.e. solar parks) that 
employ ecological modernization logics and are largely technical in nature. As India mitigates 
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climate change, the discursive formations justifying the salvation potential of the deus ex mitigata 
belong to a broader dispositif of climate governance (Braun, 2014; Legg, 2011), repertoires of an 
emerging planetary order (Wainwright and Mann, 2013; 2015; 2018). Next, I will explore common 
climate or sustainability-related discursive formations that influence those of Solar India. 
 
1.4. Discourses of climate and sustainability 
In this section, I will explore 3 threads of sustainability discourse: 1) climate crisis; 2) sustainable 
development; 3) ecological modernization. Among the most prevalent and influential climate or 
sustainability discourses that policymakers and civil society draws upon to justify expanding 
renewable energy projects like the solar parks are climate crisis discourses. Not only in the context 
of climate change, but discursively constructed crises are often used to mobilize political and 
ideological forces (Roitman, 2013). Anthropogenic climate change is often referred to as a 
historically unique “crisis” with moralistic imperatives in need of swift action (Archer and 
Rahmstorf, 2010; McKibben, 2006; Kolbert, 2006; Swyngedouw, 2010) or a “problem” that 
necessitates state intervention (Rose and Miller, 1992). Scientists, scholars and activists alike 
mobilize moralistic crisis discourses in an attempt to influence political action and to access 
options for justice (Buxton, 2016). In doing so, they produce new crisis subjectivities for 
disproportionately vulnerable populations in the Global South whose human-ness is predicated on 
their suffering and their need to be saved by transnational civil society’s humanitarian 
interventions (Nagoda et al, 2017). Indeed, such crisis narratives have rebooted previously 
discredited discursive formations of geographic determinism (see Robbins, 2012), combined with 
Orientalist discourses that racialize and “other” non-Western populations (Hall, 1992; Said, 1978; 
Fanon, 1965; Escobar, 1995; Radcliffe, 2005), to scaremonger a looming threat of conflict in 
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underdeveloped former colonies of the Global South (Parenti, 2012; Peluso and Watts, 2001). In 
this logic, climate crisis narratives form justifications through which the defense industry declares 
climate change a “threat multiplier” in order to expand the military-industrial complex into new 
frontiers of a global battleground (Scheffran et al, 2014; King and Goodman, 2011). Conversely, 
the climate crisis’ moralistic discourses can produce guilt by exposing the causal link of developed 
nations’ industrial development and rapacious consumption to “climate refugees” and hazard 
victims (Baldwin, 2013; Bettini, 2013; Sassen, 2014; Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). Paradoxically, 
it also produces a “savior complex” in the Global North as the only power who can ameliorate this 
crisis, reproducing North-South geopolitical power relations (Ervine, 2013; Bond, 2012; Bumpus 
and Liverman, 2010). Crisis narratives are also used to mobilize control over natural resources and 
land (White et al, 2012), which I will explore in the results section. 
 
Sustainable development discourses are prevalent in schemes promoting renewable energy 
(Jessup, 2010; Barry et al, 2008), like Solar India. Per the canonical Brundtland Report, sustainable 
development is about meeting the needs of the present without sacrificing future generations’ 
ability to do so (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; Dryzek, 2013).  By 
saying “we’re all in this together,” sustainable development discourses effectively essentialize all 
humans on earth (irrespective of being differently-situated) and problems (irrespective of 
causality) into local iterations of a blameless global phenomenon. In effect, questions of causality, 
justice, reparations and transformation are effectively side-stepped (Ribot, 2014; Bassett and 
Fogelman, 2013; Taylor, 2015). Prior to the sustainable turn in “Big D” development, development 
discourses have a long history of representations that depend upon a socio-spatial dialectic (Soja, 
1980; Gilmore, 2002) that co-constitutes the racializing and underdeveloping specific populations 
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and spaces in the Global South (Linke, 2014; Ferguson, 2006; Frank, 1989). This is done through 
discursive formations that operate through hierarchical binaries, (i.e. traditional/modern, 
savage/civilized, inferior/superior) that interpellate a racialized and spatialized “development 
subject” through which (neo)colonial occupations and (neo)liberal economic transformations are 
justified (Power, 2003; Escobar, 1995; Radcliffe, 2005).  In the age of the Anthropocene, 
sustainable development discourses build upon these former discursive formations by constructing 
similar hierarchical binaries (i.e. unsustainable/sustainable, degradation/conservation, 
vulnerability/resilience) that justify political and economic structures and processes positioned to 
mediate socioecological change. Ergo, sustainable development is achieved through the 
production of social difference. Escobar (1995: 195) succinctly explains sustainability’s discursive 
power: “The sustainable development discourse redistributes many of the concerns of classical 
development: basic needs, population, resources, technology, institutional cooperation, food 
security, and industrialism are all found in the Brundtland report, reconfigured and reshuffled…By 
adopting the concept of sustainable development, two old enemies, growth and the environment, 
are reconciled.” With many environmental “bads” being the outcome of market-related 
“externalities,” solutions and environmental “goods” easily become operationalized through the 
global marketplace. Such is the case with REDD+ (Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012), Clean 
Development Mechanisms (Bryant et al, 2015), Payments for Ecosystem Services (McAfee and 
Shapiro, 2010), and other modalities of the neoliberalization of nature (Bakker, 2015). 
 
In addition to being amenable to neoliberal economic solutions to the “climate crisis” in the Global 
South, such discourses often promote technocratic responses to largely social and political 
problems (Ribot, 2014; Ojha et al, 2016; Birkenholtz, 2012; Yohe and Tol, 2002). Such responses 
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are embedded with discourses of ecological modernization, wherein technologies are developed 
and promoted to give people control over the environment. In this logic, ecological problems are 
a lack of adopting certain technologies (i.e. solar photovoltaics) and the adoption of said 
technology are improvements upon nature (Dryzek, 2013; Chaliganti and Müller, 2016; Robbins, 
2012; Schlosberg and Rinfret, 2008; Fairhead and Leach, 2000; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2004; 
Gidwani, 2002). Modernization discourses are often embedded with technological optimism, an 
unwavering belief in humankind’s ability to overcome ecological entropy with expert engineering 
(Dryzek, 2013). Harkening from the Enlightenment Era, modernization discourses are also used 
in tandem with development discourses to promote clientelistic or colonial relationships between 
the Global North and Global South, often at the expense of local knowledge and empowerment 
(Power, 2003). As such, development interventions that promote “appropriate technology” or 
amount to tech dumping are administered upon a development subject ostensibly lacking capacity, 
tools and knowledge. One only needs to glance in development’s rearview to be reminded of how 
modernization efforts (i.e. Green Revolution, irrigation technology) have (re)produced 
exploitative relations of production that create social differentiation and uneven development in 
neoliberal India (Baviskar, 2004; Birkenholtz, 2016; Levien, 2018; Sultana, 2013; Gidwani, 2002; 
Patel, 2013; Roy, 2010). However, the ontological effects of such discursive “truths” remain 
understudied in the context of low-carbon energy transitions. 
 
Individually and in aggregate, each of the aforementioned discourses (climate crisis, sustainable 
development, ecological modernization) comprise “grids of intelligibility12” (Stoler, 1995) through 
                                                          
12 Stoler (1995, 11) defines grid of intelligibility as “a hierarchy of distinctions in perception and practice that 




which discursive formations relating to solar development in India mobilize, accompany 
(portmanteau), and traverse (perambulate) new ideological frontiers with uneven ontological 
effects. By tracing the contours of earlier discursive formations, grids of intelligibility are 
constructed to influence policies, processes and projects relating to renewable infrastructure 
development in a political economic milieu rife with overdetermined inequalities. Experts and 
decision-makers, heralding the deus ex mitigata, both tap into and trust these grids of intelligibility 
through which they understand responses to socioecological change.  
 
2. Methods 
The ideal place to study the discursive processes behind climate mitigation is in India. Specifically, 
I conducted fieldwork in Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and New Delhi, India (Figures 8 and 10). These 
locations were chosen because Gujarat hosts India’s first solar park (Gujarat Solar Park) and 
Andhra Pradesh hosts India’s formerly largest completed solar Park (Kurnool Solar Park). I 
conducted a discourse analysis on 26 texts from January to August 2018. This consisted of policy 
and technical documents from these two solar parks, government schemes of solar development, 
and international development policies relating to climate change mitigation in India (see Table 
3). I utilized various tools from Rose (2001) to guide my discourse analysis, including “descriptive 
codes”, “analytical codes,” and “effects of truth.” Specific themes I was coding for were 
sustainable development, economic development, social development, social difference and 
energy security. I then used Fairclough’s (2001; 2003) critical discourse analysis typology vis-à-
vis structural analysis, interactional analysis and interdiscursive analysis. Finally, I utilized Laclau 
and Mouffe’s (2001) critical understandings of discourse to understand how these texts influence 
social power and political economy and can be utilized to entrench or counter hegemonic truth-
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claims. I then conducted discourse analysis in tandem with fieldwork that consisted of 400 
household surveys across 8 villages near the Gujarat Solar Park and the Kurnool Solar Park13, 84 
semi-structured interviews with policymakers and community members, and participant 
observation in villages adjacent to the solar parks. I conducted interviews with policymakers and 
stakeholders at institutions directly involved in governance and development of solar parks. I 
conducted interviews and surveys with farmers affected by solar parks in villages adjacent to the 
sites. In the case of the GSP, adjacent villagers were smallholders engaged in rainfed agriculture, 
a majority of those surveyed hailing from the broad government classification of ‘Other Backward 
Castes (OBC)’ category of caste affiliation. Within OBCs, there is a wide range of dominant sub-
castes, including Ahir, Gadhvi, Thakore and Koli. There is also a sizeable Rabari population of 
semi-nomadic pastoralists (Yenneti et al, 2016), a marginalized OBC caste. Near the KSP, a 
majority of villagers surveyed belong to the dominant Reddy caste and the marginalized lower 
castes of Kuruva, Boya, and Madiga, with sizeable Dalit and Muslim populations (belonging to 
the Sheik caste).  
 
3. Results 
In this section, I will explore discursive formations of Solar India’s so-called deus ex mitigata 
relating to: 1) crises and solutions, 2) economic and sustainable development, and 3) 
modernization and difference. In doing so, this manuscript strives to denaturalize and expose the 
“truth effects” that sustains and empowers each discursive formation. Next, I will demonstrate how 
the power of ecological and development discourses influences the development of power 
                                                          
13 Villages surveyed near GSP: Charanka, Fangli, Jamvada, Dhokavada. Villages surveyed near KSP: Gani, Sakunala, 
Brahman Palle, Kazipeta. 
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generation infrastructures as ostensible solutions to ecological crises. Below, I will provide context 
and content to exploring Solar India’s discursive formations around economic development. 
 
3.1. Crises and solutions 
"The challenges of climate change and global warming continuously threaten the world community…The Government 
is also cognizant of the cross-cutting nature of impacts with enormous cost implications for tackling them and that 
these costs could escalate if preventive action is not taken immediately.” (Government of Gujarat, 2009: 1) 
 
According to the IPCC, the region of South Asia is uniquely vulnerable to climate-related stressors 
(Hijioka et al, 2014). Despite being the third largest emitter of greenhouse gases (Olivier et al, 
2017), which will likely continue to increase (MNRE, 2017a), India’s industrial development has 
historically contributed little towards present impacts of anthropogenic climate change (Dubash, 
2011). However, the GoI increasingly views its role as a power broker of the Global South (Modi, 
2015), marshalling a suite of mitigative solutions to the “climate crisis” (GoI, 2015: 3; Modi, 
2011). “India seeks to make significant contributions towards climate change mitigation and 
emerge as a responsible global powerhouse” (MNRE, 2017b: 37). To effect, Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi has spearheaded the International Solar Alliance with France to establish 1000 
MW of solar energy in less developed regions that lie between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic 
of Capricorn by 2030 (Modi, 2015), for which he was recognized as a policy leader and awarded 
the UN’s 2018 Champions of the Earth Award (UNEP, 2018). During the founding of the Alliance 
at UNFCCC’s COP 21 in Paris, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “Today, when the energy 
sources and excesses of our industrial age have put our planet in peril, the world must turn to Sun 




Within India, energy insecurity remains a widespread problem, as “more than 50% of the 
population has little or no commercial energy access for their living and livelihood” (MNRE, 2011: 
8). Solar development, therefore, is a way that the central government can receive international 
financing for economic development under the guise of rural electrification and poverty 
alleviation. The central government views the nation as approaching a “demand and supply 
imbalance” wherein the GoI needs to “augment energy supplies” (MNRE, 2011: 7) to keep pace 
with the “rising aspirations” of a growing economy and population (World Bank, 2015: 1). Causal 
factors elicited for future energy deficits include, “economic growth, increasing prosperity and 
urbanization, rise in per capita consumption, and spread of energy access” (MNRE, 2011: 7). By 
activating Malthusian population arguments common in eco-scarcity narratives (see Meadows et 
al, 1972; Ehrlich, 1970; Robbins, 2012), GoI establishes a discursive formation of energy security 
measures contra a looming crisis of environment and development that will negatively impact 
present and future generations.  
 
Energy security is a common discursive formation through which Solar India is justified and 
thereby rendered intelligible. Solar development projects and power/knowledges of “solutions” to 
energy insecurity thereby become naturalized as “common sense” and for the “common good” to 
help solve the climate crisis (Levien, 2013; Levien, 2015). In JNNSM’s founding document it is 
proclaimed that, in light of the vast problem of energy shortages (MNRE, 2010: 2) and power 
outages (MNRE, 2010: 8), “solar is the most secure of all sources [of energy]” (MNRE, 2010: 2). 
Further, energy insecurity is framed as a crisis of its own, meriting the development of large-scale 
solar infrastructure. The Government of Gujarat (2009: 1) builds upon these discursive formations 
by positing large-scale sub-national solar development as able to “reduce the growing economic 
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and environmental burdens at the present but will help ensure energy security for sustainable 
growth and development in the future too.” As referenced above, crisis discourses, when combined 
with energy security discourses, coalesce into an apolitical eco-consensus that helps naturalize 
these discourses (Swyngedouw, 2013; Rignall, 2016). 
 
However, mass deployment of solar infrastructure throughout the states of Gujarat and Andhra 
Pradesh has not reduced energy insecurities for underdeveloped regions or marginalized 
communities. Like many other case studies of renewable energy generation in the Global South 
(Rignall, 2016; Silver, 2015; Baka, 2017; Neimark, 2016), villages adjacent to the solar parks have 
not measurably benefitted from the additional electricity generated in terms of hours received and 
reliability (Stock, in review; Table 7). In fact, while conducting fieldwork in both solar regions 
(Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh), I experienced daily electricity blackouts in adjacent villages with 
erratic times and duration of supply.  
 
 
Gujarat Andhra Pradesh 
Reliability of electricity has improved 40.7% 23.6% 
Hours of electricity have increased 43.4% 24.5% 
 
Table 7: Responses from household surveys regarding reliability and hours received of energy after solar park 
development (n=200 in each state, 400 total). Percentages shown reflect responses in the affirmative. 
 
To secure village-scale support for the solar park, representatives of the SPPD came to Charanka 
and adjacent villages. During their negotiations with the Village Councils (gram panchayats), the 
SPPDs made many promises with local residents to ensure their support for the project. However, 
few of these promises materialized. Residents of the 4 villages near the GSP were vocal in their 
dissent against the solar park and dismay over promises not kept. Each village household was 
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promised one job at the solar park (personal communication, 2018). However, only 26% of 
respondents (n=400) ever received employment at the solar parks. Only 12.5% of those peasants 
whose land was acquired for solar park development received employment at the solar parks 
(Stock, in review). Additionally, SPPD representatives promised the construction of basic 
amenities and infrastructure in adjacent villages (personal communication, 2019). One large 
landowning man from the Gadhvi caste of Charanka (near GSP) reflected on the lack of 
development by the SPPD: “In spite of the land given by the people to the solar park, the basic 
requirements of the village are not fulfilled, such as drinking water, electricity and internal roads” 
(CI.001, 12 February 2018). The SPPDs also promised that all village households would receive 
free electricity once the solar park was running (personal communication, 2019). A middle-income 
(relative to village) Hindu man from the Parmar caste of Fangli (near GSP) remembers the initial 
agreement that GPCL made with the village to develop solar there: “The GPCL people came and 
informed us that many megawatts of electricity are going to be generated, free electricity will be 
given to four nearby villages like Charanka and Fangli” (FI.004, 7 March 2018). A female from 
the Ahir caste of Charanka (near GSP) had this to say: “[GSP] hit us with heavy power bills. It’s 
difficult to pay that and sustain my extended family” (CI.011, 13 February 2018). These 
experiences corroborate those of other peasants undergoing an energy transition thousands of 
kilometers away. 
 
Many residents of villages near the KSP in Andhra Pradesh had similar feelings and experiences 
as the villagers in Gujarat. A smallholding farmer from the Reddy caste of Gani village (near KSP) 
corroborated many of the stories from other producers near the solar parks: “In the evenings, there 
is no electricity. They should actually provide solar power to our village. But we still pay for 
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electricity, they collect Rs. 500 as electricity bill from us every month. Availability of electricity 
has only reduced, we are only paying more.” (GI.011, 18 June 2018). A Vaishya Hindu man with 
only one acre of land from Brahman Palle (near KSP) said: “There are frequent electricity cuts. 
[APSPCL] promised to give 24-hour electricity for free but they didn't” (B027, 15 June 2018). 
One Dalit man from Sakunala village (near KSP) reflected on a government scheme to assist Dalits 
with electricity bills (The Hindu, 2014): “Solar development has no impact on electricity charges. 
But, because of some government policies for SC/ST caste groups, charges for electricity 
consumption below 50 units/month are exempted. That is the only benefit we get, but it is not 
because of the solar park” (SI.005, 11 June 2018). These farmers’ statements comprise counter-
narratives to dominant discursive formations that promise economic development and energy 
security. 
 
One of the main rationales for the project, marketed to private developers, is the grid-connected 
electricity generated goes to nearby urban areas, doing little to improve rural electrification. A 
deputy project manager of GreenKo corporation (operating within KSP) transparently explained: 
“Another aspect is the connectivity to different big cities like Bangalore, Chennai and Hyderabad. 
Within this triangular zone, Rayalseema can transfer so much power to cities possessing high 
energy potential zones” (respondent GK.003, 16 June 2018). As is evident from these findings, 
SPPDs are committed to economic development in regional urban centers, not in adjacent villages. 
 
The data from my fieldwork in these two solar regions demonstrates that solar park development 
has led to energy dispossessions (Baka, 2017), as peasants whose land was given for solar 
development or who live adjacent to the solar parks are not receiving more reliable or inexpensive 
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electricity. Further, the development of the 2 solar parks has been “incommensurate with local 
needs” (Baka, 2017), insofar as it sidesteps other more immediate requirements for improved 
wellbeing (i.e. water, health clinics) or exacerbates current obstacles to development. Next, I will 
examine discourses of economic and sustainable development for power/knowledges and truth-
effects. 
 
3.2. The economics of sustainable development 
“The desire to improve one's lot has been the primary driving force behind human progress. While a few fortunate 
fellow beings have moved far ahead in this journey of progress, there are many in the world who have been left behind. 
Nations that are now striving to fulfill this 'right to grow' of their teeming millions cannot be made to feel guilty of 
their development agenda as they attempt to fulfill this legitimate aspiration. Just because economic development of 
many countries in the past has come at the cost of environment, it should not be presumed that a reconciliation of the 
two is not possible." (GoI, 2015: 1) 
 
Solar India discourses commonly promise to deliver a “triple bottom line” of social equity, 
economic development and ecological protection (The Economist, 2009; Government of India, 
2015). “So, convergence between economy, ecology and energy should define our future” (Modi, 
2015). However, the economic benefits of sustainable development are most heavily promoted in 
technical documents, policy documents and political speeches relating to the solar parks. The GoI 
is using specific discourses of economic development to incentivize nation-states and institutions 
from the Global North, including international organizations (i.e. UNFCCC, World Bank), to 
invest in Solar India to offset emissions (Government of India, 2015: 3). This “opportunity” to 
finance low-carbon growth can reduce emissions intensity and improve the lives of “people barely 
living at subsistence level” (Government of India, 2015: 3). To wit, “The ratio of emission avoided 
per dollar invested and economic growth attained would be relatively more favourable in case of 
investments made in India” (Government of India, 2015: 3). According to GoI’s Paris Agreement 
NDC: “The critical issue for developing nations is the gap between their equitable share of the 
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global carbon space and the actual share of carbon space that will be accessible to them” 
(Government of India, 2015: 33). Thus, GoI requests roughly $150 billion in investments (World 
Bank, 2015), and international financing for capacity building and the transfer of appropriate 
technology by the Global North to ameliorate these development concerns (Government of India, 
2015: 29). As discussed earlier, Solar India discursive formations tap into moralistic guilt and 
Global North savior complexes to position themselves as worthy of investment. 
 
Throughout India’s economy, solar energy is currently “experiencing increasing vibrancy” 
(MNRE, 2011: 64). The inertia of Solar India is generated by prevailing ideologies of 
administrative rationalism (i.e. bureaucracies, law) and an economic rationalism reliant on market 
forces to solve the climate crisis and innovate solutions (Dryzek, 2013). The national government 
is attempting to foster a situation of competitive federalism among states by "Providing Fiscal and 
Financial incentives to Solar projects [sic]” emerging from the state (MNRE, 2012: 49). States 
then vie for federal funding by partnering with SPPDs to launch grid-connected solar parks of 
variable size and wattage. According to the founding document of JNNSM, the scheme strives to 
“create a policy and regulatory environment which provides a predictable incentive structure that 
enables rapid and large-scale capital investment in solar energy applications and encourages 
technical innovation and lowering of costs” (MNRE, 2010: 7). In practice, JNNSM attempts to do 
this by reducing custom and excise duties, reducing taxes, providing concessions on imports, solar 
equipment, components, and critical materials (MNRE, 2010: 9; MNRE, 2012: 50). The Solar 
Energy Corporation of India (SECI), the government institution under which solar development 
transpires, has established a “single window clearing mechanism” to accelerate and simplify 
business investments (MNRE, 2010). Ostensibly, this will reduce time to development and 
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produce “economic and monetary gains” for SPPDs (MNRE, 2016: 20). According to a Deputy 
Manager of SECI: “These solar parks have some unique advantages. First of all, you might have 
already gathered, obtaining land for such a large project must be a huge challenge in India. Just to 
resolve that issue, you enable a single bid clearance and to have a plug-and-play model for setting 
up projects. That is what attracts global players. Indian companies might be accustomed to the 
rules attached in the government or whatever. But the foreign ones might not have much time. To 
facilitate them, we had decided for this solar park an idea borrowed from the Special Economic 
Zones which is used in IT” (interview SECI.003, 18 July 2018). 
 
Many of the solar parks are implemented under a public-private partnership model (World Bank, 
2015: 1), a strategy that will “offer large investment opportunities” in the areas of manufacturing 
(through the Make in India scheme) and power generation, including some amounts foreign 
investment (MNRE, 2011: 85; Government of Gujarat, 2015: 5). Ostensibly, placing solar parks 
in rural areas will “help create new market opportunities” and a “substantial number of jobs” 
(MNRE, 2011: 85; MNRE, 2016) which will “empower local communities” (ADB, 2017: 3). 
These economic claims tap into discursive formations around a “rural resurgence,” the so-called 
“bottom of the pyramid” thriving in capitalism’s transformation of agrarian relations of production 
(Ramamurthy, 2014). In practice, these lofty promises have not materialized.  
 
Almost uniformly across both solar parks, the “skilled workforce” demanded by the parks are 
sourced from outside the adjacent villages, often from larger metropolitan regions like Hyderabad, 
Bangalore, Mumbai, Ahmedabad or Delhi. A smallholding man from the Kuruva caste expressed 
his disappointment: “Everybody was expecting jobs. There are not more than 10 jobs in the entire 
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village. People from other places such as from Kurnool got employment [at the KSP]” (respondent 
GI.002, 17 June 2018). Only 31.5% of survey respondents near the GSP were employed at the 
solar park, compared with 20.5% of respondents living near KSP. Of those employed, 90.4% were 
male. As mentioned above, most peasants whose land was acquired for solar development did not 
receive employment. Employed respondents were only given the opportunity to perform unskilled 
jobs, including work as security guards, cutting the vegetation growing under the solar arrays, and 
washing the solar panels, for an average of USD $2-5 per day. A young man with an MBA from 
Gani (near KSP), who is employed washing the solar panels, reflected on his precarity: “We do 
not think there is any development right now. We are still struggling for jobs and money. We do 
not have any alternative income. I have been getting the same wage before the development, it was 
Rs. 200” (GI.004, 17 June 2018). Among the villagers employed, 90.4% of employed respondents 
were male, leaving females with little opportunities for “empowerment”. 
 
Contra Solar India’s claims of economic development, solar park development in India is more 
accurately a case of dispossession without development (Levien, 2018). Many peasants were 
dispossessed of their land and livelihoods for solar development (Yenneti et al, 2016). Further, 
solar parks have created a surplus population by alienating peasants from the means of production 
(Li, 2010; Li, 2011) without creating adequate wage-labor opportunities. Next, I will put these 
findings in conversation with ecological modernization discourses to discuss the production of 






3.3. Modernization and difference 
In this section, I will explore how Solar India discourses utilize ecological modernization 
discursive formations. Broadly defined, they promote technological innovation as solutions to 
environmental problems (Dryzek, 2013). In this study, I demonstrate how discourses of ecological 
modernization are used to rationalize the development of marginal lands and “improvement” of 
poor smallholding farmer households. Specifically, I will denaturalize the concept of ‘wastelands,’ 
where many solar parks are built, and the racialization that occurs to render these spaces as needing 
improvement. 
 
The GoI’s Paris Agreement NDC document claims the nation is following a path of “development 
without destruction” (GOI, 2015: INDC, 8). JNNSM’s founding document suggests that solar 
energy should be exploited to benefit the “large proportion of poor and energy unserved population 
in the country” (MNRE, 2010: 2). India’s NDC proclaims, “Equitable, inclusive and sustainable 
development would be the key to a new model of growth that India is committed to pursue” 
(Government of India, 2015: 6). In international climate delegations, GoI frequently leverages pro-
poor representations of its vast population of impoverished citizens in order to gain a bargaining 
advantage, irrespective of national and sub-national climate policies that either ignore or reproduce 
their precarity (Chakravarty and Ramana, 2012). 
 
Building on former developmentalist discourses that caution against a “resource curse” (Watts, 
2004; Leach and Mearns, 1996; Robbins, 2012; Hecht and Cockburn, 1989), Solar India discourses 
promote the capitalization of an abundance of renewable resources (i.e. photons). Regarding solar 
potential, “every effort needs to be made to exploit the relatively abundant sources of energy 
78 
 
available to the country” (MNRE, 2012: 8; see also MNRE, 2010: 2; World Bank, 2015). Greening 
the desert through solar development depends upon the social construction of useless ‘wastelands’ 
for solar surplus value (see Makki, 2014; Baka, 2014). A project manager from APSPCL summed 
up this sentiment: “Firstly, wastelands are converted as useful lands” (APSPCL.006, 25 June 
2018). ‘Waste’ is a discursive and ontological category that attempts to naturalize the ‘economy 
of repair’ as common sense (see Gidwani, 2008; Leach et al, 2012), a colonial logic still mobilized 
today. Under the British Raj, wasteland classification was a useful technology to dispossess 
peasants of lands that were not generating revenue for the crown (Whitehead, 2010; Whitehead, 
2012; Gidwani, 1992). The term still serves as a classification for land types, and thus contains 
“buried epistemologies” of colonialism in the age of neoliberal land grabbing for sustainable 
development (Willems-Braun, 1997). The discursive erasures of ‘wasteland’ designation serve as 
a useful simplification (see Scott, 1998) of aesthetically messy spaces (Baka, 2013) that need to 
be improved upon. By mobilizing ‘wasteland’ discourses, the state justifies neocolonial relations 
of production via the state’s extension of control over these lands that were not formerly investible 
due to their lack of “statistical picturing” or perceived social or economic value by the state itself 
(Li, 2014; Baka, 2017; Harms and Baird, 2014; Ferguson, 2014; Nalepa and Bauer, 2012; Nalepa, 
Gianotti and Bauer, 2017; Makki, 2014; Neimark, 2016; Chaliganti and Müller, 2016). Wastelands 
are spaces rife with possibility, economic development via the capital accumulation of harnessing 
photovoltaic energy in a land of abundant solar resources (Stock, in review). The solar parks are 
designed to “promote high end technical investments” (ADB, 2017: 3). As the Prime Minister 
famously proclaimed, “There is already a revolution in solar energy. Technology is evolving, costs 
are coming down and grid connectivity is improving” (Modi, 2015).  However, the technological 
repair of the environment in wasted spaces through solar park development is a way for industrial 
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giants (i.e. Tata, Adani), mandated to reduce emissions, to sustain capital accumulation (see 
McCarthy, 2015; Ekers and Prudham, 2017; Bond, 2012; Boyd et al, 2011). In sum, the political 
and social construction of ‘wasteland’ spaces as devoid of both use value and surplus value employ 
paradoxical ‘empty but full’ discourses (Bridge, 2001), stemming from a colonial logic that is 
(re)produced in the post-independence period through a series of orchestrated discourses. As such, 
they promote the wastelands’ transformation to valuable spaces of ‘clean’ energy generation from 
abundant renewable resources, summarized by the normative maxim: “one man’s waste is another 
man’s treasure.” 
 
However, these wastelands are not wasted at all, just under-capitalized in the market economy. 
Indeed, they are productive spaces for resource-dependent households reliant on these lands for 
procurement of fuelwood (i.e. Prosopis juliflora), foraging and livestock grazing (Baka and Bailis, 
2014). Numerous smallholding agriculturalists and pastoralists from adjacent villages14 depend 
upon these marginal spaces for life and livelihoods. Near the GSP in Charanka village, 94% of 
households surveyed were dependent on firewood for daily cooking. Additionally, 72% said 
enclosure of wastelands for the GSP impacted their access to firewood. When compared with the 
GSP, residents near the KSP’s access to firewood was not as impacted by wasteland enclosures. 
Only 44% of Gani households and 48% of Sakunala households are dependent upon firewood for 
cooking. Roughly 56% of Gani households indicated that wasteland enclosures had no impact on 
firewood procurement, compared with 50% of Sakunala households. 
 
                                                          
14 Discussion is only for villages whose land was acquired for solar parks. GSP: Charanka; KSP: Gani and Sakunala. 
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One female from the Ahir caste of Charanka had this to say: “Earlier the area was clear and we 
could collect firewood, but now it’s difficult to go and collect” (respondent CI.013, 13 February 
2018). A Dalit woman from Fangli village corroborated her sentiments: “Earlier, we used to move 
freely on the land where the solar park is situated presently. Now, it’s restricted for the collection 
of cattle feed. We five or ten women used to go there for cattle grazing. But now with whom are 
we supposed to go? Now we suffer difficulties” (respondent FI.008, 8 March 2018). One young 
male laborer from Charanka reflected on livelihood changes due to the enclosure of land for the 
solar park: “The illiterate people of the village have to migrate elsewhere as the animal grazing 
has been stopped completely” (respondent CI.012, 13 February 2018). 
 
In addition to livelihood changes, the transformation of wastelands in clean energy has many 
implications for the (re)production of social difference. The British Raj socially constructed these 
wasteland landscapes as ‘immoral’ and racialized their inhabitants as backward and primitive 
(Gidwani, 1992). The buried epistemology of these racialized wastelands still haunts development 
discourses and upliftment schemes associated with solar development. Solar India discourses often 
reify the axiom of “backwardness/industrialization” that has long haunted scholars investigating 
agrarian transformations (Power, 2003; Escobar, 1995; Moyo et al, 2013). In discussing the GSP, 
a general manager of GPCL remarked: “The Gujarat Solar Park was developed on non-developed 
land, near the desert. Lands at Charanka were underdeveloped. That land was not even good for 
farming. So, to develop the area, we selected Charanka. It is barren land. That is a backwards area 
with unusable land. There was no development in Charanka” (interview GPCL.004, 4 March 
2018). In discussing site selection for the KSP, a project manager of GreenKo explained it thusly: 
“When you consider Andhra Pradesh geographically, Rayalseema zone is least cultivable land. 
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Because if you see geographical condition of Andhra Pradesh, these lands are not fertile at all, they 
were not used for cultivation, there was no water resource. These were barren waste lands” 
(respondent GK.003, 16 June 2018). A project manager at APSPCL similarly “APSPCL acquired 
lands in such a way no cultivable lands were disturbed, rather we took barren lands. We did not 
want to use farming lands. India is known as the backbone of farmers” (APSPCL.005, 25 June 
2018). 
 
As mentioned above, most smallholders engage in rainfed agriculture and a majority of survey 
respondents belong to marginalized castes. One general manager from SECI in New Delhi 
laughingly described peasant livelihoods near the KSP: “Agriculture is almost nil, you can say. It 
may happen in once in 5 years. Once some rain comes, they just throw the seeds. If, by God’s 
grace, seeds grow then it’s okay. Otherwise, it’s a very dry area. But by doing these solar parks, 
they are getting some employability over there, some compensation. Some local development” 
(SECI.001, 16 July 2018). Rationalized through ecological modernization discourses, the spatial 
transformation of wastelands into productive use (waste to value) also involves a racialization (via 
casteism) of producers ‘from savage to civilized’ (see Baka, 2013; Baka, 2014), insofar as it 
implies that these backward castes have backward livelihoods and live in a wasted land, 
repurposing buried epistemologies from the colonial era in the age of green development.  
 
4. Discussion: Leviathan’s light as a state of exception 
Tout court, low-carbon transitions are necessary to stave off negative sociopolitical climate-related 
impacts. Solar development in lands with vast solar irradiance is an excellent opportunity to 
mitigate climate change. As I demonstrate through ethnographic research presented here, the lived 
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experiences and opinions of many people living near the solar parks are not reflected in utopian 
discursive formations that promote solar development as solutions to climate crises or agrarian 
crises15. In fact, these voices represent discursive silences (Rose, 2001), whereby they are rendered 
invisible (eclipsed) and omitted by dominant Solar India discourses (as a knowledge project) that 
silence alternative interpretations of reality. The invisibility of these peasants’ knowledge gives 
further validity to Solar India’s dominant discourses, as well as socially constructing the 
attenuating institutions’ authority over knowledge, policymaking and implementing interventions. 
As such, the truth-effects of these powerful discursive formations have material consequences for 
people and places. 
 
The project reports, technical documents, and policies of Solar India contain representations of 
nature and development within discursive formations. In aggregate, these representations 
constitute discursive formations, building upon a grid of intelligibility to influence people’s ideas 
about solar development. The power of these discursive formations is an important modality by 
which dispossession is rationalized as an act of the “common good” (Levien, 2013) and consent is 
obtained by producers whose land is valued by the SPPDs. India’s Paris Agreement NDC 
document utilizes these logics: "If climate change is a calamity that mankind must adapt to while 
taking mitigation action withal, it should not be used as a commercial opportunity. It is time that 
a mechanism is set up which will turn technology and innovation into an effective instrument for 
global public good, not just private returns" (Government of India, 2015: 2). 
 
                                                          
15 See Ramamurthy (2014) for an exploration of ‘agrarian crisis’ narratives. 
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The cultural hegemony of Solar India as a deus ex mitigata cannot be understated at this stage of 
late capitalism. The myriad discourses undergirding Solar India are occurring within a largely 
“post-political” context (Swyngedouw, 2010; for generative critiques, see McCarthy, 2013; North 
et al, 2017) of eco-consensus (Swyngedouw, 2013). Operating as a deus ex mitigata, Solar India 
eclipses discussions of power relations under a benevolent telos of sustainable development and 
marginalizes policies, projects or praxis of climate or energy justice that go against the grain of 
neoliberal orthodoxies. Put simply, the political mobilization of solar development via discursive 
formations of, inter alia, climate crises and sustainable imaginaries depoliticizes the policy domain 
(Swyngedouw, 2011). The mainstreaming and depoliticization of climate change interventions 
(i.e. solar parks) are occurring in the Indian context of rising ethno-nationalism and an increasingly 
undemocratic populism (Bhatt, 2013; Guha, 2013), wherein land enclosures for climate change 
mitigation (re)produce social differences (Kythreotis, 2012). For instance, recent non-violent 
resistance to the KSP by dispossessed peasants, women and members of the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) at the Collectorate Office in Kurnool was met with police brutality (The Hindu, 
2016). This was a tragic yet expected example of state authority using force to uphold the 
legitimacy of Solar India’s power. 
 
Large-scale solar development in India operates within labyrinthine institutional structures, 
regionally powerful muscles in the forming corpus of a planetary climate leviathan16 that is being 
assembled to mediate all transgressions (i.e. pollution) and responses (i.e. solar parks) to the 
climate crisis (Wainwright and Mann, 2013; 2015; 2018) in a liberal democracy that sustains 
                                                          
16 Wainwright and Mann (2013: 5) define climate leviathan as, essentially, a global sovereign that “exists who can 
decide on the exception, declare an emergency, and decide who may emit carbon and who cannot. . . for the sake 
of life on Earth.” 
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capital accumulation in the present neoliberal mode of production (Swyngedouw, 2010), with 
biopolitical implications (Turhan et al, 2015). In this time of “climate crisis”, one can imagine a 
planetary sovereign, ala climate leviathan, with the power to declare a state of exception 
(Agamben, 2005) to the rule of law and basic rights (i.e. countermand the mandates of LARR; The 
Hindu, 2017). The descent of the so-called deus ex mitigata, in its capacity as a partial solution to 
the climate crisis, provides an ideological rationale for increased consolidation of national power 
for the “public good” of mitigating the looming threat of global climate change (cf. Levien, 2013; 
Levien, 2015). Constitutional rights (i.e. property rights, litigation) can be suspended for solar 
development. Further, the aforementioned dominant sustainability and climate discourses 
rationalize such a state of exception and will be privileged as “truth,” thereby silencing alternative 
discourses, dissent or other forms of knowledge. One can imagine tactics of framing latent climate 
change vulnerability of historically marginalized populations as “bare life” (Agamben, 1995) that 
needs biopolitical intervention of population management by the sovereign (Foucault, 2003), 
“make live or let die” in the context of sociopolitical reactions to resource scarcity and extreme 
weather events. This would follow Prime Minister Nehru’s famous high modernist proclamation 
of 1948: "If you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the country" (Roy, 1999). The 
sovereign’s management of climate change adaptation and vulnerability through Solar India, in 
the context of massive mitigation interventions (i.e. solar parks), may transpire along a continuum 
of the biopolitical or necropolitical17, delineated by citizenship/nationality, class, ethnicity, etc. 
State subjects under the state of exception are included within state institutions created within the 
dispositif of Solar India, but under mercurial circumstances that allow for exclusion when 
                                                          




necessary for unilateral imposition of policies, processes or projects relating to the goal of climate 
change mitigation via solar development. 
 
Anthropogenic climate change is a legitimate problem for India, as is the need for electrification. 
The perennial lynchpin of climate change interventions is rarely about carbon, almost always about 
capital and control. Wasteland spaces hold promise for modernization, as their “repair” can be 
fixed through so-called “clean and green” technological innovations like solar arrays. In this logic, 
generating “clean” energy in the ‘wastelands’ will modernize the OBCs. Placed along a “purity-
to-pollution” axis, solar development serves a dual function by legitimating difference as part of a 
project to “improve” the population (see Chow, 2002). Although caste is distinct from race, we 
can make a parallel to Stuart Hall’s (1996) succinct argument about the production of social 
difference (via caste) through capitalism: “Capital reproduces class, including its internal 
contradictions as a whole—structured by race.” The ontological and discursive erasures wielded 
by Solar India (i.e. “backward people in a wasteland”) serve the purpose of rationalizing a highly 
contested method of “cleaning” the environment and “modernizing” rural people of neoliberal 
India. 
 
However, Leviathan’s opportunity in Solar India provides an aperture through which rays of 
counter-hegemony can shine through. Sensing the futility of a proper war of maneuver consisting 
of direct confrontation against the authoritative institutions protecting Solar India’s cultural 
hegemony (see The Hindu, 2016), dispossessed peasants whose discourses are eclipsed by Solar 
India may wage a war of position (Gramsci, 2007). Contra climate leviathan operating through 
social structures, it is in resistant micro-political spaces of social relations where the dispossessed 
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can cultivate a counter-hegemony (Cox, 1999) of “alternative institutions and alternative 
intellectual resources” (Cox, 1983: 165). In doing so, peasants can denaturalize and disarm specific 
discursive formations that rationalize exclusionary and exploitative modalities of solar 
development, thereby arresting the deus ex mitigata. Other than the rising sun, contestations of 




Post-Paris Agreement, the GoI is swiftly implementing large-scale solar installations to mitigate 
climate change and generate much-needed electricity for the developing nation. Indeed, these 
projects are the outcome of sustainable imaginaries by policymakers and “experts” that generate, 
collate and articulate specific discursive formations to mobilize certain renewable energy projects. 
State institutions of Solar India (i.e. Ministry of New and Renewable Energy) rationalize solar 
parks as solutions to poverty, rural electrification and climate change through discursive 
formations of 1) crises and solutions, 2) economic and sustainable development, and 3) 
modernization and difference. Discursive formations around the climate crisis and a looming 
energy security crisis are used to attract investments in solar development, positioned as a method 
of poverty alleviation and rural electrification. Indeed, energy poverty is an impediment to well-
being and economic development in these solar regions. In practice, the solar parks have not 
reduced energy insecurities, as villagers are not receiving more reliable, more frequent, or more 
inexpensive electricity. SPPDs create business-friendly policies to attract private and international 
investments, claiming that adjacent “people barely living at subsistence levels” (Government of 
India, 2015: 3) will benefit from a windfall of job opportunities and regional development. In 
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reality, there has been a paucity of job creation and vast land dispossessions, creating a surplus 
population alienated from the means of production. The spatial improvement of rural ‘wastelands’ 
into investible spaces via “clean” energy also includes the racialization of “backwards” 
populations with traditional livelihoods in need of modernization. Through two case studies 
(Gujarat Solar Park and Kurnool Solar Park), I shed light on solar projects developed by 
dispossessing smallholder peasants of land and access to natural resources and dominant discursive 
formations that eclipse alternative discourses and the lived experiences of local inhabitants. More 
equitable and inclusive discourses promoting climate change mitigation through solar 
development would give prominence to the voices of affected populations and highlight 
collectively-owned community-based micro-grids (i.e. Dhundi Solar Cooperative) as alternatives 
to dispossessive solar infrastructures. 
 
The promise of solar development represents a deus ex machina (rather, a deus ex mitigata) plot 
device of neoliberal India that promises social development through sustainable solutions in the 
Anthropocene without transforming political economic structures that (re)produce social 
difference. Globally through the International Solar Alliance, the deus ex mitigata is poised to 
become the sine qua non of low-carbon development in the Global South to meet ambitious Paris 
Agreement commitments to cap warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius (UNEP, 2018). Solar India 
represents national and sub-national institutional configurations of a forming global climate 
leviathan, with the authority to enact states of exception to fast-track massive mitigation projects 
(i.e. solar parks) in a post-political neoliberal mode of governance. The inconvenient truth is that 
Solar India’s discourses have powerful truth-effects. Conveniently, a deus ex mitigata that drops 
from above brings an implausible end to great climaxing climatic crises without resolving the 
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lingering power struggles in the plot. A just transition to low-carbon energy sources must look like 
a political economic transformation for the dispossessed and marginalized peasants whose land 
and livelihoods were sacrificed, which need not exclude mitigation technologies represented 
through Solar India discourses. But let us not be blinded by solar optimism either. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE SUN AND THE SCYTHE: REGIMES OF DISPOSSESSION AND 
EVERYDAY RESISTANCE ‘FROM BELOW’ IN SOLAR RESOURCE/STATES 
 
1. Introduction 
“As you put clean energy within the reach of all, it will create unlimited economic opportunities that will be the 
foundation of the new economy of this century.”  (Prime Minister Narendra Modi, 30 November 2015) 
 
“There are plenty who resisted [the solar park]. The land acquisition inevitably triggers resistance.”  
(Rabari woman, 12 February 2018).” 
 
India is the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse gases (Olivier et al, 2017) and has the 
world’s second largest population (Government of India, 2011). It is likely that the country’s 
emissions will continue to climb rapidly despite rapid development of the renewable energy 
industry (Government of India, 2017). In India, as in the context of other developing countries, 
expanded energy production and concomitant rising CO2 levels are seen as necessary to help raise 
India’s 363 million poor out of poverty. In efforts to slow rising emissions and scale up energy 
generation, the central Government of India (GoI) launched the 2010 Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Solar Mission (JNNSM) as part of their 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). 
The goal is to incentivize state governments to promote and develop solar infrastructure 
(Government of India, 2008; MNRE, 2012).  
 
Currently in its third phase of implementation (2017-2022), the JNNSM seeks the ambitious goal 
of achieving 100 GW of solar energy generating capacity by 2022. In line with their 2015 UN 
Paris Agreement commitments to prevent more than 2 degrees Celsius warming globally, India 
seeks to reduce emissions by 33% before 2030 (Government of India, 2015). India will achieve 
this by quadrupling renewable energy projects, comprising the lion’s share of the country’s 
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Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to mitigate climate change (Government 
of India, 2015). The JNNSM projects are divided into utilities projects (i.e. ground-mounted solar 
panels, solar panels covering canal extensions) and residential projects (i.e. solar water heaters, 
solar irrigation pumps). The largest electricity generating JNNSM projects are large-scale, ground-
mounted solar panel parks (MNRE, 2016; Yenneti, 2016). In order to meet its Paris Agreement 
goals, GoI has allocated Rs 4050 crore (roughly USD $648 million) to develop 25 ultra-mega solar 
power projects (defined as solar parks with a minimum generating capacity of 500 MW) by 2020 
throughout India.  
 
However, solar parks of this generating capacity require hundreds of hectares of land, if not more. 
In many instances, the only land available are so-called government-owned “marginal” lands or 
brownfield sites (Rignall, 2016). These lands are part of the commons, used and managed by 
agropastoralists, who rely on these spaces for grazing, fodder and fuelwood foraging (MNRE, 
2016; Yenneti and Day, 2015). Their transformation from commons to solar parks necessitates 
prohibiting agropastoralists’ usage. This is a hotly contested process and involves both alienating 
agropastoralists from the conditions of production, as well as relocating them at times.  
 
In this paper, I study the political and economic processes through which the state and private 
capital engage to enclose these commons lands away from agropastoralists and render them 
investable for solar parks. I draw on recent research on accumulation by dispossession to explore 
the economic and extra-economic means through which this occurs, and agropastoralist resistance 
to these efforts. To do so, I rely on primary data collected in 2017-2018 comparing two of India’s 
largest solar parks. The first, Gujarat Solar Park (GSP) was India’s first grid-connected and 
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ground-mounted solar park, a success story upon which all subsequent solar parks’ planning and 
implementation is based. The second, Kurnool Solar Park (KSP) in Andhra Pradesh, is currently 
under construction and is outcome of the Government of India’s Ministry of New and Renewable 
Energy decision to scale-up grid-connected ground-mounted solar initiatives through the JNNSM 
(GoI, 2014).  
 
Despite the laudable drive to expand green energy, the JNNSM ultra-mega solar parks represent a 
convergence of domestic and foreign actors for the dispossession of and capital accumulation in 
rural, often marginal spaces (see Lavers, 2012; Rignall, 2016; Yenneti et al, 2016). However, 
affected populations are responding to these rural transformations in diverse ways. Drawing upon 
literature from the fields of political ecology and critical agrarian studies, this research is motivated 
by the following questions: 1) How and through what processes are the costs and benefits of the 
Gujarat Solar Park and Kurnool Solar Park distributed across differently situated individuals?; 
2) How are project-associated land enclosures resisted by adjacent resource-dependent people? 
This paper seeks to contribute to discussions of the classical agrarian question, industrial 
capitalism’s economic and political transformation of peasant producers, in the context of land 
dispossession by the state. Additionally, this manuscript complicates essentialized notions of 
unified peasant resistance in the face of agrarian transformation and resource dispossession. 
 
This paper progresses in 5 further sections. The next section is an exploration of the classical 
agrarian question, including the phenomena of regimes of dispossession and green grabbing. 
Section 3 details my methods for data collection, including a detailed contextualization of my 
study areas in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, India. Section 4 discusses the results from this research 
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paper, including evidence of patterns of dispossession, energy dispossessions, partial 
proletarianization, and resistance ‘from below.’ Section 5 is a discussion that puts this research in 
conversation with Polanyian double movements. Section 6 is the conclusion of this paper. 
 
1.1. Illuminating the Agrarian Question 
“Capitalist production, therefore, only develops the techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of 
production by simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the worker.” (Marx, 1990: 
638) 
 
1.1.1. Primitive accumulation 
Karl Marx has described the combined processes of the original enclosure of commons and 
proletarianization within a capitalist system as primitive accumulation (Marx, 1867). The producer 
is removed from the means of production, production for subsistence is transformed into surplus 
value, and the original producers become wage laborers (see Perelman, 2000).  The alienation of 
the producer from the means of production, enforced through ‘extra-economic’ politico-legal 
structures (McCarthy, 2004; see also Glassman, 2006; Brass, 2011), is not just an enduring 
historical characteristic of capitalist development, but also a socio-spatial process that transforms 
the landscape, leading to uneven development (Smith, 1994) that subsequently ‘underdevelops’ 
the peasantry (Frank, 1989) through capitalist relations of production that extract surplus value 
away from producers. David Harvey (2003), among others (see Luxemburg, 2003; Levien, 2011b), 
contends that this process of primitive accumulation is ongoing, a process he refers to as 
accumulation by dispossession. Within the context of solar park development in India, networks 
of global capital (i.e. solar park developers, polluting firms, speculative investments, international 
development funds) produce renewable energy infrastructures in rural areas that can be productive 
spaces for resource-dependent households (Baka and Bailis, 2014). However, there remains a 
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paucity of empirical studies on the distribution of costs and benefits of low-carbon infrastructure 
among differently-situated peasants in the drylands of India, a gap in the literature this manuscript 
attempts to address. 
 
Following Levien (2015; 2013b), I contend that India’s rapid expansion of solar infrastructure as 
part of a push towards low-carbon development constitutes a regime of dispossession, defined as 
“socially and historically specific constellations of state structures, economic logics tied to 
particular class interests, and ideological justifications that generate a consistent pattern of 
dispossession” (Levien, 2013b: 383). In this paper, I will discuss 2 patterns of dispossession (i.e. 
what is being dispossessed, to whom and by whom; Levien, 2013b) occurring at the site of the 
GSP and the KSP. Offsetting CO2 to mitigate climate change is occurring via the dispossession of 
marginalized user groups through land enclosure, the sine qua non for solar parks (Yenneti and 
Day, 2016; Yenneti et al, 2016). Bumpus and Liverman (2008) describe this process as an 
accumulation by decarbonization. Carbon mitigation projects, like solar parks, often alter the 
livelihoods of rural producers (Newton et al, 2015). The solar regimes of dispossession transpire 
through land grabbing for sustainable development, or green grabbing.  
 
1.1.2. Green grabbing 
Development interventions in India are increasingly implemented through the market logics of 
neoliberalism (Casolo and Doshi, 2013), especially development interventions that address 
environmental concerns like climate change (Bakker, 2015; McAfee, 2012; McCarthy and 
Prudham, 2004; Heynen et al, 2007). Within solar parks, solar radiation and the carbon dioxide 
mitigated becomes a privately-held commodity to be bought and sold within a marketplace, 
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connected to energy infrastructure in spaces (often rural) removed from finance capital (see 
Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Newton et al, 2015). New frontiers of capital accumulation occur 
through “new carbon economies” (Boyd, Boykoff and Newell, 2011), in this case an anti-carbon 
economy. JNNSM solar projects are embedded within these commodified carbon neoliberal logics 
in rural spaces increasingly enclosed for these projects.  
 
Throughout the Global South, diverse actors are committing large-scale land acquisitions for 
agricultural improvement, rural development, or security concerns relating to an impending 
environmental crisis (Watts, 2004; McMichael, 2008; Borras Jr. et al, 2011; De Schutter, 2011; 
White et al, 2012; Cotula, 2012; Roitman, 2013; Makki, 2014; Ramamurthy, 2014; Nalepa, 
Gianotti and Bauer, 2017). Land grabbing is a type of large-scale land acquisition, defined as “the 
capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety 
of mechanisms and forms, carried out through extra-economic coercion that involves large-scale 
capital, which often shifts resource use orientation into extraction, whether for international or 
domestic purposes, as capital’s response to the convergence of food, energy and financial crises, 
climate change mitigation imperatives, and demands for resources from newer hubs of global 
capital” (Borras and Franco, 2013: 1725). Geography, rather the reconfiguration of social and 
economic space, is at the center of transitions to low-carbon economies (Bridge et al, 2013; 
Scheidel and Sorman, 2012; Pasqualetti, 2011; Rignall, 2016). Land grabs are a vital part of a 
‘global land rush’ to sustain low-carbon transitions (Scheidel and Sorman, 2012; Rignall, 2016) in 
India. The JNNSM solar parks comprise a vital component of this strategy, yet they are a form of 
green grabbing, an elite capture that dispossesses peasants of both land and natural resources 
(Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012; Rocheleau, 2015; Robbins, 2006). Such land grabs can result 
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from multilateral treaties (McCarthy, 2004; Rignall, 2016), such as the JNNSM solar parks rushing 
to decarbonize in according to India’s 2015 Paris Agreement commitments. The expropriation of 
agricultural land for neoliberal development is accelerating in western India through state-
assistance and public-private partnerships (Zoomers, 2010; Levien, 2015; Sampat, 2015), 
especially Special Economic Zones (SEZs)18 (Levien, 2011b; Levien, 2013b), as is the case with 
JNNSM projects writ large. In fact, the concept of the solar park in India was modeled after Special 
Economic Zones (personal communication, 17 July 2018), modern “green” configurations of 
Nehruvian steel towns and industrial estates (Levien, 2013b). However, the state’s regime of 
dispossession for solar development espouses developmentalist discourses about climate 
mitigation for the “public good,” albeit with less classically Nehruvian developmentalist telos 
(Levien, 2015). As mentioned earlier, these rural transformations are implemented on government-
owned and state-defined “marginal” lands. To accomplish this, these common spaces are enclosed 
or private farmlands are purchased by solar park project developers (SPPDs), often conducted 
through subordinate scales of governance19. As such, land tenure arrangements are changed, 
disproportionately impacting smallholding agriculturalists and pastoralists whose livestock are 
dependent on common land resources for grazing or for fuelwood collection (Baka and Bailis, 
2014). This paper attempts to showcase different patterns of dispossession across the 2 case studies 
of green grabbing, and different responses by affected peasants. 
 
                                                          
18 The Santalpur Special Investment Region, the Euro Multivision Special Economic Zone, and the Gujarat 
International Finance Tec-City (GIFT) are all SEZs that are geographically proximate to GSP (Government of Gujarat, 
2017; GIFT, 2018). The larger Andhra Pradesh-Telangana region also has many SEZs and ICTs nearby KSP, including 
the futuristically branded Cyberabad (Zoomers, 2010). Each of these industrial and financial centers receives 
electricity from the grid-connected solar parks. 
19 Private land for the GSP and KSP was acquired under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (High Court of Gujarat, 2015). See Levien (2011a) for a 
generative critique of this bill. 
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As will be discussed in more depth later in the manuscript, peasants often experience these land 
deals through a mix of resistance, acquiescence or inclusion (Hall et al, 2015). Subsequently, 
agrarian relations of production and household reproduction are negatively impacted, rural 
livelihoods are transformed (see Ramamurthy, 2014) as the enclosed spaces are privatized, 
resulting in a proletarianization of the peasantry. However, the enclosure of rural spaces for solar 
park development results in a partial proletarianization (Byres, 1981; Misra, 2017; see also 
Breman, 1996), as many of the households that lost land and livelihoods also do not receive 
employment in the solar parks. Below, I discuss how energy projects in wasteland development 
schemes that promise poverty alleviation and energy security, such as JNNSM solar parks, 
frequently result in elite capture and smallholder marginalization (Ariza-Montobbio et al, 2010; 
see also De Schutter, 2011). 
 
1.1.3. Solar resource/state wasteland simplifications 
These ‘sustainable’ agrarian transformations are producing new frontiers of land control beholden 
to new technologies of governance (Lund and Peluso, 2011; see also Robbins, 2006). The 
Kafkaesque political-legal structures of solar parks (see Figure 2) is a networked assemblage 
(Rocheleau, 2015) of actors and institutions across multiple scales of governance to facilitate low-
carbon energy transition (Rignall, 2016), emblematic of other state-making processes in rural India 
that serve to dispossess marginalized populations (cf. Gupta, 2012; Birkenholtz, 2015) but in the 
context of resource exploitation (Bridge, 2014). Increasingly, India is experiencing a swift private 
sector penetration of public sector electricity generation systems (Joseph, 2010). The 
unprecedented boom of solar parks for electricity generation across rural Indian drylands is yet 
another regime of dispossession initiated by the resurgent resource/state, which Bridge (2014) 
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defines as the “scientific and political practice around resource-making and state-making projects” 
(see also Birkenholtz, 2015). Apropos to this case, individual Indian states create new state policies 
and sub-national institutions to exploit solar resources on enclosed common lands or newly 
acquired private lands, ostensible progressions reflecting a telos of rural economic development 
and sustainability. In this case, state-making occurs to facilitate neoliberal development via “green 
grabs” of previously unprofitable ‘wastelands’ or wasteland resources (i.e. solar radiation in 
sparsely populated drylands). Essentially, the state becomes a land broker for green capital 
(Levien, 2012; Levien, 2013b; Levien, 2018). This research attempts to showcase this process and 
its uneven outcomes. 
 
Essentially, most solar parks represent a public-private partnership to renewable energy 
generation. Following Borras and Franco (2013: 1729), the state assists solar park project 
developers (SPPDs) in acquiring land via techniques of extra-economic tactics that include: 1) 
plans to develop a solar park that justify the acquisition of land; 2) defining, demarcating and 
identifying specific tracts of ‘marginal’ or ‘wastelands’; 3) assertion of state’s authority over these 
land, regardless of disputed property title or customary use; 4) acquisition of these lands via 
consent or coercion; 5) allocation of these lands to SPPDs or firms that lease the land from the 
SPPD to generate solar energy (i.e. Tata Power Solar, Adani Solar, GreenKo).  
 
‘Wastelands’ is a vague government classification of marginal or degraded lands (ICAR, 2010), 
socially constructed ‘immoral’ and racialized landscapes due to their lack of revenue generation 
for the British colony (Gidwani, 1992). Prior to present day land acquisition, the process of 
defining, demarcating and identifying so-called wastelands for solar development itself is a form 
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of simplification (Scott, 1998; Harms and Baird, 2014). Germane to this research, the 
resource/state appropriates land and natural resources to facilitate the accumulation of rents in the 
discursive erasures of ‘wastelands’ in rural ‘backwards’ areas, spaces of terra nullius that need to 
be ‘improved upon’ (Baka, 2013; Baka, 2017; Nalepa and Bauer, 2012; Nalepa, Gianotti and 
Bauer, 2017; Makki, 2014; Rignall, 2016; Harms and Baird, 2014; Ferguson, 2014; Ariza-
Montobbio et al, 2010). The arbitrary political construction of wastelands is often aesthetic (Baka, 
2013). The state disseminated Prosopis juliflora (local vernacular: baval) for the purposes of social 
forestry (see Kaur et al, 2012), now the presence of prosopis serves as an aesthetic shorthand for 
wastelands (Baka, 2013). This remains true in both solar case studies, despite the productive uses 
of prosopis by resource-dependent adjacent populations (see Baka and Bailis, 2014). The 
resource/state uses repertoires of simplification (Scott, 1998), such as classification, mapping and 
statistical exercises, to make the wasteland an investible commodity or to render the wastelands 
governable spaces to manage a specific natural resource like solar radiation (Baka, 2013; Baka and 
Bailis, 2014; Robbins, 2001; Watts, 2004; Li, 2014).  Paul Robbins succinctly describes these 
processes of resource/state simplification: “…the pursuit of objectivity in modern scientific and 
bureaucratic communities, driven by challenges to the legitimacy of state expert power, has led to 
the increasing promulgation of portable technologies and the hegemonic imposition of state-fixed 
categories through the practice of ecological modernization” (Robbins, 2001: 163). 
 
This simplification extends to the processes of incorporation and enclosure (Hall et al, 2015; 
McCarthy, 2010). SPPDs make distinctions between patta land, private land with proper title, and 
D-patta land, a vague classification including cases of customary tenure, illegal cultivation of 
government lands or areas on old maps demarcated in dotted lines (also referred to as D-form patta 
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land) (respondent APSPCL.002, 23 June 2018). As I demonstrate below, many peasants’ land was 
enclosed based on their articulation within these state simplifications of land tenure. This process 
is more complex in Andhra Pradesh, where the state has transformed marginal public land into 
patta land and distributed it to the landless poor (discussed below). However, the extension of patta 
through assigned land was not complete in Gani and Sakunala villages (The Hindu, 2017). In this 
study, which lands were selected (public vs. private) and claims to these lands is a determinate of 
the distribution of costs and benefits of the solar parks, as well as a determinate of response by 
positioning differently-situated peasants. 
 
1.1.4. The agrarian question 
The relationship between the resource/state and peasants is defining land politics and labor 
opportunities. Green grabs occurring under globally ascendant neoliberal capitalism reestablish 
the pertinence of the classical agrarian question (Kautsky, 1988; Lenin, 1967; Bernstein, 2004; 
McMichael, 2008; Patnaik, 2012; Lerche, 2013), the myth that industrial capitalism will produce 
social and economic transformation of poor rural areas. Since the 1990s, a defining feature of 
India’s breakneck development is jobless economic growth, producing surplus populations 
increasingly reliant upon livelihood activities of the informal sector (Dasgupta and Singh, 2005). 
This form of agrarian transformation for climate mitigation technologies fails to industrialize these 
politically-designated “backwards” areas, thus leaving the classical agrarian question unanswered 
or bypassed (see Moyo et al, 2013; Lerche, 2013). SPPDs often claim that these agrarian 
transformations will lead to a ‘rural resurgence’ (Ramamurthy, 2014). In reality, they alter 
relations of production that ultimately undermine the vitality of Indian peasant agriculture 
(Patnaik, 2012; Lerche, 2013; Levien, 2012; Luna, 2018) due to a coercive redistribution of land 
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(Levien, 2018). For many peasants dispossessed of land, the outcome of this process is a partial 
proletarianization (Byres, 1981; Misra, 2017), as their labor is not needed, creating a new surplus 
population without adequate wage-labor opportunities (Breman, 1996; Li, 2011; Li, 2010). This 
study highlights the land, labor, production and resistance implications of agrarian 
transformations, such as large-scale solar infrastructures. Below, I discuss the processes by which 
I arrived at my empirical and theoretical findings.  
 
2. Materials and Methods 
Fieldwork for this research was conducted from January to August 2018 in Gujarat, Andhra 
Pradesh and New Delhi, India. The reason for a larger comparative study emerged from additional 
questions after completion of fieldwork at the GSP. I wanted to understand whether the processes 
occurring at the GSP are unique or more general to solar park development in other areas of India. 
If the processes at the GSP are unique, how, in what ways and why does it differ from other solar 
parks? If the processes at GSP are similar to other solar parks, why is it the same despite different 
political and economic processes, and local conditions? The parameters for selecting the GSP and 
the KSP, as well as specific villages within these solar regions, are listed in Table 1. Household 
survey questionnaires were administered to eight villages bordering the GSP and the KSP (see 
Figures 8 and 10), fifty (n=50) households per village, for a total of four hundred (n=400) surveys. 
Three of the villages surveyed experienced land enclosures by the solar park and the remaining 
five villages surveyed serve as comparison studies (see Table 4; Figures 8 and 10). Households 
were selected using an every third household sampling technique, randomly stratified by class, 
caste and gender. The surveys were conducted in Gujarati, Telugu, Hindi or Urdu languages, per 
the respondents’ fluency and preference. I also conducted 84 semi-structured interviews with 
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people from the impacted villages, government officials and employees from companies operating 
at the solar parks in the locations of New Delhi, Gandhinagar, Hyderabad, Patan district (Gujarat) 
and Kurnool district (Andhra Pradesh). 
 
3. Study areas 
3.1. Patan, Gujarat 
The GSP is situated in the semi-arid yet economically prosperous state of Gujarat (Figure 8), built 
on 5384 acres of land, roughly 2669 acres were designated as government ‘wastelands20’ and the 
remaining portion was local farmers’ private land purchased by the park’s SPPD, Gujarat Power 
Corporation Limited (GPCL). The land enclosed for the GSP is from the village of Charanka (see 
Figure 8). The caste composition of the 4 study villages fall within the government’s Other 
Backward Castes (OBC) category, largely Rabari (semi-nomadic pastoralists), Ahir, Gadhvi, 
Thakore and Koli with Muslim and Dalit minorities. The average landholdings of survey 
respondents were 6.54 acres. Farmers surveyed were largely dependent upon rainfed agriculture, 
with no surface irrigation systems, and grow one season per year (kharif), typically cumin, pearl 
millet, sorghum and wheat. In the case of customary use of government land or encroachment, 
these lands were expropriated by GPCL. The GSP was India’s first solar park, commissioned on 
April 19, 2012. At present, the GSP has 640 MW solar power generation capacity installed by 
roughly 30 companies (GPCL, 2017), and will likely be expanded to 800 MW by summer 2019 
(personal communication, 7 August 2018). 
 
                                                          
20 Roughly 40% of Gujarat’s land mass is “either left barren or unculturable/culturable waste” (ICAR, 2010). Total 




3.2. Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh 
The KSP is an ultra-mega solar park with 1000 MW generating capacity (Figure 10), 
commissioned in July 13, 2017. The park’s SPPD is Andhra Pradesh Solar Power Corporation Pvt 
Ltd (APSPCL), a joint venture between the Andhra Pradesh government and the Central 
Government’s Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI). The KSP is built on 5683.22 acres of 
semi-arid land21, of which 3494.29 acres (61.5%) is government land. The non-government land 
was enclosed from the villages of Gani and Sakunala (see Figure 10), which remains a politically 
contentious issue discussed below (see The Hindu, 2017). These private lands constitute a mix of 
conventional private lands with titles and public lands that were assigned22 to poor and landless 
peasants of marginalized communities (i.e. Dalit, ST; hereafter assigned land) and hence private. 
As of August 2018, KSP is the world’s largest completed single-location solar park, with larger 
ones proposed and being developed. The KSP was built in the semi-arid region of Rayalaseema. 
All agriculture in these four villages are rainfed with no irrigation systems. Typical crops grown 
in this region are cotton, sorghum, and chili peppers. Most residents within the 4 villages surveyed 
belong to the Reddy, Kuruva, Boya, and Madiga castes with sizeable Dalit and Muslim populations 




                                                          
21 Roughly 549,000 hectares of Kurnool district considered to be “degraded and wastelands,” mostly due to mining 
activities (ICAR, 2010). 
22 The category of “assigned land” and resulting process of land distribution to the landless poor emerged with the 
Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977. Unlike private land, assigned lands are 




In this section, I empirically ground claims that the solar resource/state dispossesses farmers of 
land in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh. Next, I explore how the generation of electricity from the 
solar parks constitute a form of energy dispossession. After, I discuss how most dispossessed 
farmers are not extended employment opportunities, a phenomenon of partial proletarianization. 
Finally, I show numerous examples of how affected people from these villages are resisting the 
solar parks. 
 
4.1. Regimes of dispossession 
The development of both solar parks transpired through patterns of dispossession of productive 
lands in the villages of Charanka (GSP; Figure 12), Gani (KSP) and Sakunala (KSP; see Figures 
8 and 10). This section attempts to answer my first research question about the distribution of costs 
and benefits of solar-based dispossession. Within the two solar regions, 21% of respondents had 
their lands enclosed for the solar park (GSP: 14%; Charanka: 56%; KSP: 28%; Gani: 48%, 
Sakunala: 64%). The average landholdings lost were 5.42 acres (Charanka: 16.7; Gani: 4.15 and 
Sakunala: 4.19). As one respondent (S034, 6/10/18) from Sakunala lamented, “We sold 11 acres 
of our land to the solar park but only received money for 1 acre.” A respondent from Gani (G006, 
6/17/18) echoed these sentiments: “I lost 13 acres of land for the solar park. They never paid me 







Figure 12: Land enclosed from Charanka village for the GSP. (Photo: Ryan Stock) 
 
With the expedience and assurance provided by the central government’s freshly-minted 
legislation on land acquisition designed to streamline dispossession (see Levien, 2011a), Block 
Development Officers, under the direction of District Collectors, assisted SPPDs with the process 
of land enclosure of government wastelands and private land sales by farmers to develop GSP and 
KSP (personal communication, 7 August 2018), an extension of the solar resource/state at capillary 
extensions of governmental power. Through the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in 
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (LARR) (or outside of LARR; The 
Hindu, 2017), peasants were offered consent awards for private land sales. Those with properly 
titled private land (patta) were given a variable amount of money for their lands and those with 





One smallholder in Charanka with patta land title gave firsthand experience about variable 
payment schemes: “A simple agreement letter handed over to the landowners. If they agree, they 
have to sign the document and receive the payment. The first compensation of Rs. 6,90,000 per 
acre required exhaustive filing which extend even to the capital of the state. And those who 
followed later were given Rs. 7,51,000, a huge difference of Rs. 60,000 per acre. Those who joined 
earlier in the project bore financial losses and completed exhaustive bureaucratic and legal 
procedures.  On the other hand, those who joined later received Rs. 60,000 more and received 
payment without any extra efforts. Injustice is done to those who joined earlier” (respondent 
CI.009, 12 February 2018). One assigned land Dalit farmer in Gani, who sold 4 acres for the KSP 
and was only paid for 2 acres, shed light on the problematic of payment differentials: “Patta land 
was given Rs. 5.5 lakhs. D-category lands were given Rs. 4.2 lakhs. There is a gap of almost one 
lakh. We had to give all the lands without any consultation. It was forcibly taken away” 
(respondent GI.006, 18 June 2018). Like this man, numerous farmers within both of these 
categories expressed that they were not fully paid for lands sold. Those who did not have proper 
titles for their land (D-form) received nothing and had their lands expropriated by the SPPDs. In 
Sakunala, near the KSP, there were 428 farmers who were denied compensation and patta titles 
for customary use of lands that were expropriated by the solar park (The Hindu, 2017). One farmer 
in Sakunala summed it up succinctly: “For people who owned the right documents, they received 
money. If the land is having some problems, the government didn't give money” (respondent S033, 
10 June 2018). 
 
There were multiple allegations and a lawsuit in 2012 (subsequently dismissed) claiming that the 
GSP project was involved in a land purchasing scam, wherein a small group of speculators bought 
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wide swathes of land in Charanka earmarked for the project just prior to government notification 
of the project in 2011 (High Court of Gujarat, 2015). Ostensibly, these speculators were paid Rs. 
198 per sq. mt. of land by the SPPDs for approximately 918 hectares for solar park development, 
instead of the market price of Rs. 110 per sq. mt. paid to farmers (Press Trust of India, 2015).  
 
A female respondent in Dhokavada reflected on inequalities in opportunities at the GSP: “People 
who work at the solar park get a low salary. People like the village ‘head’ or contractor get good 
money. They are doing corruption” (respondent D035, 25 May 2018). One such village ‘head’ in 
Charanka candidly admitted his privileged position in the solar park development: “As a 
contractor, only I am benefitting from the solar park. Not other families. It's great if employment 
increases” (respondent C001, 7 February 2018). This person is of a relatively higher caste 
positionality (Rajput) in Charanka. Being a large landowner, he was able to sell 20 acres of his 40-
acre plot of private land to GPCL. He oversees a security business and contracting business at GSP 
and even rents out his tractor for use by companies within the solar park. A different farmer whose 
farming encroached on public land expressed his dismay at land dispossession: “The government 
took our 10 acres of land for free because we don't have any documents to prove it's our land. The 
solar park only did good for 10 out of 100 people in Sakunala” (respondent S049, 10 June 2018). 
As is evident from this case study, solar park development is often rife with elite capture. Next, I 
discuss the energy-specific forms of dispossession occurring in the two solar regions. 
 
4.2. Energy dispossessions 
The local populations who least contribute to the accumulation of atmospheric greenhouse gases 
do not directly benefit from the additional electricity generated from the solar parks (cf. Rignall, 
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2016; Silver, 2015; Baka, 2017), as these spaces previously received electricity under various rural 
electrification schemes (i.e. Jyotigram Yojana). As I will discuss below, solar energy provision to 
villages adjacent to the KSP and GSP has not improved the reliability of electricity, the amount of 
hours they receive energy, nor decreased the cost of electricity. Within the 400 households 
surveyed in both solar regions, only 32.16% of respondents said their solar park improved the 
reliability of electricity (GSP: 40.7%; KSP: 23.62%). Additionally, 33.92% of respondents said 
that the solar parks have improved the hours of electricity received (GSP: 43.43%; KSP: 24.5%). 
The author experienced numerous blackouts in villages adjacent to both solar parks, corroborating 
accounts of the unreliability of electricity. “There are frequent electricity cuts. They promised to 
give 24-hour electricity for free but they didn't” (respondent B027, 15 June 2018). 
Overwhelmingly, producers near the solar park complained that their electricity bills increased 
after the implementation of the solar park. A female respondent at Charanka summed up the 
situation thusly: “We get electricity but at a decided rate, not free of charge. Electricity generated 
at the solar park is re-routed to the substation at Varahi, then to our village. Earlier, they have 
promised to provide free electricity to Charanka, but now the price has doubled” (respondent 
CI.002, 12 February 2018). In concord with Baka (2017), the development of these two solar parks 
has led to energy dispossessions, wherein local producers whose land was dispossessed or living 
adjacent to the solar parks do not receive benefit vis-à-vis electrification, cheaper or more reliable 
electricity. “The solar park is good for India but not for Charanka. It’s good as it generates 
electricity but it has stolen the property of my village. It’s not development for Charanka, it’s 
destruction” (respondent CI.009, 12 February 2018). Apropos to the claims of dispossession 
without development (see also Levien, 2018), the next section discusses the dearth of labor 




4.3. Partial proletarianization 
“Such is the functioning of solar – starving the laborers.” (Fangli farmer, 8 March 2018) 
 
Within both solar regions, only 26% of respondents were employed at the solar park (GSP: 31.5%; 
KSP: 20.5%). Overwhelmingly, those employed in both solar parks did menial labor jobs, washing 
the solar panels, cutting grass that grows under the solar panels, or worked as security guards 
(Figure 13). A smallholding farmer from Jamvada identified the disparity in employment 
opportunities after the GSP was built: “When the new solar park was constructed, only that time 
we got some work. After finishing the construction work, we do not get any work” (respondent 
J035, 23 May 2018). The composition of workers at the solar park from the 8 comparison villages 
is 90.4% male, with only 10 females surveyed working at the solar parks (GSP: 6; KSP: 4). The 
classical agrarian question unresolved, there are new agrarian questions to be addressed, such as 
gender equity and ecological sustainability (Moyo et al, 2013; Luna, 2018). In addition to 






Figure 13: Laborers cleaning the solar panels at the Kurnool Solar Park. (Photo: Ryan Stock) 
 
In both solar regions, only 12.5% of respondents whose land was enclosed for the project were 
offered employment at the solar park (GSP: 39.3%; KSP: 33.3%). For those who do work at the 
solar park, there are numerous complaints of wage theft or artificially depressed wages. “There is 
a lot of corruption. The company gives 20,000 per month but middle man gives only 8,000 per 
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month salary. Some people get jobs as security guards at the solar park. It takes 2 or more months 
to get the salary. Most non-Gujarati people get jobs and earn money at the solar park. GPCL 
promised to give employment to people from the Santalpur region. But now a lot of people working 
there are not residents of Santalpur and nearby villages” (respondent F026, 6 March 2018). Most 
of the employment generated by the solar parks were highly technical and specialized, thereby 
excluding local peasants whose average level of education completed is 5th standard (GSP: 4.8; 
KSP: 5.2). Despite GPCL having taken 31 men from Charanka to a 3-day training in Gandhinagar 
to learn solar skills, none of them were offered permanent jobs. Even GreenKo company at KSP 
created a skill development center at KSP, where they offer a 6-month training in solar 
engineering. However, GreenKo also does not offer jobs to graduates of this program, nor local 
technical school graduates for reasons unclear to the author. As a result, most solar park workers 
come from elsewhere in the state or country (Bangalore, Hyderabad, Vadodara, New Delhi) and 
live away from their families (i.e. wife, children), relishing in the masculine homosociality. A solar 
engineer from Orange company at GSP laughingly told me, “This is a bachelor’s place! We are all 
bachelors here.”  
 
The solar land grab has not resulted in displacement or expulsion from the land. Instead, it created 
a surplus population (cf. Li, 2010; Li, 2011) for the vast majority who do not receive employment. 
The regime of dispossession for solar park development has produced a partial proletarianization 
in the solar regions (Byres, 1981; Misra, 2017; Breman, 1996), creating many landless peasants 
who are not being absorbed into wage-labor positions resulting from the solar park schemes (Li, 
2011), a form of dispossession without development (Levien, 2018). Large landholding village 
elites have benefitted from new opportunities to become contractors, but the unemployment of 
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smallholders whose land was enclosed for the solar park stands in cruel contrast. These findings 
complement Levien’s (2015; 2012) work in Rajasthan, where elite farmers with more social capital 
could capitalize off of land brokerage for SEZ development. As vast tracts of land are now missing 
from the two solar regions’ agricultural productivity, opportunities for wage labor on farms have 
also decreased. Araghi (2009) refers to this phenomenon as ‘enclosure-induced displacement.’ 
One respondent from Fangli sums up this grim predicament: “One labors hard at the solar park 
and does not get any money. Such is the functioning of solar – starving the laborers.” (respondent 
FI.007, 8 March 2018). However, this “surplus population” is contesting the terms of their 
dispossession by the 2 solar resource/states, as I will demonstrate below. 
 
4.4. Ruptures and resistance ‘from below’ 
“To speak of rebellion is to focus on those extraordinary moments when peasants seek to restore or remake their 
world by force. It is to forget both how rare these moments are and how historically exceptional it is for them to lead 
to a successful revolution.” (Scott, 1976: 203) 
 
Building upon Gramscian approaches of social power (Crehan, 2002; Ekers and Loftus, 2008; 
Birkenholtz, 2009; Rai, 2018), the solar resource/state maintains its hegemony through a 
continuum of coercion and consent across byzantine networked assemblages of actors and 
institutions (Rocheleau, 2015). As I discuss below, resistance against the solar resource/state 
regime of dispossession is diverse, mirroring the positionality of affected peasants. 
 
Far from passive victims, vulnerable populations like these in Western India exhibit agency in the 
face of ecological change (Stock et al, 2019), agrarian transformation (Rai, 2018) and technologies 
of rule (Birkenholtz, 2009). Peasants exhibit agency against the solar resource/state through a mix 
of resistance and consent in the space of political society against SPPD’s operations and CSR 
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activities (Chatterjee, 2004). With global neoliberalism and land grabs both intensifying and 
extensifying throughout the Global South, new social movements have been shown to contest these 
rural transformations (Bond 2012; Hall et al, 2015; Osborne, 2011) and resource appropriations 
(Baviskar, 2004; Birkenholtz, 2016; Osborne, 2011; Bond, 2012). For example, a ground-swell of 
peasants and citizens groups contested a SEZ state policy that would have ceded large-tracts of 
land to numerous SEZ projects throughout Goa state, India. Through their resistance and consistent 
pressure, agitators were able to overturn the SEZ policy and cancel all planned SEZ projects, even 
those that had already begun to break ground (Sampat, 2015; see also Levien, 2013a). However, 
not all those who resist neoliberal land transformations are as successful or unified as these intrepid 
Goans. 
 
Discussing primitive accumulation under the British Raj, Marx proclaimed, “The Indians will not 
reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till 
in Great Britain itself the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial 
proletariat, or till the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English 
yoke altogether” (Marx, 1977). Though present, Indian peasant consciousness of dispossession has 
not led to a unified insurgency or counterhegemonic movement (Chatterjee, 2004), nor is 
necessarily based on a negation of imposed identities (cf. Guha, 1999). Peasant groups’ lack of 
revolutionary upheaval is not indicative of their consent or complicity with the shift towards 
exploitative relations of production in agrarian transformation. Reactions to large-scale land 
acquisitions ‘from below’ are often more complex than the ‘expulsion-resistance’ scenario (Borras 
and Franco, 2013) and contingent on their positionality within the political economy (Baird, 2017). 
This study is an attempt to highlight the ‘differentiated impacts and variegated political reactions’ 
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of the dispossessed (Hall et al, 2015). These often powerless groups (smallholder, marginal and 
landless farmers in this study) contest solar development through overt resistance (i.e. protests, 
blockades) or by wielding their ‘weapons of the weak,’ tactics that often include “foot dragging, 
dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on” 
(Scott 1985: 29). Alonso-Fradejas (2015) shows how indigenous Guatemalans defend their 
territories against agribusiness and state extraction using a repertoire of both structured and 
everyday forms of contention, culminating in new alliances between previously disparate actors. 
 
Building upon Scott, Borras and Franco (2013) develop a typology of resistance ‘from below,’ 
including: 1) struggles against expulsion; 2) struggles around the terms of incorporation; 3) 
Struggles against land concentration, and for redistribution and recognition; 4) Struggles across 
overlapping/intersecting geographical and institutional spaces. Additionally, Hall et al (2015) 
bring our attention to the concept of acquiescence as a form of agency and resistance. In this 
section, it is my intention to show how such reactions from below are embodied and are often 
‘everyday’ responses (Scott, 1985). Contestations vary widely across the two solar case studies, 
even varying within specific villages, mirroring the socially differentiated residents (Baird, 2017) 
and impacts of the solar resource/state’s agrarian transformation (Borras and Franco, 2013). 
Within the two solar regions, resistance is largely occurring against expulsion, around the terms of 
incorporation, discursively and via embodied affectivities. 
 
Producers near both solar parks expressed candid opinions of the solar parks themselves. Selecting 
from a 5-point Likert scale (1= Very unfavorable, 2= Unfavorable, 3= Neutral, 4= Favorable, 5= 
Very favorable), the average respondent had an “unfavorable to neutral” (2.8) opinion of the solar 
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parks (GSP: 3.0; KSP: 2.7). On a similar 5-point Likert scale (1-very negative; 2-negative; 3-
neutral; 4-positive; 5-very positive), respondents thought the solar parks had a “negative to 
neutral” (2.8) presence near their village (GSP: 3.1; KSP: 2.5). Compared to non-impacted 
villages, respondents from villages whose land was enclosed for the park had a more negative 
opinion of the solar park (2.5) and the solar park’s presence (2.5). The opinions stand in contrast 
to the hegemonic discourses of solar resource/state resurgence. 
 
Similar to wasteland development schemes for biofuel in Tamil Nadu (Baka, 2013), land 
acquisition for the solar parks transpired in relative acquiescence, complicity by many producers 
themselves. Overwhelmingly and understandably, respondents associated employment at the solar 
parks as a form of empowerment and social development. In the two solar regions, most struggles 
against expulsion have occurred in the form of a partial proletarianization (discussed above). 
Acquiescence to patterns of dispossession for solar park development isn’t the only modality by 
which peasants express agency in the face of this vast agrarian transformation. In response to the 
question, “Is there anyone who resisted the enclosure of land for GSP?,” one Rabari woman from 
Charanka told of a more overt instance of resistance: “There are plenty who resisted. The land 
acquisition inevitably triggers resistance” (CI.002, 12 February 2018). Another smallholding 
farmer corroborated her account: “The entire village protested. The land acquisition process took 
place for three times. Finally, the collector came and told the villagers to comply with the project 
and he would distribute the check as per the government rule. So, finally we accepted the checks” 
(respondent CI.008, 12 February 2018). Many farmers dispossessed by the KSP in Gani and 
Sakunala claim their land was expropriated by APSPCL without abiding by the mandates of the 
Land Acquisition Act of 2013 (The Hindu, 2017). In reaction, there were protests supported by the 
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Communist Party of India (Marxist) at the Collectorate Office that included chanting, climbing the 
perimeter gates, attempted suicide by a woman, and occupation of the premises for multiple hours. 
The police responded to this with ‘extra-economic means’, mainly brutality, by charging the crowd 
with batons and beating several of the farmers (The Hindu, 2016). In 2017, there were also protests 
at the site of the solar park itself by many of these same farmers to demand the disbursal of 
remaining compensation for land acquisition and the provision of employment, which the High 
Court failed to equitably resolve (The Hindu, 2017). Many farmers in both villages have still not 
received adequate compensation for lands lost. 
 
Partial proletarianization of the solar resource/state peasantry is a form of adverse incorporation 
(Hall et al, 2015). One farmer in Fangli explained to me how several village youth have repeatedly 
blockaded the road to the GSP in protest of the lack of jobs offered at the park (respondent FI.003, 
7 March 2018). Within both solar regions, there are also struggles around the terms of 
incorporation (Borras and Franco, 2013; Hall et al, 2015), including remuneration over land deals. 
A woman in Charanka whose assigned land was enclosed for the GSP is fighting back by suing 
the SPPD: “There is a court case running. If we win, then we'll get more money for our land” 
(respondent C022, 9 February 2018). Likewise, another farmer in Gani is taking the KSP SPPD to 
court for not paying adequately for his lands. Finally, the author witnessed one such struggle 
around the terms of incorporation play out in Sakunala village near KSP. On June 18th, 2018, four 
officials from GreenKo company arrived to inspect a water filtration system installed in the village 
one year prior. Upon arrival, a mass of villagers greeted them with a tense altercation of shouting 
and chanting about the failure of this Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) project to be activated 
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for use for over 12 months, despite repeated promises by GreenKo (fieldnotes: 18 June 2018). This 
was a snapshot of a vibrant political society at work (Chatterjee, 2004). 
 
In a move to contest modernization and rural resurgence discourses around the GSP, one of my 
respondent’s sons posted the following message on Facebook: “SAVE HUMAN'S LIFE, SAVE 
CHILDS LIFE... Due to solar park, The temperature in charanka village is 46degree. So, please 
stop the all new project will coming soon in charanka [sic]” (Field notes, 26 May 2018). In addition 
to being an ‘everyday act of peasant resistance,’ this urgent message reflects a vernacular 
understanding of environmental change (i.e. increasing temperatures due to climate change) 
common among farmers of Western India (Stock et al, 2019; Birkenholtz, 2008), combined with 
disdain for another rural development project that does not improve the lives of local people. This 
individual is gainfully employed as a driver and supervisor of security guards for his father’s 
company at the GSP, whom many in the village regard as a wealthy family. And yet a burgeoning 
sense of inter-class and inter-caste alliances are forming around the contestations of solar 
resource/state hegemony in the villages of GSP and KSP. 
 
The most tragic example of resistance ‘from below’ is the story of a smallholder’s son in Sakunala 
who was never compensated for his assigned land. “We sold 5 acres of land to the solar park, but 
they didn't pay us. My son committed suicide because of the solar park. My daughter-in-law left 
Sakunala also. Now I have no income” (respondent S035, 6/10/18). This man’s suicide can be 
understood as an affective response to his alienation to the means of production vis-à-vis the 
dispossession of his family’s land (cf. Shah, 2012). Struggles over expulsion and the terms of 
incorporation are embodied, psychologically and somatically. Resistance ‘from below’ does not 
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generally occur in romanticized revolutions. Within the solar resource/state, it often occurs within 
the quieter spaces of livelihoods and everyday life itself.  
 
5. Discussion 
Indisputably, a breakneck transition to renewable energy generation in India is necessary to stave 
off additional emissions to a changing climate system that delivers unforetold present and future 
natural and political hazards in this underdeveloped nation. On April 22, 2016, India signed the 
UN Paris Climate Agreement to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Pledging to quadruple its 
renewable power capacity to 175 gigawatts by 2022, India will increasingly use JNNSM solar 
parks to achieve this goal. As the impacts of climate change become more severe and more 
frequent in human social systems and infrastructure, billions of dollars will be invested by 
multilateral institutions and civil society organizations on carbon mitigation, helping target 
populations adapt to climate variability, and reducing the risk of those identified as vulnerable to 
the natural hazards exacerbated by climate change. But the GSP and KSP case studies serve as 
grim admonitions; Solar India is a simulacra to processes of dispossession and resistance in 
upcoming solar parks. Apropos to agency, Rabari farmers are resisting the enclosure of their land 
for the development of the Radha Nesda Solar Park (750 MW) in a geographically proximate 
district to the GSP. Currently, there are 4,000-5,000 cows, goats and water buffalo grazing these 
lands during the monsoon season. According to one member of the village council of Radha Nesda, 
“We’re all Hindus here. We need that land for our cows. The solar park can be made in the desert, 
why take farmers’ land? We don’t oppose solar. We oppose the government taking grazing lands” 
(personal communication, 24 March 2018). This group’s struggles against expulsion (Borras and 
Franco, 2013) from their land contests the further territorialization of the solar resource/state in a 
118 
 
post-political milieu (Swyngedouw, 2010) of “techno-managerial eco-consensus” (Rignall, 2016) 
that uncritically promotes solar development, despite dispossession against historically 
marginalized populations. 
 
Tracing the contours of development trajectories long espoused in classical agrarian studies by 
Kautsky (1988), Lenin (1967) and their ‘successors’ (see Patnaik, 2007; Levien et al, 2019; 
Patnaik, 2012; Moyo et al, 2013; Misra, 2017; Lerche, 2013), the influx of ‘green’ capital for solar 
park development allowed large landholders who were surplus producers to capitalize on agrarian 
transformation for solar through gainful employment opportunities and renting out industrial 
farming technology to the solar developers. In contrast, smallholder peasants whose agriculture 
was largely subsistence for the purposes of household reproduction, who earlier worked for wage 
laborer as proletarians on largeholders’ farms (who needed them for accumulation), lost vital 
wage-labor opportunities when land under cultivation was transformed for solar parks, their full 
proletarianization interrupted. Indeed, this follows patterns of capital accumulation via 
dispossessive land grabs across the Global South, wherein the landless peasants’ labor is not 
needed nor integrated into new relations of production (Li, 2011). 
 
Land, in addition to money and labor, is a fictitious commodity (Polanyi, 2001 [1994]; Prudham, 
2013) and therefore has the tendency to become overexploited because of its lack of being properly 
embedded in the marketplace. In India, pro-embedded sentiment grew in the 1990s across all class 
and gender categories, reflecting widespread opposition to neoliberal reforms (Levien and Paret, 
2012). The current case study of resource/state regimes of dispossessing land for the marketization 
of solar parks is one of a Polanyian double movement (Polanyi, 2001 [1994]; Prudham, 2013), 
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wherein social protection often comes in the form of CSR schemes for community development 
in a clever attempt to assuage dispossessed peasants’ anxieties over alienation without altering the 
relations of production, a veritable ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson, 1994). Such CSR schemes 
are an attempt by SPPDs to “reverse the effects” of dispossession to quell resistance without 
providing a livelihood (Sanyal, 2007; Chatterjee, 2008). In effect, CSR schemes ‘render technical’ 
the political claims of the people struggling with the very social problems the solar park creates 
(Li, 2007; Birkenholtz, 2013; Resurrecion and Elmhirst, 2008).  
 
CSR activities at the solar parks vary by company (GPCL, 2015), but examples at GSP include a 
small number of solar street lights, a few solar lamps, provisioning of backpacks to students and a 
workshop to teach women from Charanka and Fangli traditional hand-stitching (SEWA, 2015). 
Perhaps most ironic is Mahindra company provisioning small cookstoves to Charanka households 
in Spring 2018 that still require firewood, the very resource whose access the solar park excluded 
through land enclosure (personal communication, 7 August 2018). At the KSP, CSR activities 
included the construction of several latrines, solar street lights, and two drinking water stations not 
operable after two years. Within both solar regions, 76.7% of respondents employed at the solar 
park were unaware of any social development schemes or CSR responsibilities associated with the 
solar park, compared to 78.3% of respondents not employed at the solar parks. Effectively, this 
means that an almost equal percentage of survey respondents were unaware of social development 
or Corporate Social Responsibility schemes related with the solar park, irrespective of their 




Technical CSR activities are no alternative for social protections enshrined by law facilitating the 
redistribution of resources and power. As I demonstrate in this paper, the separation of land and 
labor for solar-based exchange-value creates a rupture in relations of production (Prudham, 2013), 
a rupture with the power to constitute struggles of resistance, what Burawoy (2003) refers to as an 
“active society” that contests the pernicious enclosures of market fundamentalism (see also Levien, 
2013a). Further, the rupture wherein double movements between neoliberal marketization and 
social protection occur is often met with a struggle for emancipation, what Fraser (2011) calls a 
triple movement. The overt and everyday resistance ‘from below’ to solar land enclosures are small 
examples of emancipatory actions and intentions to oppose domination and expose oppressive 
relations. Peasant uprisings in the form of “land wars” have been successful in interrupting capital 
accumulation in Western India (Levien, 2013a), in addition to myriad other examples of Polanyian 
contestations to the neoliberalization of nature (Lohmann, 2010; Bond, 2012; Bakker, 2015). The 
success of this case study’s resistances remains to be seen. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The SPPDs (GPCL, APSPCL) draw upon a multi-scalar “networked assemblage” of the solar 
resource/state to perpetuate patterns of dispossession of local producers’ land and livelihoods for 
the purpose of capitalizing on ‘wasteland’ landscapes under the auspices of mitigating carbon in 
the Anthropocene. Solar park development produces a partial proletarianization for a new surplus 
population of landless peasants without job opportunities. These social problems are simplified 
and “rendered technical” through the provisioning of CSR schemes in each solar region. 
Additionally, the provision of renewable energy is ‘incommensurate with local needs’ (Baka, 




Resistances ‘from below’ against the solar resource/state regime of dispossession span a range of 
struggles against expulsion, struggles around the terms of incorporation, acquiescence and 
embodiment. Scholars of dispossession in the context of global ecological change and ‘neoliberal 
environments’ (Heynen et al, 2007) must approach their investigations from a nuanced position 
attuned to the ‘differentiated impacts and variegated political reactions’ of the dispossessed (Hall 
et al, 2015). The urgency of low-carbon transitions in the Anthropocene must not reproduce 
underdevelopment through green grabbing; the renewed urgency of answering agrarian questions 
of peasants contesting renewable energy development must not suffer essentializations of agency. 
As the Government of India develops more solar parks in the drylands to profitably mitigate 
climate change and generate much-needed renewable energy, marginalized populations shouldn’t 





CHAPTER 6: PHOTONS VS. FIREWOOD: FEMALE (DIS)EMPOWERMENT BY 
‘GENDER POSITIVE’ SOLAR POWER 
 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the Global South, anthropogenic climate change will have place-specific interactive 
effects on social systems that mediate people’s differential exposure to environmental hazards 
(Birkenholtz, 2012), depending on one’s own positionality in the political economy and within 
multiple axes of social difference (i.e. gender, race, caste, class) (Hijioka et al, 2014; Djoudi et al, 
2016; Sultana, 2014a; Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; Carr and Thompson, 2014; Osborne, 2015). 
Likewise, policies and projects designed to mitigate climate change or assist vulnerable 
populations adapt to climate change may also produce differential exposure and adaptive outcomes 
for certain populations (Smucker and Wangui, 2016; Yenneti, Day and Golubchikov, 2016; 
Nightingale, 2017; Nagoda and Nightingale, 2017) due to their lack of attention to the political 
economic causality of vulnerability (Ribot, 2014). However, it remains unclear how specific 
climate change mitigation technologies (i.e. solar power) produce social difference and how 
affected populations respond to these projects, including whether they internalize project 
narratives and take on subject positions of the same. Utilizing an access model of vulnerability 
(Birkenholtz, 2012; Ribot and Peluso, 2003), this research suggests that the Gujarat Solar Park 
(GSP) is one such project that reproduces social power asymmetries along multiple axes of social 






1.2. Gender in India’s climate policy 
Within climate change policy in India, there is a paucity of research identifying specific 
populations that may be vulnerable to climate change or theorizing the causality of their 
vulnerability. One such policy is the Government of India’s Nationally Determined Contribution 
(NDC) for the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement (GoI, 2015). The policy document fails to mention 
caste or class-based differences in vulnerability, barring a homogenous classification of poverty 
and apolitical references to poverty alleviation. The policy document then goes on to suggest that 
access to “clean technologies” (i.e. solar energy) is a major component to poverty alleviation (GoI, 
2015: 29), without answering the most important questions (who, what, where, when, how, why?). 
The policy document also claims that all measures taken under this policy represent challenges to 
address “gender equality and women empowerment” (GoI, 2015: 4), again without a nuanced 
exploration of how gender-based difference is differentially impacted or how specific policies will 
promote female empowerment.  
 
The GSP was designed to be a Kyoto Protocol-era UN-affiliated Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), sustainable development projects that generate certified CO2 emissions reductions that are 
valued in emissions trading schemes (UNFCCC, 2016). The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change designed CDMs to provide “gender positive” or “gender neutral” 
impacts for women (UNFCCC, 2012). Little research has been done on the gender impacts of 
CDMs. However, CDMs have been shown to reproduce social power configurations (Ervine, 
2013; Bachram, 2006), procedural injustices (Bryant, Dabhi, Bohm, 2015; Newell, Phillips and 
Purohit, 2011), and differentiate access to material resources (Newell and Bumpus, 2012). Though 
the CDM is now largely defunct and not trading much in India (personal communication, 16 July 
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2018), the GSP still registers as a CDM project and is still beholden to the mandate of ‘gender 
positive’ impacts. 
 
Within the Government of Gujarat’s State Action Plan on Climate Change (GoG, 2014), women 
are identified as a being a vulnerable population, stating that climate change may negatively impact 
their access to natural resources, like fuelwood. “Women who have the responsibility of securing 
water, food and fuel face the greatest challenges. In addition, unequal access to resources, and to 
decision-making processes make them more vulnerable” (GoG, 2014: 191). However, the policy 
document does not differentiate women from larger gender concerns and homogenizes all women 
as vulnerable. Importantly, it does not discuss gender-based vulnerability as linked to the political 
economy and iteratively articulated through axes of social difference. As I demonstrate below, 
women’s access to fuelwood may also be hindered by an energy development project, imbued with 
gender and colonial logics, that boast livelihood protections. It is within the context of these 
various policy documents that enshrine gender-sensitive development and female empowerment 
that the present research study is embedded. This study interrogates the Gujarat Solar Park and its 
intersectional local effects. 
 
1.3. Solar and rural livelihoods  
India’s flagship climate mitigation scheme under their Paris Agreement NDCs are the solar parks 
(GoI, 2015; MNRE, 2012). The Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) was launched 
under the 2008 National Action Plan for Climate Change (GoI, 2008), committed to promoting 
and scaling up solar development in India (GoI, 2010). In the policy document outlining Phase II 
of the government of India’s scheme for solar development, “Electricity is vital for a better quality 
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of life - along with reduction in poverty and improvement in education, health and livelihoods” 
(MNRE, 2012: 24-25). Poverty reduction and rural livelihoods frequently make cameos in 
government schemes related to the environment to assure social legitimation of said policy, 
without being deeply integrated. India’s NDC appropriately suggests that many rural livelihoods 
are threatened by anthropogenic climate change: “The adverse impacts of climate change on the 
developmental prospects of the country are amplified enormously by the existence of widespread 
poverty and dependence of a large proportion of the population on climate sensitive sectors for 
livelihood” (GoI, 2015: 19). However, there is a groundswell of literature suggesting that many 
climate mitigation and adaptation policies and projects may also threaten rural livelihoods 
(Smucker and Wangui, 2016; Yenneti, Day and Golubchikov, 2016). Resource access, 
management and control is highly variable within climate change mitigation schemes (Newton et 
al, 2015) and broadly contested (Rignall, 2016; Bond, 2012). This research attempts to highlight 
the gender, caste and class-based dimensions of one such climate mitigation scheme in India, the 
Gujarat Solar Park. 
 
Generally considered a “prosperous” state, 63% of Gujarat’s population depends upon agriculture 
for their livelihoods (GoI, 2011). Whether development “model” (The Economist, 2015) or 
“muddle” (Drèze, 2014), the state has a large disparity between rich and poor (Hensman, 2014). 
Despite many efforts to “modernize” agriculture (Gidwani, 2008; Patel, 2013; Saha, 2013), many 
farmers in rural Gujarat remain vulnerable to climate change and climate-related impacts (Stock 
et al, 2019; Jain et al, 2015). Many households in rural India are reliant upon firewood for cooking 
(Baquié and Urpelainen, 2017; Baka and Bailis, 2014). This is true for the case study villages in 
the Northern Gujarat region of Patan. Cooking in this region is done using traditional biomass 
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cookstoves (chulo) fueled by wood, brush or agricultural waste that is largely collected by women.  
Animal dung is also used for cooking, primarily from Brahman cattle (Bos indicus) or water 
buffalo (Bubalus bubalis). Harvested firewood in this region typically comes from Prosopis 
juliflora (vernacular: baval), an invasive species to the region (Baka and Bailis, 2014). In fact, the 
region of Patan wherein the GSP is located is classified by the Government of India as a 
‘wasteland’ (marginal or degraded lands; see ICAR, 2010), despite productive uses for local 
producers and fraught politics of knowledge (see Baka, 2013; Baka, 2017; Nalepa and Bauer, 
2012; Nalepa, Gianotti and Bauer, 2017; Makki, 2014; Rignall, 2016; Ariza-Montobbio et al, 
2010). Indeed, this wasteland designation was the reason land in Charanka was enclosed for the 
solar park. Regarding land selection and acquisition for solar parks, a general manager of the Solar 
Energy Corporation of India in New Delhi stated, “the government land or some wasteland should 
be there, which will not affect the food security of the country” (interview SECI.001, 16 July 
2018). And yet these enclosed wastelands are the very spaces upon which many families from this 
region grow their food. As this research shows, competing land uses in these wasteland spaces, 
harvesting photons versus harvesting firewood or food, is a security issue for marginal, 
smallholding and landless populations of Patan district. 
 
Rural development schemes have disproportionately impacted women (Birkenholtz, 2013; Bock, 
2015; Truelove, 2011; Sultana, 2011; O’Reilly, 2004). Birkenholtz (2013) shows how state efforts 
to improve rural water infrastructure actually produced gendered differentiation in access to water. 
Rural Indian women from low-income households disproportionately experience energy poverty 
and negative health outcomes resulting from the burning of biomass in enclosed structures (Reddy 
and Nathan, 2013), in addition to energy dispossessions that fail to increase access or affordability 
127 
 
of electrification initiatives (Baka, 2017). This pattern remains true for energy development 
schemes. The enclosure of land for solar parks has disproportionately impacted marginalized 
populations (Rignall, 2016; Yenneti, Day and Golubchikov, 2016). As this research will show, 
enclosure of wastelands and acquisition of smallholder farmland ruptured the relations of 
production, thereby exacerbating the burdens of household reproduction and livelihoods for 
women. 
 
This paper asks the following research question: Does the Gujarat Solar Park influence already 
gendered social-economic-political asymmetries? This research examines the impacts of the GSP 
on differently situated resource-dependent people through a political ecological analysis of 
gendered access to and benefits from resources, as well as differences in the way that the GSP is 
accepted or rejected by resource-dependent people. By investigating the rearticulations of resource 
access and subjectivities occurring under the GSP, this research echoes Robbins’ (2012) relevant 
question, “How are the terms of change defined and by whom?” This study is imperative given 
the rapid spread of solar parks, not only in India but throughout the Global South. 
 
This paper progresses in 4 additional sections. The next section explores the literature of feminist 
political ecology and intersectionality to establish a conceptual lens through which to understand 
the present case study and connect it with similar struggles. Section 3 details the study area and 
describes the methods used to conduct this study. Section 4 explores the results of this study. 





2. Literature review 
2.1. Feminist political ecology  
Political ecology is a diverse “field of practice” that investigates the political dimensions within 
environmental access, control, management and transformation (Blaikie, 1985; Bailey and Bryant, 
1997; Forsyth, 2003; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003; Peet, Robbins and Watts, 2011; Robbins, 2012; 
Perreault, Bridge and McCarthy, 2015). As a sub-discipline of political ecology, feminist political 
ecology (FPE) is concerned with the gendered division of knowledge and power within the politics 
of resource access and environmental change (Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter, Wangari, 1996; 
Elmhirst, 2011b; Truelove, 2011; Hanson, 2016; Jarosz, 2011; Sundberg, 2004). FPE is site-
specific and considers embodied experiences among agents involved in resource and livelihood 
struggles, where social difference is emergent and produced out of everyday practices (Hanson, 
2016; Nightingale, 2011; Sultana, 2011; Doshi, 2017). Recent FPE studies show how space helps 
constitute gendered subject positions through everyday actions of social reproduction and 
embodied practices (Rocheleau, 2008; Hawkins and Ojeda, 2011; Elmhirst, 2011; Doshi, 2017; 
see Rodó-de-Zárate and Baylina, 2018). Feminist scholarship has demonstrated that gender itself 
is a performance (Butler 1990), one of many social differences whose articulation and 
performativity is both fixed and fluid (Stoler, 1997). As I will demonstrate below, these social 
differences create “grids of intelligibility23” by and upon which additional articulations of social 
differentiation are enacted (Stoler, 1995) to reproduce already gendered social, economic and 
political asymmetries. O’Reilly (2006) explores an NGO’s attempt to commodify drinking water 
for the purpose of improving gender equity in Rajasthan through discursive representations of 
                                                          
23 In considering bourgeoise identity in Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, Stoler (1995, 11) defines grid of 
intelligibility as “a hierarchy of distinctions in perception and practice that conflated, substituted, and collapsed the 
categories of racial, class and sexual Others strategically and at different times.” 
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women utilizing the new water system as “modern” and those using the old as “traditional,” 
ignoring the financial limitations and patriarchal limits to participation in the new water regime. 
Similarly, this paper demonstrates a rural development scheme that reproduces gendered, class and 
caste-based power asymmetries via resource access. 
 
2.2. Intersectionality  
The concept of intersectionality owes its origins to the vital contributions of critical race scholars 
and Black Feminist Thought (hooks, 1984; Collins, 2000; McKittrick, 2006; Gilmore, 2007; 
Moraga and Anzaldua, 1983). The term was originally coined by Crenshaw (1989, 1991), who 
was demarginalizing the study of interactions between subjectivities (i.e. race, gender) that 
produce social difference in an effort to reveal power structures. Gender is one field by which 
power is articulated, but much scholarship on gender has historically not accounted for the class 
and race-based intersections and articulations which shape power and subjectivity (Scott, 1988). 
However, there is a rich history within feminist geographies (Moss, 2005) of work that engages 
the intersections of multiple subject positions (Rose, 1993; Kobayashi, 1994; Pratt, 1999; Massey, 
2005). As such, intersectionality is a “broad-based knowledge project” (Collins, 2015) that refers 
to the mutual constitution and articulation of multiple subjectivities and embodied practices that 
shape social inequalities and power relations within political economic and discursive structures. 
However, the uses of intersectionality are widely divergent (Cho et al, 2013) and methods 
involving the concept are ambiguous yet complex (McCall, 2005), which Valentine (2007) 
cautions may pose a challenge for feminist geographies. The concept is gaining ground in studies 
concerned with climate change adaptation and vulnerability (see Djoudi et al, 2016; Kaijser and 
Kronsell, 2016; Osborne, 2015; Sultana, 2014a; Carr and Thompson, 2014; Iniestia-Arandia et al, 
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2016) and agrarian studies (Luna, 2018). As Nightingale (2011) shows in her case study, 
intersectional subjectivities are resilient and emerge through the contestation of socioecological 
boundaries through the everyday act of forest harvesting in rural Nepal.  
 
Mollett and Faria (2013; 2018) argue for a postcolonial intersectional analysis within FPE that 
includes critical engagement with critical race theories. According to Mollett and Faria (2013: 
120), “Postcolonial intersectionality acknowledges the way patriarchy and racialized processes are 
consistently bound in a postcolonial genealogy that embeds race and gender ideologies within 
nationbuilding and international development processes.” To state the obvious, caste is not race. 
However, both processes depend on the naturalization of social difference for supremacy and 
subjugation (Guha, 2013; Natrajan and Greenough, 2009: 18). In these four case study villages 
(presented in the next section), caste affiliation is the most prominent form of hierarchalized social 
differentiation that mediates social power relations. Following Mollet and Faria’s (2013: 116) 
insistence that scholars of FPE “must pay attention to caste, ethnicity and regional ethnic 
nationalism” and Rodó-de-Zárate and Baylina’s (2018) call for studies on intersectionality to be 
centered in space and specific context, the following research study uses an FPE postcolonial 
intersectionality approach to examine the unintended consequences of a solar park, with emergent 
and intersecting caste, class and gender subjectivities. This framework fits this case study because 
the GSP is a national and international development project bound up in the patriarchy and caste-
based hegemony of Northern Gujarat, a development project imbued with its own gender ideology, 





3. Study Area and Methods 
3.1. Study area  
The GSP was commissioned on April 19, 2012 and was Asia’s largest single-location solar park 
when built. It presently generates 640 MW of solar energy, which will be expanded to 800 MW 
by 2019 (personal communication, 7 August 2018). The GSP was developed by the Gujarat Power 
Corporation Limited (GPCL), who leases out space within the solar park to roughly 30 companies 
who now generate solar energy. The GSP is located in the Western India state of Gujarat. 
Fieldwork was conducted in 4 villages bordering the Gujarat Solar Park in the semi-arid Patan 
district (Figure 8). The caste composition of villages adjacent to the solar park is mostly comprised 
of a majority of the lower-caste government-designated “Other Backward Castes (OBC)” category 
(Rabari, Ahir, Gadhvi, Koli, Ayar), with a far fewer number of higher-caste households from the 
Rajput category (Thakore, Parmar, Darbar, Vaghela, Jadeja) with Muslim and Dalit minorities (see 
Table 8). Rajput castes enjoy a higher caste position and class position within these villages. OBCs 
are lower castes, but of the OBCs, Gadhvis are the most economically prosperous of the region 
and Rabaris are semi-nomadic pastoralists who are historically marginalized (see also Yenneti and 
Day, 2015). Females represented 9.5% of survey respondents (n=38) in all study villages, but 
higher with 20% (n=10) in the village of Charanka. Both Charanka and Fangli villages have a 
literacy rate of 46.3%, compared with the state average of 78% and the national average of 74% 
(GoI, 2011). These villages have below-average resources devoted to females. Per capita GDP 
(2014-2015) for Patan district is INR 105,000 compared with the state’s average of INR 154,000 











Charanka 2% 8% 60% 24% 6% 
Fangli 4% 34% 54% 8% 0% 
Jamvada 2% 56% 40% 2% 0% 
Dhokavada 0% 0% 98% 2% 0% 
 
Table 8: Social composition of respondents (n=200) in study villages. 
 
All 4 villages have one cropping season that is rainfed during the monsoon season. The main crops 
grown were cumin, pearl millet and sorghum. Within GSP-adjacent villages, women are doing 
more of the manual labor and harvesting but men do more of the aggregation of crops, dealing 
with middle men who purchase from them, and taking the harvested crops to larger markets in the 
nearby cities of Radhanpur and Unjha. Due to the paucity of jobs, there is a crisis of masculinity 
wherein patriarchy and caste-based dominance is displayed through leisure activities, idleness, 
conspicuous consumption and aspirations for international migration (Tilche and Simpson, 2018; 
Gidwani, 2000; Jeffrey, Jeffrey and Jeffrey, 2008; Rai, 2018). Transformations in the global 
political economy of agriculture create regional restructuring in modalities of agrarian production 
that shift gender roles (Tilche and Simpson, 2018; Ramamurthy, 1997; Venkateshwarlu and Da 
Corta, 2001; Gidwani, 2008; Robbins, 2002), whereby women do more farm-related labor (in 
addition to household reproduction tasks) because men engage in circular migration or wage-labor 
(Ramamurthy, 2000a; Ramamurthy, 2014; Kumar, 2016; Rai, 2018; Tilche and Simpson, 2018), 
a process known as the feminization of agriculture. These processes are common in this region of 
Western India (see Gidwani, 2008; Tilche and Simpson, 2018; Robbins, 2002), even exacerbating 






The fieldwork for this research was completed between January 2018 and August 2018. This 
research utilized mixed methods. Household survey questionnaires were conducted among 4 
villages adjacent to the GSP, including Charanka, Fangli, Jamvada and Dhokavada (see Table 4).  
 
Charanka is the only village whose land was enclosed for the solar park24. In each village, 50 
surveys were conducted (n=200) and respondents were stratified by caste, class and gender (see 
Table 1). Following Moss (1995: 447), numerical data generated from the surveys was used to 
“situate qualitative interpretations within the wider social order and political economy.” There 
were also 42 interviews conducted for this study throughout Gujarat state and New Delhi, 
involving policymakers from multiple government institutions, solar park companies, and villagers 
from Charanka and Fangli. Participant observation was also conducted in adjacent villages to 
triangulate survey findings. Lastly, discourse analysis on technical and policy documents was 
conducted, relating to the GSP, state and national climate policies. Each household survey 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews were conducted in Gujarati or Hindi languages, 
unless otherwise specified by the participant. As development practitioners and scholars, it is 
important that we “do development” while being conscious and critical of development policies 
and the implementation of development projects (Sultana, 2014b). This article represents my 
contribution towards the feminist turn of political ecology scholarship (Heynen, 2018). I am wary 
of the specter of “disembodied scientific objectivity” (Haraway 1991) that still stalks the hallowed 
halls of human geography. All knowledge-claims in this article represent situated “partial 
                                                          
24 The Gujarat Solar Park was built on 5,384 acres of land, of which 2,669 acres was public land. The remaining 
2,715 acres acquired were smallholders’ farm land from Charanka village. 
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perspectives” (Rose, 1997) of an “embedded” (Moss, 1995) research scholar who occupies a 
different subject-position (i.e. American, cisgender, white, male, academic) than the people I 
engaged for this study, yet someone whose intimate family ties to this region of India compliment 
and complicate fieldwork practices (Walton-Roberts, 2010). 
 
4. Results 
Women in Patan district are not only responsible for household reproduction (see Hart, 1992; 
Willis, 1981), but increasingly for household production (see Figure 14). A national restructuring 
of agrarian production due to a globalized political economy of agriculture is intensifying the 
feminization of agriculture, wherein women are increasingly burdened with agriculture related 
labor work (Ramamurthy, 2014; Tilche and Simpson, 2018). Both production and reproduction 
activities are increasingly impacted by the solar park. The spatial dislocation of livelihood 
practices focused on household reproduction via the enclosure of lands for the solar park, 
combined with exclusion from employment opportunities at the solar park, are reinforcing social 
power among residents with higher caste and class positionalities. In fact, latent caste, gender and 
class-based differences in the villages create a “grid of intelligibility” through which access and 
exclusion is administered by the solar park developer and associated institutions (Stoler, 1995). In 
this section, I will show how gender, caste and class subjectivities intersect, are mutually 
constitutive and are reproduced through configurations of land, labor and social schemes related 
to the solar park and livelihood activities. In this section, I will begin by enumerating how women 
are dispossessed of access to public land for the purposes of foraging for fuelwood and grazing 
livestock, revealing the embodied affectivities of impacted women. Next, I discuss the 
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exclusionary labor arrangements of the solar park. Finally, I contrast claims of female 




Figure 14: Village women in Gujarat harvesting cotton (kapaas). (Photo: Ryan Stock) 
 
4.1. Productive fuelwood foraging lands lost 
Large-scale land acquisitions, necessary for solar park development, have differential gender-
based impacts (Behrman et al, 2012). The ability to derive benefit from land and resources through 
access is a vital component of social empowerment and economic advancement (Ribot and Peluso, 
2003), especially for women (Evans, 2015). Not having access to these former wasteland spaces 
has created new burdens for lower-caste and lower-class women in villages adjacent to the GSP. 
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Survey and interview respondents were distressed about the enclosure of so-called ‘wastelands’ 
for the park (roughly 60% of the park’s total 5,384 acres), and their lack of access to these lands. 
Prior to the GSP, women used to access these government lands to forage for firewood and fodder, 
as well as letting their livestock graze these lands. Referring to her cows’ lack of access to grazing 
lands, a smallholding Ahir woman from Fangli: “Look at them – they’re starving! The grass of 
considerable size within the area is ready but they don’t allow anyone to take it. Whose duty is it 
to go and collect cattle feed? It’s the duty of us, women. But they don’t allow us. Look – the cows 
are starving. They’ve installed electrification at the solar park for security and surveillance” 
(respondent FI.006, 8 March 2018). 
 
Despite less farm land in the region, women surveyed from Charanka report spending an additional 
1.23 hours per day (average, n=10) on agriculture related activities after the solar park arrived, 
corroborating national trends of the feminization of agriculture. In addition to household 
production becoming more difficult because of a lack of employment at the solar park, women in 
this region are also on the frontlines of the crisis of reproduction. Households near the GSP were 
largely dependent upon firewood or dung cakes for their daily cooking. In Charanka, 94% of 
households surveyed (n=47) relied upon firewood for cooking (see Table 9). Likewise, 64% of 
households (n=32) exclusively used traditional cookstoves with firewood, while only 26% of 















General castes 94.5% 99,924.49 7.4 
Dominant OBCs 93.2% 55,407.74 8.1 
Marginal OBCs 96.2% 21,346.15 1.9 
Scheduled Castes 100% 31,000.00 3.5 
 
Table 9: Dependence on firewood for cooking by caste (n=200). Average income in rupees per year, Rs. 71.4 = US 
$1. Average landholdings in acres. 
 
Of those with gas stoves, all of them also used traditional cookstoves with firewood daily for 
cooking. Regarding land enclosures, 72% of households surveyed said that enclosure of land for 
the GSP impacted their access to firewood. Collecting firewood is a daily task conducted by middle 
and lower-class women, necessary for tasks related to household reproduction like cooking food, 
making tea, cleaning, etc. Firewood is typically collected within the outskirts of the village, in 
areas referred to as “jungle” on government lands. No men are allowed to enter these spaces or 
accompany women on this task because of strict gendered divisions of labor and patriarchal gender 
norms of the villages. Women typically go with 2-6 other women of their same caste to collect 
firewood, at various times of the day depending upon their ability to get away. In addition to 
fuelwood procurement, such activities provide a social activity for women, where women can 
freely express, inter alia, emotions, aspirations and anxieties. As such, these ‘wasteland’ spaces 
are actually emotional geographies wherein women who embody their material and discursive 
realities are able to perform or transcend a range of subjectivities whose expression is limited 
within the patriarchal and caste-based hegemonic spaces they spend most of their days. These are 
fixed social spaces where subjects are able to experiment with the fluidity of caste, gender and 
class-based identities and duties of production and reproduction (Stoler, 1997). When the solar 
park appeared, it directly threatened and reduced women’s social space, displacing the private 
spaces most conducive for female socializing to a few disparate patches of trees in the distance or 
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only on the edges of farmlands owned by family members. This is an example of the spatial 
production of intersectional social differences (Mollett and Faria, 2018). A lower-class Dalit 
woman from Fangli reflected on these changes: “Earlier, we used to move freely on the land where 
the solar park is built. Now, it’s restricted for the collection of cattle feed. Five or ten of us women 
used to go there for cattle grazing. But now with whom are we supposed to go? Now we suffer 
difficulties” (respondent FI.008, 8 March 2018). These lower-class women’s material 
displacement is also ideational, the dispossession of an emotional geography. 
 
When asked to estimate the daily impact of not having access to the vast stretch of ‘wastelands’ 
used to collect Prosopis juliflora and other woody plants for firewood, the average daily time given 
by households surveyed is an additional 1.5 hours (90 minutes) per day spent by women seeking 
firewood from further distances or disparate patches of “jungle” (n=200). Wealthier households 
without gas stoves have begun purchasing firewood from trucks that come through the village. 
Poorer and middle-income (relative to village) are still dependent on foraging for fuelwood. In 
sum, the enclosure of land for the solar park has had a greater impact on the middle-to-lower caste 
and middle-to-lower class women’s ability to access fuelwood. These findings run parallel to 
Birkenholtz’s (2013) findings of lower-caste women spending more “trip hours” for water 
collection in Rajasthan, despite a World Bank water development scheme intended to improve 
access for women. 
 
Since these lower-class and lower-caste women are now excluded from collective spaces rich in 
Prosopis juliflora, water fetching at the communal hand pump has become a task and space 
conducive of female socializing, although not private as it is located in the middle of the village. 
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More affluent households can afford the INR 800 for a water tanker truck to arrive to their homes 
and fill up large drums of 100 gallons or underground tanks. However, water is required for many 
activities central to household production, and most families in Charanka still access water from a 
centrally-located hand pump. Many poorer families wash their clothes in the village lake near the 
Shakti Maata temple in the outermost perimeter of the village. Even according to a Brahmin caste 
woman, occupying a relatively higher caste and class position (her son works as a boss of security 
guards at the solar park), “I fetch water many times a day. It is very crowded, there are many 
women waiting their turn. I have to wait to get water” (personal communication, 14 February 
2018). Resource and livelihood struggles are exacerbated by the solar park. As I demonstrate in 
this paper, affected women express their resistance to the solar park through a “structure of feeling” 
that manifests into an emotional geography of discontent over dispossession (Ramamurthy, 2011; 
Nightingale, 2011; Sultana, 2011). 
 
Adding insult to injury, Mahindra company (operating within the GSP) conducted a corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activity in Spring 2018 by giving each Charanka household a small 
improved cookstove that reduces the smoke produced, thereby reducing women’s exposure to the 
smoke and associated health conditions (i.e. asthma, COPD, lung cancer) associated with years of 
breathing smoke while cooking. However, the cookstove still utilizes firewood and is much smaller 
than most of their other cooking arrangements. All of the women in Charanka consulted by the 
author utilize this stove daily but not for their primary cooking tasks, usually as a supplementary 
cooking surface (personal communication, 7 August 2018). Ironically, CSR activities like this 
improved cookstove perform an empowerment “on paper” that does little to actually empower the 
women dispossessed of land and resources by the solar park. In fact, offering new stoves was an 
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attempt to secure and institutionalize dispossessed women’s support for the solar project (see 
Birkenholtz, 2009). Instead of new stoves, women dispossessed of access to resources should 
receive employment at the solar park, which I discuss below. 
 
4.2. Jangal ma mangal? 
A constant criticism of GPCL and companies within the solar park is that they do not offer 
employment to women. The present study confirms this assertion.  Sixty-three of the 200 
households surveyed had someone employed at the solar park. All but 2 of the 63 households were 
employed in menial labor jobs (i.e. washing solar panels, cutting grass, labor) or security guards. 
To quote a female lower-class Rabari respondent in Charanka, “How can we eat? We cannot find 
jobs at the solar park…We don’t have land. The solar park took our land” (respondent CI.002, 
semi-structured interview, 2/12/18). However, not all government officials see the plight of 
project-adjacent residents so dire, as a project executive at GPCL stationed in Charanka explained 
to me in English: “The people of Charanka need not any employment here. They are all 
businessmen, super rich people. They need no jobs. They live merrily over the interests drawn 
from these crores of rupees” (interview GPCL.001, 22 March 2018). Invoking colonialist tropes 
of modernization (Escobar, 1995), a general manager of GPCL stationed in Gandhinagar echoed 
this man’s sentiments: “That is a backwards area with unusable land. There was no development 
in Charanka before. The solar park has stimulated the local economy. Cash is flowing” (interview 
GPCL.004, 4 March 2018). But not all people in Charanka and adjacent villages experience this 




Among the 4 villages surveyed (n=200), only 6 women worked at the solar park (3 from Charanka, 
3 from Dhokavada). Each were employed washing solar panels and cutting grasses that grow 
underneath the solar arrays, making between INR 200-400 (USD 2.90-5.80) per day, a decent wage 
in these villages. Of the 6 women employed at the solar park, 4 were of the Ahir caste, 1 was 
Muslim and 1 was a Dalit. No Rabari women surveyed and interviewed were employed at the solar 
park. Relative to Muslims and Dalits, the Ahirs occupy a higher caste position but still qualify 
within the government-designated “Other Backward Castes” category. The Dalit woman had 8 
acres enclosed from the solar park and no longer has land to farm, whereas the Ahir women had 
large landholdings previous to the solar park and only had 1 acre enclosed each. Comparatively, 
Ahir women possessed greater household assets (i.e. motorcycle, TV, toilet), agricultural assets 
(i.e. tractor, borewell), livestock (i.e. cow, water buffalo), land holdings (acres) and agricultural 
income (yearly estimate in rupees), all of which were used as proxies for class in this study. The 
assets possessed by these women’s households were statistically average for the villages they lived 
in, indicating the women employed at the solar park tended to be of a relative “middle income” 
status. Relative to their counterparts, the women from the adjacent villages who were employed at 
the solar park for menial jobs (i.e. washing panels, cutting grass) tended to be from a higher caste 
and class position.  
 
A smallholding Rabari woman from Charanka reflected on the lack of jobs at the GSP: “Women 
do herding. If employment at the solar park is increased, women can get jobs and their status can 
improve” (respondent C042, 10 February 2018). Within the village of Charanka, 84% of survey 
respondents said the GSP did not provide new income opportunities (Fangli: 94%; Jamvada: 92%; 
Dhokavada: 98%). As detailed above, an average of 78% of all survey respondents said GSP did 
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not change women’s status in the community. These figures stand in stark contrast to the “on 
paper” empowerment aspirations by public and private institutions associated with the solar park, 
as well as the policy documents that undergird solar development in the state. However, the irony 
of such overinflated claims of empowerment have not been lost on local residents. A well-
respected middle-income Muslim man in the community, who refused to sell his land for the solar 
park, reflected on the park’s influence: “No one knew Charanka before the solar park was built, 
not even those who live in neighboring villages. Now the entire world knows about our village. 
But it’s like jangal ma mangal!” (respondent CI.005, 12 February 2018). The phrase “jangal ma 
mangal”, roughly translates in Gujarati language to “bliss in the jungle”, often used sarcastically 
to ridicule claims of rural development. A landless Dalit male also used the phrase in discussing 
the solar park: “Earlier it was jungle, now it’s mangal!” (respondent CI.004, 12 February 2018). 
Patriarchy may prevent certain willing women from seeking employment at the GSP, but it cannot 
be argued that there are ample opportunities available. Sustainable development in the form of 
solar energy generation has come to this region of Patan, but the distribution of benefits has not 
been equitable (see Yenneti and Day, 2016; Yenneti, Day and Golubchikov, 2016), nor can claims 
of development, or even mangal, be sustained when local producers are actively underdeveloped 
in the process. Next, I discuss contrast the solar park’s female empowerment claims with lived 
experiences of affected women. 
 
4.3. Empowerment: Perceptions, realities and “on paper” 
Rural development, gender-sensitive development and female empowerment have all been central 
concerns identified within policy documents related to climate change adaptation, mitigation and 
vulnerability in India (GoI, 2015; GoG, 2014; UNFCCC, 2012). The GSP boasts a number of 
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“social commitments” for rural upliftment and capacity-building as part of their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) activities, including the temporary employment of unskilled laborers and 
semi-skilled laborers, a teacher training program, a drinking water facility, installation of solar 
streetlights in Charanka and adjacent villages, paved roads, renovation of the local primary school 
and ambulance services for Charanka (MNRE, 2014). Ostensibly, GPCL will also implement a 
“skills development center” targeting adolescents and women, wherein they can develop skills 
related to solar power operations and maintenance for the purpose of improved local employment 
opportunities (Balan, 2014). According to their website “GPCL has initiated some significant 
participatory and non-participatory roles in the areas of upliftment of Women & Child” (GPCL, 
2015). But despite many claims embedded within solar and climate policy, and the promises of 
many institutions associated with GSP to promote the empowerment of women (GPCL, 2015; GoI, 
2015; GoG, 2014; UNFCCC, 2012), residents of adjacent villages had a largely different 
perception of progress towards empowerment, standing in contrast to the aims of project 
developers to secure their subjectivity to project goals. The survey instrument asked each 
household their thoughts on female empowerment, labor roles, status change and livelihoods 
change (see Table 10, questions 1 and 2, for examples). When asked how the solar park has 
impacted women’s status, the average response of households was “remained the same” (Table 
10, question 3). Contrary to institutional claims of female empowerment, residents of adjacent 
villages do not feel that the solar park and associated social development programs have changed 











Question 1: Has the presence of the solar 
park in the community changed women’s 
labor roles within their specific 
livelihoods? 
Village Yes No 
Charanka 16% 84% 
Fangli 10% 90% 
Jamvada 0% 100% 




























Table 10: Questions asked to survey respondents (n=200) regarding perceptions of female empowerment. Likert 
scores represent village averages, on a scale from 1=diminished greatly, 3=remained the same, 5=improved greatly.
Question 2: Has the presence of the solar 
park in the community changed women’s 
status in the community?  
Village Yes No 
Charanka 22% 78% 
Fangli 32% 68% 
Jamvada 16% 84% 
Dhokavada 24% 76% 
Question 3: How has the solar park 
impacted women's status in your village? 







One of the CSR activities conducted by GPCL to promote female empowerment was a one-off 
training that focuses on “Enhanced skills of women residing in the villages nearby Solar Park, 
Charanka by providing them training of needle work, patch work etc.” (GPCL, 2015). In early 
2014 (January-March), GPCL paid the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) INR 
1,038,000 (roughly USD 15,043) to conduct a training for 20 women in Charanka and 20 women 
in nearby Fangli village (n=40) to learn traditional needlework and embroidery techniques for 
making traditional women’s clothing of the Patan region under SEWA’s flagship Hansiba 
program, including sewing and patchwork (SEWA, 2015). Of the 20 participants in Charanka 
village, 8 were of the Rajput categorization (Thakor, Rathod), 9 were “Other Backward Castes” 
(Ayar, Gadhvi) and 3 were Muslims. Despite a sizeable Rabari population in Charanka, none of 
them were participants in this scheme. Eighteen of the 20 participants in Fangli were Ahirs from 
the “Other Backward Castes” designation, 1 from the Rajput categorization (Jadeja) and 1 Brahmin 
participant (Joshi). Most of the Ahir women were of middle-class status and one of the Rajput 
families was of higher-class status. The average class-position of CSR participants was “middle-
to-high,” based upon the attendance list corroborated with my survey data. The project’s entire 
duration was three months, including a one-month training. Women could sell the embroidery 
work they made, but most of them kept it within the family for when the younger girls get married 
and join their in-laws’ house (personal communication, 10 April 2018). Presently, only a few of 
the women trained in these techniques still remain affiliated with SEWA and none of the women 
trained maintain an affiliation with GPCL’s other CSR activities. 
 
However, GPCL’s efforts to secure dispossessed women’s subjectivity to the aims of the solar 
park through this CSR activity was largely unsuccessful. The author met with two employees of 
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SEWA who reside in nearby Dhokavada village, both of relative middle-class status and of the 
Ahir caste. One of the SEWA women, who lived her entire life in Dhokavada, had no knowledge 
of the aforementioned CSR projects with SEWA. When asked about the impact of GPCL’s claims 
of the “upliftment of women and children” (GPCL, 2015), she laughingly responded, “There is no 
female empowerment” (respondent D035, 23 May 2018). After a long pause, she reflected more 
on the nature of work at the solar park: “People who work at the solar park get a low salary anyway. 
People like the head or contractor get good money. They are doing corruption. The solar park 
doesn't give jobs much. The salary is low or sometimes people don't get their salary” (respondent 
D035, 23 May 2018). Another SEWA-employed Ahir woman from Dhokavada applied to GPCL 
to work at the solar park several times, but they did not respond. She even traveled to GPCL 
headquarters in the Udhyog Bhavan region of Gandhinagar to seek employment, but agency 
representatives refused to meet with her. Reflecting on GPCL’s claims of female empowerment 
through one-off CSR activities, she stated, “How can women’s status improve? They don’t give 
women jobs at the solar park. I don’t support them” (respondent D048, 25 May 2018). In addition 
to the lack of opportunities for women, corroborating a general consensus among many survey and 
interview respondents, this woman spoke about the lack of jobs for locals: “People from out of 
state or a different city get more jobs at the solar park. Local village people do not get many jobs 
there” (respondent D048, 25 May 2018). Responding in English, a college-educated large-
landholding Gadhvi male identified, “We still require basic amenities from the government. 
Around 30 big companies operate here in solar park. They are earning handsomely from the solar 
park. We only say that they should give at least 1% to 5% of their profit for the welfare of the 
village. They can invest this as CSR activity, and there is a clause as well. The company has to 
return some benefit to the local community. But such a clause remains on paper only. The ground 
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reality is altogether different” (respondent CI.001, 12 February 2018). Thus, it seems the case for 
“off paper” development of GSP-adjacent villages is paper thin. Ostensibly, empowerment is 
reserved for those enjoying “middle-to-high” class positionality and a relatively higher caste 
positionality. 
 
In concluding the discussion on CSR activities conducted in the region, GPCL discusses future 
CSR activities envisioned for the region: “In the immediate future, we intend to widen our scope 
towards the development & strengthening of girl child [sic].” (GPCL, 2015). Adding confusion to 
their commitment to the goal of institutionalizing dispossessed women’s subjectivity to the 
neoliberal governance of solar infrastructure, GPCL rejected a 2015 proposal from SEWA for 
childcare-related CSR activities and a female hygiene training seminar in Charanka, as well as a 
2017 proposal for a CSR activity to distribute school uniforms to school-aged girls in Charanka 
and surrounding villages (personal communication with SEWA, 10 April 2018). The hollow 
claims of female empowerment by developers and companies within the GSP echo other climate 
change adaptation and vulnerability discourses from government officials that homogenize women 
and essentialize their social vulnerability. As the above examples reveal, female empowerment 
and ‘gender positive’ development through the GSP exists ‘on paper’ only. 
 
5. Discussion 
In rural South Asia, natural resource management and sustainable development projects have a 
long history of reproducing existing asymmetric social power relations and social differentiation, 
even when meeting some of their intended goals (Birkenholtz, 2013; Birkenholtz, 2016; Levien, 
2013; Sultana, 2011; Truelove, 2011; Mehta, 2009; Baviskar, 2004; Hardiman, 2006). The GSP 
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follows in this long genealogy (see Yenneti, Day and Golubchikov, 2016), perhaps even an 
extension of colonial and imperial logics of, inter alia, territory, hegemony, patriarchy and 
racialization (see Robbins, 2006; Bumpus and Liverman, 2010; Butler, 2015; Ramusack and 
Burton, 1994; Escobar, 1995). The solar park schemes emerge within the context of a globally 
ascendant neoliberalism in the Anthropocene, as an urgent response to global environmental 
change largely caused by developed nations of the Global North. These large-scale infrastructure 
projects built to “modernize” and decarbonize emerging economies like India’s receive funding 
from many development agencies (i.e. Asian Development Bank, World Bank, Clinton Climate 
Initiative) and capital firms mandated to reduce emissions (GETCO, 2011; GPCL, 2011), with 
resource-dependent women bearing the true cost of decarbonization. 
 
In this paper, I demonstrate how a solar park exacerbates the gendered social, economic and 
political asymmetries of adjacent villages. Configurations of land, labor and social schemes related 
to the solar park, imbued with its own gender ideologies, (re)produces subject-positions that 
intersect to reinforce social power at the village scale. Intersectional subject-positions that are 
(re)produced vis-à-vis the exclusion of access to firewood in the land enclosed for the solar park, 
lack of employment and exclusionary CSR activities produces both inter- and intra-village 
emotional geographies that cut across caste, class and gender boundaries. Lower-caste and lower-
class women embody their spatial and discursive dislocation (see Sultana, 2011; Nightingale, 
2011; Stevenson et al, 2013; Davidson and Bondi, 2004; Davidson, Bondi and Smith, 2005; Smith 
et al, 2009; Doshi, 2017). Complimenting the work of Ramamurthy (2011), these lower-class and 
marginal caste women reflect upon their own perplexing positionality within smallholder 
capitalism (cf. Stock et al, 2019), embodying these contradictions via a “structure of feeling.” In 
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addition to embodiment (see Longhurst, 1997; Moss and Dyck, 2003) and the production of 
emotional geographies these groups are demonstrating agency and resistance in the face of yet 
another rural transformation that leaves them behind (see Zanotti, 2012; Yaka, 2017). 
 
The present policy discourses of ‘gender positive’ project design, combined with female 
empowerment pledges by institutions associated with the GSP harken back to earlier eras of gender 
and development paradigms: focusing on gender roles but not inclusive of women in Women in 
Development (WID) (Ramamurthy, 2000b); ignoring the role of men in Women and Development 
(WAD); obscuring power relations in Women, Environment and Development (WED) (Leach, 
2007; Resurreccion and Elmhirst, 2008); naturalizing male-female binaries and women’s 
closeness to nature in ecofeminism (Shiva, 2010); ignoring race and other subject positions in 
Gender and Development (GAD) approaches (Arora-Jonsson, 2014). These discourses are 
embedded in colonial logics of modernization and racialization (Escobar, 2005; Mollett, 2017), 
tropes of the vulnerable third world woman abound. Further, these divergent gender discourses 
create a “grid of intelligibility” upon which additional empowerment claims are pledged through 
policy and project implementation and outcomes by policymakers uncritical of past development 
mistakes, making the unintended consequences of further subjugation of these populations all but 
guaranteed.  
 
As this study shows, efforts to “mainstream” gender concerns in policy and project documents that 
enable the GSP to generate solar energy fail to truly empower lower-caste and lower-class women 
(cf. Arora-Jonsson, 2014; Bock, 2015). Essentializing gender-based difference serves the interests 
of government agencies, companies operating within the solar park (i.e. Tata Power, Roha Energy) 
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and other agencies who have supported this project (i.e. Asian Development Bank, Clinton Climate 
Initiative) uninterested in fundamentally restructuring modes of production by which they accrue 
surplus value and redistributing power and material resources, beginning with historically 
marginalized populations upon whose land and labor such profitable climate mitigation projects 
operate. By ignoring the power relations of intersectional subjectivities (i.e. gender, caste, class), 
development interventions like solar parks may miscalculate gender-based vulnerabilities or, 
worse still, reproduce them. Putting this study in conversation with the history of gender and 
development, I hope this case study builds upon other FPE postcolonial intersectional approaches 
to understand power relations in the context of international development, rural transformations, 
energy transitions and ecological change in the Global South. 
  
6. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates how a solar park in Western India influences social, economic and 
political asymmetries through the discursive production and intersection of gender and other forms 
of social difference (see Butler, 1990). Conceptually, this research utilizes an FPE postcolonial 
intersectional approach to analyze the social dimensions of the Gujarat Solar Park. Specifically, 
gender, caste and class-based subject-positions enable or disable opportunities for employment at 
the solar park, dependence upon foraging for fuelwood in landscapes now enclosed for the park, 
and participation in solar companies’ CSR activities. GPCL deploys CSR activities as a technology 





Identifying the many ways in which rural lower-caste and lower-class women are dispossessed of 
accessing natural resources by the GSP is important because India is modernizing rapidly without 
tangible advances in rural women’s social status. Indisputably, India needs to make a swift low-
carbon transition in a herculean effort to mitigate rapidly advancing climate change. At the time 
of writing, the Government of India plans to develop 25 more solar parks within the next few years 
requiring large-scale land acquisitions which will undoubtedly have differential impacts 
throughout these rural spaces based on subject position (see Behrman et al, 2012). With India in a 
leading role at the International Solar Alliance (UNEP, 2018), global solar development will 
replicate large-scale, top-down solar energy configurations, thereby reproducing gendered social 
differentiation with place-based permutations, eclipsing ‘gender positive’ guarantees. As these 
solar parks encroach further into productive wastelands and become more profitable, marginalized 
populations should be ensured equal benefit. Institutions harvesting photons should not prevent 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
“Today, when the energy sources and excesses of our industrial age have put our planet in peril, the world must turn 
to Sun to power our future.” (Prime Minister Narendra Modi, 30 November 2015) 
 
“(When someone suggests to you a solution for escaping an impasse, you can be almost sure that he is ceasing to 
understand, assuming that he had understood anything up to that point.)” (Derrida, 1993: 32) 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. “We have not interacted with local people” 
Traversing the identical rectilinear rows of solar arrays can be disorienting. Their ambient 
temperature is enough to unravel a field day’s seamless interview itinerary. And yet, this heat 
generated by the sun is our best hope of slowing the pace of rising temperatures globally. Cooling 
off in the shade of a humming shed of inverters (Figure 15), solar engineer Viramkumar25 leans 
over and lowers his sunglasses. “For solar parks, sunlight is a free source. It is accessible to 
everyone and it is perennial. In India, even now there are many villages which do not have power. 
Hence, there is a lot of demand of power” (interview GK.004, 16 June 2018). Squinting my eyes, 
I can see the village of Gani far off in the distance, a veritable sacrifice zone for sustainable 
development in Andhra Pradesh. “Electricity is being made available to every household in local 
villages. If they are complaining, I am not aware of it.” He took a slight pause and then looked 
down at his steel-toed work boots. “But we have not interacted with local people,” he clarified in 
English.  
 
                                                          




Figure 15: Viramkumar posing in front of a solar inverter. (Photo: Ryan Stock) 
******* 
As this dissertation demonstrates, solar parks are promoted as positively “transforming the lives” 
of local people. Regardless of good intentions, solar park development involves dispossession of 
land, transformation of livelihoods, and the (re)production of intersectional social differences. The 
angry farmer from Sakunala, mentioned in the Introduction’s vignette, exemplifies the 
sociopolitical frictions caused by solar parks. As Viramkumar admits and my interviews with 
bureaucrats corroborate, solar park developers don’t interact with local people like him. As such, 
many developers remain unaware or uninterested in the accompanying social impacts in adjacent 
villages. Even if Viramkumar and other similarly situated solar engineers committed to interacting 
with peasants like the angry farmer from Sakunala, it is unlikely they would have the power or 
154 
 
influence to reverse his dispossession. Those with more power and influence than Viramkumar are 
beholden to the financial and political exigencies of offsetting carbon dioxide, irrespective of land 
constraints and local injustices. It is toward these critical tradeoffs to which I now turn. 
 
1.2. Navigating the Aporia of Solar Development 
“We cannot not desire development.” (Wainwright, 2008: 10) 
 
Humankind in the era of the Anthropocene is at a critical impasse. I believe solar development is 
necessary. I cannot discount the ability of such large-scale renewable energy infrastructures to 
decarbonize the electricity grid with sufficient speed and scale. Indeed, it may be the only way 
India can meet its Paris Agreement commitments in time. However, the modalities of solar park 
development do not reflect a “just” transition to renewable energy. Effectively, I find myself 
occupying an aporia, defined cumbersomely as “the difficult or the impracticable, here the 
impossible, passage, the refused, denied, or prohibited passage, indeed the nonpassage, which can 
in fact be something else, the event of a coming or of a future advent, no longer has the form of 
the movement that consists in passing, traversing, or transiting” (Derrida, 1993: 8). This aporia has 
animated this dissertation research, analysis and writing. 
 
The asymmetric power relations of development interventions, some of which are explored in this 
dissertation, complicate “good intentions” to improve lives. Development itself is rightly 
considered an aporia, imploring us to consider “radical critique” (Wainwright, 2008). I recognize 
that the “climate crisis” is, indeed, a truly unfathomable and a regrettable disruption in planetary 
processes. Further, the fates of human beings on a rapidly changing planet are highly heterogenous, 
dependent upon one’s positionality. Yet solutions for the climate crisis (i.e. solar parks) can create 
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new problems or reproduce old ones. I cannot defensibly banish large-scale solar infrastructure to 
the postcolonial pyre as nothing more than the current iteration in a long genealogy of rural 
development schemes that reproduce marginality and dispossession. And yet can decentralized, 
community-based solar cooperatives aggregate enough mega-wattage in time to transition the 
Indian energy grid away from fossil fuels before these study villages are cooked to inhabitability? 
Pace Wainwright (2008), I cannot not desire [solar] development. Knowing what is at stake, I 
accept my role as a critical geographer to help navigate through this dark aporia to illuminate paths 
to empowerment for many of my respondents and friends in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh. This 
dissertation was my attempt to shed light on the (un)intended consequences of solar park 
development in India and the myriad ways that the people most negatively affected are fighting 
back. Below, I will retrace my steps by providing summaries of each chapter. 
 
2. Chapter Summaries 
I began my exploration of solar park development in chapter 4 with a discourse analysis of 
technical and policy documents related to solar energy and climate change in general. Here, I drew 
on Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) theory of discursive formation to examine the following question: 
How are solar development and project-associated land enclosures discursively rationalized by 
the state? Methodologically, I utilized critical discourse analysis to deconstruct the 
power/knowledge and politics of knowledge surrounding solar park development and climate 
policy in India. I corroborated the discourse analysis with fieldwork findings from household 
surveys and semi-structured interviews. I advanced previous investigations by identifying specific 
discursive formations (i.e. climate and energy crises, economic development and ecological 
modernization) that are used to promote and rationalize a techno-managerial approach to solar 
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development. Solar parks are promoted as solutions to the “climate crisis” and concerns related to 
energy security, but they have not effectively reduced energy insecurities of adjacent communities. 
Solar park project developers court private finance by touting regional economic development, a 
mirage revealed by fieldwork data of countless peasants denied employment and dispossessed of 
land. Further, discourses of ecological modernization reproduce neocolonial tropes of rural 
populations in need of development. In the context of neoliberal India, the solutions identified and 
the projects developed do not address asymmetric power relations between peasants and the state. 
I conclude by determining these discursive formations comprise a deus ex machina that 
rationalizes a more sustainable form of capital accumulation in neoliberal India through top-down, 
large-scale solar park development. 
 
Chapter 5 explored accumulation by dispossession in the context of solar park development as 
well as modalities of resistance by affected peasants. Specifically, this chapter sought to answer 
the following research questions: 1) How and through what processes are the costs and benefits 
of the Gujarat Solar Park and Kurnool Solar Park distributed across differently situated 
individuals? 2) How are project-associated land enclosures resisted by adjacent resource-
dependent people? Methodologically, I conducted household surveys and semi-structured 
interviews to answer these questions. Utilizing the Gujarat Solar Park and the Kurnool Solar Park 
as case studies, I demonstrate that the solar park project developers leveraged fuzzy ‘wasteland’ 
classifications and highly contested land acquisition laws to purchase or seize land. There is a wide 
fluctuation in payments offered and received, as well as land titling arrangements involved in this 
process. Peasants interviewed and surveyed in these villages overwhelmingly feel as if their 
economic position is more precarious after the solar park arrived. My research also demonstrates 
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the occurrence of energy dispossessions, insofar as adjacent villages are experiencing the same 
irregularity of electricity availability combined with higher cost per kilowatt-hour. Despite 
promises that one individual per each household would receive gainful employment at the solar 
parks, most remain unemployed and now landless. In doing so, the solar parks created a surplus 
population that isn’t being absorbed into the new solar economy, a partial proletarianization of the 
peasantry. However, dispossessed peasants are not passive victims. Many express resistance 
through slander, protests, road blockages, storming the gates of the Collectorate Office, even 
suicide. The findings of this chapter reestablish the urgency of responding to the classical agrarian 
question in the context of low-carbon energy transitions. 
 
In chapter 6, I decided to take an even deeper investigation into the sociocultural impacts of solar 
park development by looking into the differential impacts of land enclosure for the Gujarat Solar 
Park. The impetus of this chapter was to answer the following question: Does the Gujarat Solar 
Park influence already gendered social-economic-political asymmetries? Utilizing fieldwork data 
obtained from household surveys and semi-structured interviews, I show how resource-dependent 
women from surrounding villages, largely from Charanka and Fangli villages, are 
disproportionately affected. Lack of access to firewood and grazing lands has (re)produced social 
marginality. On average, poorer women from these villages have to travel 1.2 additional hours 
daily in search of firewood. Additionally, the so-called wasteland spaces that are now cordoned 
off for the solar park were emotional geographies, wherein women fetching firewood could 
express themselves, experimenting with the fixity and fluidity of caste, class and gender. Enclosure 
of these spaces is yet another dimension of dispossession for these women. Survey respondents 
from GSP adjacent villages do not feel as if the solar park has changed women’s status. On the 
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contrary, many lamented how the solar park does not hire women. Of the few women who did 
receive jobs at the GSP, they tended to be from a relative higher class and caste positionality than 
others in the village. These perceptions and experiences stand in stark contrast to empowerment 
claims made by the solar park project developer, whose mission statement includes female 
empowerment. The institution did host a one-time corporate social responsibility scheme of 
teaching traditional embroidery to village women, but those included were of relative higher class 
and caste status, thereby reproducing marginality for the resource-dependent women who were 
most negatively impacted by the solar park’s enclosure of land. The larger irony is that female 
disempowerment is the outcome of multiple policy frameworks under which the solar parks 
operate (i.e. Paris Agreement, Kyoto Protocol, State Action Plan on Climate Change) that mandate 
‘gender positive’ development outcomes. The findings of this chapter demonstrate the emergence 
of intersectional social differences from the solar parks and associated social development 
schemes. 
 
3. Contributions to Literature 
This dissertation is a political ecology of solar park development. As such, I draw heavily on 
scholarship within the field of political ecology to inform my research and assist with data analysis. 
Further, this dissertation contributes to debates and advances scholarship within the fields of 
critical agrarian studies (RQ 2 and 3, chapter 5), feminist political ecology (RQ 4, chapter 6) and 
critical development studies (RQ 1, chapter 4). By taking a granular approach to studying agrarian 
transformation in the context of solar development, I hope my findings inform and complicate 
discussions on agrarian political economy, the agrarian question, peasant resistance and 
proletarianization. This dissertation also attempts to contribute to the field of feminist political 
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ecology. I do so by exploring the gender dimensions of solar park development, embodied 
affectivities and emotional geographies of impacted women, asymmetries of access to resources 
and employment at the solar parks, and intersectional subjectivities within multi-scalar structures 
of power. I also attempt to advance scholarship within the field of critical development studies by 
identifying the discursive power and dispossessive materialities of renewable energy projects 




On April 22, 2016, India signed the UN Paris Climate Agreement to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions. Pledging to quadruple its renewable power capacity to 175 gigawatts by 2022, India 
will increasingly use JNNSM solar parks to achieve this goal. As the impacts of climate change 
become more severe and more frequent in Indian social systems and infrastructure, billions of 
dollars will be invested by multilateral institutions and civil society organizations on carbon 
mitigation, helping target populations adapt to climate variability, and reducing the risk of those 
identified as vulnerable to the natural hazards exacerbated by climate change. Indeed, billions of 
dollars have already been spent in developing large-scale centralized solar infrastructure, discussed 
in chapters 2 and 5. As documented in this dissertation, solar parks have become India’s phalanx 
against the climate crisis. Their rapid consecutive roll-out of ultra-mega solar parks is outpacing 
their ambitious national emission reductions targets established through the Paris Agreement. But 
this is India’s geopolitical moment and leading by example is not enough. By marshalling the full 
weight of the International Solar Alliance (ISA), India has established itself as the global authority 
of solar development in the Global South. The processes identified in this dissertation will likely 
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be magnified and reproduced elsewhere in the nation in similar disinvested rural spaces. With 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi steering the ISA, the regimes of dispossession and the production 
of intersectional social differences identified in this dissertation may be latitudinally spread 
between the Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn. With ambitions to become the OPEC of 
solar (Mohan, 2018) and financial backing from the World Bank, the ISA will henceforth secure 
a hegemonic control of solar development in the Global South that preserves geopolitical power 
structures, all but guaranteeing centralized, techno-managerial and top-down solar projects. In 
October 2018, Prime Minister Modi revealingly told the ISA assembly, “Our dream is one world, 
one sun, one grid.” A global solar cartel is precisely the political economic infrastructure necessary 
for a rapidly assembling climate leviathan to have unequivocal authority to respond to the climate 
crisis (Wainwright and Mann, 2018).  
 
The social dimensions of such a headlong lunge into sustainable development remain largely 
unexamined. This dissertation’s intellectual merit lies in its multi-scalar qualitative approach to 
comparing solar parks’ impacts on poverty and resource access along axes of social difference. 
Through empirically grounded and historically informed social science research,  this project’s 
findings will deepen the understanding of scholars, activists, and policy makers about the 
sociopolitical dimensions of sustainable development interventions like the GSP and KSP. 
Additionally, the significance of this study may be revealed as even larger solar parks are 
constructed. The April 2018 announcement of the 5000 MW Dholera Solar Park, to be built on 
11,000 acres of land near the Gulf of Khambat in Gujarat state to service the emerging Dholera 
Special Investment Region, will eclipse all existing and planned solar parks in the nation by a 
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factor of two. May this “hatchet” of a political ecology also function in reverse, planting new 
“seeds” of praxis in other solar sites in the Global South. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Promoted globally as a success story, Indian solar parks represent a deus ex machina that resolves 
the challenges presented by climate change in concord with the neoliberal political economy, 
reorganizing rural geographies for capital accumulation in urban industrial and financial centers. 
In doing so, smallholding farmers and agropastoralists are dispossessed of land and livelihoods. 
Despite claims of female empowerment by solar park developers and mandates of ‘gender 
positive’ outcomes by policy frameworks under which these solar parks operate, women in 
adjacent villages are disproportionately impacted. By cordoning off vast stretches of public 
‘wastelands’ for the parks, lower-caste and lower-class women are prevented from accessing the 
most productive spaces for firewood collection. But many affected peasants are resisting solar park 
development. Following Levien (2018), I conclude that the GSP and KSP are cases of climate 
mitigation via dispossession without development and uneven development. 
 
Amitav Ghosh (2017) identified humankind’s inability to comprehend and confront climate 
change as the great derangement. However, India is attempting to do this through solar park 
development, albeit with profound sociopolitical frictions for adjacent residents. Are we just 
ameliorating the great derangement with sustainable derangement? Only time will tell. But 
Viramkumar’s hushed confession provides a clue; if policymakers don’t interact with local people 
and policymaking processes don’t benefit local people, like the angry farmer from Sakunala, the 
light of Solar India is a mirage that obscures the long-established circuits of capital. By occupying 
162 
 
the aporia of solar development, this dissertation is my attempt to document the ire of the 
dispossessed to illuminate paths of empowerment. Moving forward, solar park developers and 
affiliated institutions that draft and adjudicate solar-based renewable energy policies should 
consider the below policy recommendations. 
 
6. Policy Recommendations 
The following recommendations represent first attempts to establish guidelines for more equitable 
solar policy. They are written broadly and include general suggestions. Specific details will need 
to be worked out. May these recommendations spark conversations among stakeholders and 
change agents, leading to the careful elaboration of concrete policy alternatives to dispossessive 
solar parks like the GSP and KSP. 
 
1. All lands obtained for solar development must be paid for in full prior to their transfer to solar 
park developers. All lands obtained must be offered the same price, irrespective of the 
buyer/seller’s positionality within local axes of social power. Block Development Officers and 
officials from the Revenue Department must absolve signed consent decrees that were 
finalized under dubious circumstances. All lands expropriated without payment must be 
repatriated. Further, all assigned lands that were expropriated without payment must be 
repatriated.  
 
2. Electricity generated at the solar parks must be routed directly to adjacent villages, upon whose 
land the project was built. Presently, electricity produced is being re-routed away from adjacent 
villages and circulated around the region, before eventually returning to the villages.  As a 
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result, households are experiencing blackouts and poor connectivity. Rural electrification 
should not be defined by improving urban electrification through the capture of rural 
electricity. Households who gave land for the solar parks should be provided free electricity 
by the electricity distribution company for the entire lifespan of the parks. 
 
3. Households whose lands have been purchased or expropriated for solar park development 
should be guaranteed jobs at the solar park in perpetuity, subject to an annual review. Jobs 
granted should be dignified, paying more than daily agricultural wages, and should provide 
opportunities for additional training, education and promotion through the institution for whom 
they are working. Washing the solar panels, cutting the grass that grows underneath, and 
making tea do not constitute the caliber of employment that lead to true empowerment and 
economic improvement of local residents. Solar park developers should coordinate with 
companies operating in the solar park to offer and maintain the employment of this population. 
SECI should hold solar park developers accountable to ensure that this occurs and routinely 
audit to ensure this process remains effective. 
 
4. As an alternative to large-scale solar parks, SECI should empower state-based solar developers 
to establish community-based solar micro-grids that are cooperatively owned. A successful 
model to replicate is the Dhundi Solar Energy Producers’ Cooperative Society in Kheda 
district, Gujarat. Once established, such micro-grid cooperatives must not disqualify residents 




5. Financial assistance awarded to solar development by national and state agencies, as well as 
by multilateral institutions or development agencies (i.e. UNFCCC, International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, Asian Development Bank) must be disbursed directly to newly-formed 
solar cooperatives. SECI will be beholden to assisting these local initiatives reach financial 
stability and access resources necessary to continue operations. Further, elected heads of these 
solar cooperatives shall be recognized as authorities of solar development and should be 
extended all professional opportunities and courtesies by the aforementioned international 
agencies to consult and participate in events and initiatives pertaining to solar development. 
 
6. SECI needs to establish concrete policy mechanisms to ensure that the aspirations of solar 
policy will enable positive livelihood change. As such, there must be quarterly independent 
audits of each solar company’s operations on the ground, including the inspection of the 
treatment of workers and impact on local communities. Additionally, there must be quarterly 
independent audits of each solar company’s declared corporate social responsibility schemes. 
If solar companies’ neglect to fulfill their commitment to social and economic development of 
adjacent villages, there must be a tax levied against each company that in violation, 
commensurate with mega-watts generated and financial holdings of the company. 
 
7. Skill-building and training centers need to be established in every village wherein land was 
given to the solar park by the park developers. Every household who gave land to the solar 
park must be provided an opportunity to be trained in the technical skill-sets necessary to 
occupy a well-paying job at the solar park. These centers should only offer space to people 
from outside of the villages once all eligible villagers have been sufficiently trained. This 
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would address the skills gap in the local workforce, as well as extending job opportunities to 
farmers who can no longer farm, due to vast land enclosures. Each company operating in the 
solar park should be involved in training the local population at this skills center. 
 
8. Water made available for the solar park to clean the solar panels must also be made available 
for farmers in adjacent villages wherein land was enclosed for the park. “Water grabbing” for 
solar energy should not further impede local agriculture. In the event that the solar park does 
not draw from any canals, dams or rivers, sourcing 100% of water for cleaning the solar arrays 
from water ponds established on-site, then local farmers should be provided direct lines to a 
geographically-proximate water source by the local water utility. Given water scarcity in the 
solar regions, SECI should allocate funds for each solar park to provide “tankers” of drinking 
water for each village wherein land was taken for the solar park. 
 
9. Each newly constructed solar park must undergo a vigorous and inclusive public consultation 
process in local villages with residents. This process must extend beyond conversations with 
the Panchayati Raj Institutions and must be open to the public, held in locations of the village 
and times of the day amenable for residents to attend. Further, local residents of each village 
wherein land will be enclosed for the solar park must be allowed to participate in all decision-
making processes regarding solar park development. Project developers must heed the decision 
of local residents, irrespective of monies previously earmarked or invested in the project. 
 
10. Commitment to gender equity for solar development must be realized. Local women who 
desire employment at the solar park must be offered dignified and equitably-remunerated 
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employment at the solar park without prejudice to their gender, caste and class positionality. 
Additionally, CSR activities targeting local women should be preferential to women from 
marginal castes and of lower-class status. Further, workplace cultures and practices of toxic 
masculinity must be addressed through stringent consequences for perpetrators, thorough 
sensitization training and education for current employees and managers, and independent and 
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